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Winter 1990–91

Bruce Russett — Doves, Hawks, and U.S. Public Opinion

Paul E. Peterson — The Rise and Fall of Special Interest Politics

Jerome Slater — The Superpowers and an Arab-Israeli Political Settlement

Ethan B. Kapstein — The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System

Paul F. Diehl — Ghosts of Arms Control Past

Howard Tolley, Jr. — Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human Rights

Book Reviews

Title Page and Index to Volume 105

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Postmaster—Send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, N.Y. 10115-0012.

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index.* Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci,* the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Urban Affairs Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life.* Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index,* and *Book Review Digest.* A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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Number 4
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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

BRUCE RUSSETT uses public opinion polls to illustrate some of the ways in which popular attitudes moderate the extreme positions of elites on national security policy.

PAUL E. PETERSON identifies the way in which budget summits have worked to the advantage of interests closely identified with the two major political parties and to the disadvantage of more specialized interests.

JEROME SLATER reviews the U.S.-Soviet negotiations for an Arab-Israeli political settlement during the cold war. He argues that the record demonstrates surprisingly that the Soviet Union sought a genuine political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict since the late 1960s, and that the U.S. policy of excluding the Soviets from the Middle East thwarted opportunities to reach such a settlement.

ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN discusses the rise and fall of the Brazilian weapons production industry. He argues that the industry's growth in the 1970s and 1980s was due to a propitious set of circumstances in the international economic security environments. Changes in these environments in the 1990s, however, are likely to constrain the industry's future development.

PAUL F. DIEHL analyzes the impact that the SALT II treaty had on Reagan administration arms control policy during the period 1981–1984. Using an agenda-setting model, he argues that SALT II had only a lingering impact on policy formulation, most often as a negative precedent.

HOWARD TOLLEY, JR. examines the litigation strategies of human rights public interest lawyers challenging judicial restraint. He concludes that frequent losses and occasional victories depend heavily on factors beyond the litigators' immediate control—support by executive agencies and the political orientation of the deciding judge.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Doves, Hawks, and U.S. Public Opinion

BRUCE RUSSETT

A bitter debate has long raged between self-styled "realist" observers of international relations and "idealists" (sometimes called "transnationalists"). These contending perspectives are similar, though not identical, to popular distinctions between hawks and doves, and between conservatives and liberals. Such distinctions are simplistic and obscure a more complex multidimensional pattern,[1] but they represent a useful first cut.

At first blush such polarities seem to represent views of irreconcilable principles, fundamentally opposed views of human nature and of the right way to order world affairs or political life in general. Yet most people incorporate some aspects of each opposing view rather than epitomize the extreme points on these spectra. This is true both of academic theorists and of ordinary citizens. The mix between the two views in any particular individual's head and in the collective body politic determines the range of acceptable action open to political leaders. Leaders may try to expand their freedom of action by persuading much of the public to shift its mixture of acceptable policy in one direction or the other. A great leader will actually do that. But the leader's ability to shift opinion is rarely great. Rather, the maneuvering space is restricted chiefly to the range of actions already deemed

[1] Ole Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Domestic and Foreign Policy Belief Systems among American Leaders," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (June 1988): 248–294; Eugene Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990.

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acceptable. That range has been defined differently for different leaders and has changed over time.

The Range of Acceptable Options

For the hard-headed realist, world politics is a struggle for power, a competition between independent nation-states wherein a state that fails to pursue its self-interest in a tough-minded manner thereby risks its security and even its sovereignty. Since there is no superior government to enforce peace, each state must look out for itself and maintain a favorable balance of power. The idealist, by contrast, insists that competition is not all, that even adversarial states must often cooperate in order to achieve their goals. Many interests are common rather than competing; states must cooperate to provide a basis for international trade and finance, and enemies usually have shared interests in avoiding wars and severe arms races.

On the hawk-dove spectrum, hawks emphasize competitive elements, the need to keep up one's military strength to deter war; also they are ready to use that strength periodically in order to defend their own sphere of interest and to reduce the adversary's. Their favorite historical analogy is Munich and the appeasement of 1938. Hawks talk about how "our" interests differ from "theirs" and of the need to maintain the separateness, the borders, between us and them. Doves reply with words about the need for cooperation to avoid war and the risks of provoking the adversary. They prefer negotiations for arms control and disarmament to reliance on unilateral action. Their favorite historical analogy is likely to be 1914, when arguably the major powers stumbled into a massively destructive war that none of them really wanted. Doves speak of connectedness, the need to find common ground and a community of interests transcending national borders.

Modern-day conservatives laud the possibilities of individual action by persons and, internationally, by nations acting alone. Political liberals decry unfettered individualism as destroying natural bonds of community and mutual aid.

At their extremes, all these characterizations are caricatures. Each has a bit of the truth. States and individuals do compete, and cooperate. War is a risk; sometimes it arises from unrestrained aggression and sometimes from fear or desperation. Political leaders may start from one side or another of these spectra, but soon find that in the realities of world politics they must incorporate elements of both in their actions. They also soon discover that most of their constituents are not to be found at either end, and that to retain political support a leader must in some way combine the rhetoric as well as the reality of both sides. The successful mixture will vary over time and circumstance; more than one mixture may work for any given circumstance. Yet no leader can ignore the need to find a mix of practical realism tailored to perceptions of that leader's particular strengths and weaknesses. The public opinion evidence for this during the cold war era is very strong; necessarily more fragmentary evidence for the last two or three years nevertheless indicates its continuing relevance. This article uses material from United

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States political opinion, but similar conclusions apply to other established democratic political systems.[2]

Leaders may recognize that in many instances members of the public are willing to accept any of several alternative policies in pursuit of a general goal like peace and security. One of the clearest examples is the range of policy options that were approved during the early years of the Vietnam war. Majorities could be found for bombing North Vietnam (but not China) and sending more U.S. troops, but also for negotiation and even allowing Viet Cong participation in the South Vietnamese government. Americans may have been muddled or inconsistent in so doing. Or they may have been expressing a desire to end the war, not necessarily by a clear-cut victory, and in effect giving the government a broad mandate to choose among various means to achieve that goal. Either tough or conciliatory actions, taken in moderation and appropriately timed by the government, would meet with approval by a majority. As it was, President Lyndon Johnson chose to move primarily in the direction of military action, but if the survey data are to be believed, alternatively he could have built support for a negotiated settlement.[3]

Much the same conclusions follow from the evidence for at least a short-term "rally 'round the flag" for almost anything that looks like decisive action in foreign affairs.[4] Public opinion can endorse and legitimize a wide range of policies. During the Iran hostage crisis, a survey asked whether people would approve each of six hypothetical actions. One moderately conciliatory option (send the shah elsewhere) was approved by 74 percent, as was one—in context—moderately hawkish option (a naval blockade of Iran) approved by 62 percent. Moreover, people were asked, about all six actions, whether they would change their views "if President Carter considered this action necessary." On the average, about half of those initially opposed said they would change. Similar responses about yielding to presidential judgment appeared in a Utah survey among residents opposed to plans floated by the Reagan administration to base the MX missile there. Not surprisingly, approval of presidential leadership is greater for those who already are partisans of the president.[5]

[2] See Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) chap. 3; also Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics*, forthcoming.

[3] Sidney Verba, Richard Brody, Edwin Parker, Norman Nie, Nelson Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon Black, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," *American Political Science Review* 61 (June 1967): 313–333.

[4] John. E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973); Samuel Kernell, "Explaining Presidential Popularity," *American Political Science Review* 72 (September 1978): 506–522; Richard Brody and Catherine Shapiro, *Policy Failure and Public Support: Reykjavik, Iran and Public Assessments of President Reagan* (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987); Russett, *Controlling the Sword*, chap. 2.

[5] Lee Sigelman, "Gauging the Public Response to Presidential Leadership," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 10 (Summer 1980): 427–33; George C. Edwards III, *The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983); Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*.

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Toughness and negotiation are not mutually exclusive. One can "bargain from strength," be firm and unyielding right up to the last moment and then offer a major concession, as is a recognized negotiating strategy. Elements of both are in fact widely advocated by the same individuals. In a response to a survey question frequently asked by the Roper Organization during the cold war, typically one-fourth of the population chose, "It's clear Russia can't be trusted and we will have to rely on military strength to counter them"; one-fourth answered, rather, "We should do nothing that is likely to provoke an American-Russian conflict but instead try to negotiate and reason out our differences"; and about half essentially combined the two: "We should take a strong position with the Russians now so they won't go any further but at the same time we should try to reestablish good relations with them."[6] When announcing the American attack on Viet Cong "sanctuaries" in Cambodia, President Richard Nixon tried (unsuccessfully) with a carefully crafted speech to present his action as centrist, neither an invasion of Cambodia nor a pullout.

Most foreign policy actions, even those toward the center, will offend one end or the other of the range of opinions. But the Iran-contra affair had the unusual capability of offending the entire range. It had a disastrous effect on President Ronald Reagan's popularity (an immediate 20-point drop in his job performance index in the polls, with only a modest recovery thereafter) because it offended both ends of the hawk-dove spectrum. Two-thirds of the population, including but not limited to the dovish Left, opposed giving military assistance to the Nicaraguan contras. But the secret dealings with Iran angered equal numbers, including many on the hawkish Right. Iran's popularity rating among twenty-three countries was down at the bottom, well below even Syria and the Soviet Union.[7] Elite criticism of either element was therefore safe. Also, the acts themselves were mixed. One was a conciliatory move toward a hated adversary (Iran); the other was a step up the escalation ladder of military force in Central America.

Finally, military action to repel an armed attack across international borders more effectively rallies support than does military intervention against domestic communists within a country. The 1983 action against Grenada was more widely accepted when presented as "mainly to protect the Americans living there" than to overthrow a Marxist government. In 1986, the Nicaraguan government was posing no immediate threat to its neighbors or to the United States, so American popular sentiment to overthrow it was low.[8]

[6] William Schneider, "Rambo and Reality: Having It Both Ways" in Kenneth Oye, Robert Leiber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1987), 49; William Schneider, "Public Opinion" in Joseph Nye, ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Lloyd Free and Albert Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

[7] Schneider, "Rambo and Reality," 56–57, 60.

[8] John E. Mueller, "Changes in American Public Attitudes toward International Involvement" in Ellen Stern, ed., *The Limits of Military Intervention* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977); Schneider,

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Nuclear Weapons: Being Tough but Keeping the Risks Down

The preferred mix of toughness and conciliation varies for many reasons, but usually with some discernible consistency, internal logic, and relation to external events. It evolves as conditions in the world at large evolve. Over the history of the post-World War II era, support for the use of military force—including nuclear weapons—was strongest when the United States had the clearest advantage. Immediately after the war, about 80 percent of the population approved the use of nuclear weapons against Japan. (Indeed, a vengeful 23 percent said, "We should have quickly used many more of them before Japan had a chance to surrender.")[9]

Loss of the nuclear monopoly in 1949 made little immediate difference, perhaps because the public generally understood that the Soviet Union did not yet have any means to deliver bombs against American targets. Two questions, both distinct for their wording, show the greatest readiness to use nuclear weapons first in a possible war. In 1949 the populace rejected by almost three to one the proposition that "the United States should pledge that we will never use the atom bomb in warfare until some other nation has used it on us";—but the question implies a unilateral American pledge rather than a mutual one. Two years later, two-thirds of the population said that if the United States should get into an all-out war with Russia "we should use atomic bombs first" rather than "only if used on us" (19 percent); however, the phrase "all-out war" partially prejudges the case by suggesting an inevitability that the bombs will be used on us anyway.[10] Less tilted questions produced first-use approvals nearer the 50 percent level.

The intensified cold war and the Korean War marked the greatest readiness to use nuclear weapons, but even then it was hardly overwhelming. In 1950 about half the population expressed a willingness to use them in response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe; this dropped a little but still remained over 40 percent in 1956. Similar opinions applied in consideration of a communist attack in Asia. Variants of this question were asked often in the early and middle 1950s, and answers ranged from below 30 percent to above 60 percent depending on the wording. The average such response on a survey was around 45 percent. A small majority also was prepared to use the bomb in Korea against the Chinese.[11]

In the early 1950s it still was possible for many to believe that the United States

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"Rambo and Reality," 59; Brad Lockerbie and Stephen Bonelli, "Question Wording and Public Support for Contra Aid, 1983–1986," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54 (Summer 1990): 194–208.

[9] Thomas W. Graham, *The Politics of Failure: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control, Public Opinion, and Domestic Politics in the United States, 1945–1985* (Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1989), 43, 45, 83

[10] Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Energy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 27 (Summer 1963): 155–190.

[11] Bruce Russett and Donald R. DeLuca, "'Don't Tread on Me': Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Fall 1981): 381–399; Thomas W. Graham, *American Public Opinion on NATO, Extended Deterrence, and Use of Nuclear Weapons: Future Fission?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 4, 1989).

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was relatively immune to Soviet nuclear retaliation. Although by 1950 60 to 80 percent of the population thought that the atom bomb would be used against the United States if a war (or world war) should occur—a figure that has remained in that range ever since—in 1951 42 percent of the population thought they "would feel reasonably safe if an atomic war should come" (50 percent not safe). And although most people expected nuclear weapons to be used in any attack on the United States, in 1952 and 1954 three-fourths of those with an opinion thought that no more than a few enemy planes would get through, and only a third thought that their own community would be hit.[12] These perceptions were not far off the mark of those held by government leaders at the time.[13]

Expectations of personal vulnerability rose as the Soviet Union acquired first a bomber force capable of hitting the United States on round trip missions, and then a force of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As early as 1956 a majority of Americans with opinions thought the area where they lived would be wiped out, and that they and their families would not be likely to live through an atomic war. By 1963, the "don't knows" had shrunk from 32 percent to 8 percent, and a majority (52 percent) thought their chances of surviving would be poor.[14] That percentage has continued to rise somewhat, as Americans have absorbed a belief in MAD (mutual assured destruction) as a reality, whatever the official policy characterizations. By 1987, 83 percent thought there could be no limited nuclear war; that a nuclear war would become all-out and all mankind would be destroyed.[15]

At the same time, enthusiasm for using nuclear weapons—never overwhelming—dropped. From the late 1950s readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe or Asia hovered generally in a range of from 15 to 40 percent depending on question wording, only rarely going outside that range. The average level was about 30 percent as a means of defending Europe, and 20 percent for Asia, consistent with experts' general assessment of the former's greater strategic importance. Save for a dip in the late 1960s and a short-term peak in the early 1980s, there were no a significant shifts over time after 1956.

This low percentage contrasted with a much higher commitment to the defense of allies in general. If nuclear weapons were not mentioned, but Americans were simply asked whether they were willing to defend allies with military force, the percentage in the affirmative was much higher (between 60 and 75 percent for defending Western Europe) and rose in the last decade.[16] Even now, support re-

[12] Stephen B. Withey, *Fourth Survey of Public Knowledge and Attitudes Concerning Civil Defense* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1954); Erskine, "The Polls: Atomic Energy."

[13] For example, see Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).

[14] Erskine, "The Polls: Atomic Weapons"; Kramer et al., "Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons"; and Graham, *American Public Opinion on NATO.*

[15] Daniel Yankelovich and Sidney Harman, *Starting with the People* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1988), 49, 64; Tom Smith, "Report: Nuclear Anxiety," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52 (Winter 1988): 557–575.

[16] Russett and DeLuca, "'Don't Tread on Me'"; Graham, *American Public Opinion on NATO*, Appendix 1.

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mains in place for keeping American troops in Europe. In March 1990 Americans were optimistic about the international environment. Approximately three-fourths of them were "mostly hopeful" about changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and believed that those peoples were moving toward democracy rather than new dictatorships. Nevertheless, sentiment for spending less on the defense of Western Europe did not rise from that two years previously, and three-fourths of Americans did not think that the changes diminished the importance of having U.S. military forces in Europe. Whereas a majority favored a cut of both Soviet and American forces in Europe to about 100,000 each, only 14 percent would approve a cut of both sides to zero.[17] There is little evidence here for a view of Americans as potentially isolationist.

As for whether use of the atomic bombs against Japan was in retrospect a good thing, the average response since 1950 has been between 60 and 70 percent, again with no clear trend once the immediate 80 percent support level had dropped.[18] Most Americans still believe the alternative was an invasion of the Japanese home islands with hundreds of thousands of American casualties—a belief many members of the foreign policy elite continue to hold, despite evidence that President Harry Truman and his advisers had *much* lower contemporary estimates of the likely toll in American lives.[19]

One trend, however, is clearer. As Figure 1 shows, in the 1940s about 60 percent of Americans believed that development of the atomic bomb was overall "a good thing," and only a third held the contrary opinion. But by the 1970s the doubters outnumbered the enthusiasts, and by 1982 two-thirds of the population said it had been bad, and only a quarter that it was good. Attitudes toward nuclear weapons now share many characteristics of those toward nuclear power—not clearcut opposition, but ambivalence—regarding them as part of a devil's bargain bringing irresistible benefits but also implying the risk of horrendous long-term costs.[20]

Another indication of changing popular perception of the bomb emerges in the diminished support for building additional nuclear weapons. It is hard to evaluate this over a decades-long period, because the nature of the weapons systems changed, and many of the survey questions refer to particular weapons (neutron bomb, MX, B-1 bomber) about which some controversy raged. Nevertheless, more general questions about the desirability of building more nuclear weapons are identifiable from the 1946–1950 period, and after a gap again for the mid-1980s. Figure 2 shows that whereas more nuclear weapons regularly commanded majority support in the early cold war years, by 1982 the conviction that the United States had

[17] American Talk Security, Survey No. 13, Report No. 2, *The U.S. Looks at the Revolutions of 1989* (April 1990), 32–37.

[18] Graham, *American Public Opinion on NATO*, 43, 45.

[19] Barton A. Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 42 (July 1986): 38–40.

[20] William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Media Discourse and Public Opinion: A Constructionist Approach," *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (July 1989): 1–37.

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FIGURE 1

Is Development of the A-bomb Good or Bad?



The data for Figures 1 through 4 is from Small, *Public Attitudes*. The data for Figure 5 is from AIPO (Gallup) and National Opinion Research Center surveys.

enough was dominant. Save for a brief resurgence of interest in more weapons that coincided with the 1984 election, a solid majority of the population regularly recorded themselves as satisfied with the existing level.

As Table 1 shows, even many people who expected the Russians to cheat said they would favor an agreement to build no more. Pluralities or majorities disapproved of the Reagan administration's decision to abandon the SALT II treaty,

FIGURE 2

Should the U.S. Build More Nuclear Weapons?



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TABLE 1

American Attitudes toward Nuclear Disarmament, 1981

	Percentages		
Attitudes toward	*Favor*	*Oppose*	*No Opinion*
U.S.–USSR agreement to destroy all existing nuclear weapons	47	44	9
U.S.–USSR agreement to build no more nuclear weapons	72	20	8
Of the 60 percent of respondents who think the USSR "not very likely" to abide by agreement	65	28	7
If a UN-sponsored referendum, would vote for nuclear disarmament	59	29	12

Source: *Gallup Report*, May 1981, 3–9.

thought the decision would increase the chances of war and hurt the chances to reach future arms agreements, and thought it would increase the arms race.[21]

Most Americans remain committed to nuclear deterrence, if with many reservations. In a 1984 Public Agenda survey 62 percent rejected the idea that "by the 1990s it should be American policy never to use nuclear weapons under any conditions." In 1988 and 1990 two-thirds agreed that "nuclear weapons have been essential in preventing a world war."[22] According to a 1982 survey, they were willing by a two-to-one margin to *risk* destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Soviet Union.[23] But they had some qualms about this. For instance, in 1977 a Harris Poll found 52 percent believing it was morally wrong for a country to use nuclear weapons "even if it has to," and the Public Agenda found 79 percent agreeing that "there is nothing on earth that could ever justify the all-out use of nuclear weapons." But "an eye for an eye"—that is, nuclear retaliation for a nuclear attack against us—retained the support of from 65 to 90 percent of the population, depending on just how the question was asked.

Nuclear weapons were seen as filling a utility for deterrence that most Americans have been unwilling to forego. Certainly they were unwilling to forego the use of nuclear weapons in response to a (really pretty implausible) Soviet conventional attack on the United States; the situation of a Soviet conventional attack on one of America's principal allies was more equivocal.[24]

Limited use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet conventional attack on NATO allies in Europe was the kind of first use that most Americans were reluctant to foreswear unilaterally. Nevertheless, the lack of enthusiasm showed, as they

[21] *Gallup Report*, No. 249, June 1986.

[22] Americans Talk Security, Survey No. 13, Report No. 3 (April 1990), *Nuclear War and Weapons*, 13.

[23] Andrew Kohut, "What Americans Want," *Foreign Policy* 70 (Spring 1988): 150–166. If there is no specific citation to survey materials, the data can be found in materials of the public opinion and arms control project at Yale University, directed by Thomas W. Graham and Bruce Russett, and usually in the Roper Center archives at Yale.

[24] Jeffrey P. Small, *Public Attitudes toward Building Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence* (Senior Essay, New Haven, Yale University, 1989); Graham, *American Public Opinion on NATO.*

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regularly favored a no-first-use agreement with the Soviet Union. (A no-first-use agreement, if both sides thought it might be kept, of course, would diminish the value of American nuclear weapons for deterring a conventional attack in Europe. Most Americans may have regarded that as an acceptable price.) From 1950 to 1960 roughly 60 percent of the population favored such an agreement, with that number rising to about 70 percent by the 1980s. The precise distribution of responses varied over time and with the wording of the question, but so long as the principle of a bilateral agreement is at issue, and not a unilateral renunciation, public endorsement is clear.[25]

The reality of mutual nuclear deterrence, plus perhaps the articulation of deterrence theory, has been understood by the public; high-income and high-education groups do not differ notably from the public in general. This means that Soviet nuclear weapons themselves were not necessarily considered to be so bad. In 1950, two surveys asked whether, now that the Soviet Union had the bomb, the chances of war would increase or decrease. Many people thought the Soviet bomb made little difference; of those who did, by about three to two they saw the chances of war rising. But as Figure 3 shows, by the middle 1950s and early 1960s perceptions had changed dramatically—to the point where by about a three-to-one margin they saw the changes of war as *decreasing* with the Soviet bomb. This continued to be the majority opinion in the 1980s, though by a narrower margin than earlier. By about a four-to-one margin, Americans have for many years consistently believed that the United States possessed a second strike capability to retaliate for any nuclear attack; when asked in the 1980s whether the Soviet Union also had such a capability, a strong majority agreed that they did.[26]

Americans' acceptance of the fact and theory of mutual deterrence shows in response to repeated questions about whether they preferred the United States to be stronger, weaker, or equal to the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. Until the early 1980s Americans regularly expressed a preference for American nuclear strength to exceed that of the Soviet Union. But beginning in 1983 most surveys have found a substantial majority saying only that they wished the United States to be equal, and in doing so joined a long-held position of most West Europeans.[27] They seek a balance of power, not advantage or dominance. Of course few (only about 10 percent) wanted to be weaker. But consistently fewer than 25 percent

[25] Kramer et al., "Attitudes toward nuclear weapons"; Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, "The Public Mood," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Fall 1984): 33–46. By the 1980s large portions of the U. S. national security elite, including admirals and generals, had reached a similar conclusion. Andrew Kohut and Nicholas Horrock, "Generally Speaking: Surveying the Military's Top Brass," *Public Opinion* 7 (Oct/Nov 1984): 42–45, report that 61 percent of such flag officers say they could not justify a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. To be sure, despite ambiguities, in strategic parlance no "first strike," which might permit small-scale demonstrative uses not constituting an "attack," implies a less restrictive policy than does no first use.

[26] Small, *Public Attitudes Toward Building Nuclear Weapons*.

[27] Bruce Russett and Donald R. DeLuca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Summer 1983): 179–196; Small, *Public Attitudes Toward Building Nuclear Weapons*.

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FIGURE 3

Now That the USSR Has the Bomb, Will the Chance of War Increase or Decrease?



wanted the United States to be superior, and about 60 percent said that of the three options they preferred the United States and the Soviet Union to have equal power.

Also, that's all they saw as feasible. When a Gallup survey of March 1987 asked whether further increases in nuclear weapons could not give the United States or the Soviet Union a real advantage over the other, 69 percent agreed and only 21 percent disagreed.[28] The Public Agenda project (1988) reported that by March 1988, 83 percent said, "If we had a bigger nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would keep building until they caught up."

Nuclear weapons do give rise to moral ambiguity, and overall they probably are not considered to be a "good thing."[29] In the first decades of the cold war, Americans believed—by a three-to-one margin, greater than in other industrialized democracies—that nuclear weapons decreased the chances of war. Now people are no longer so sure, with those who think the weapons decrease the chances of war only narrowly outnumbering those who think they increase war's likelihood. More than three-quarters would now approve of a fully verifiable agreement that

[28] Americans Talk Security, *Compendium of Poll Findings on the National Security Issue* (New York: Daniel Yankelovich Group, 1987), 239.

[29] A 1985 survey about SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) is instructive. It contrasted a hypothetical system with "nuclear weapons in orbit, ready to be triggered from the ground. . . ." against one "that would not involve nuclear devices but would consist of electromagnetic launchers, or 'rail guns,' on the ground," and asked respondents whether they would prefer the system with "the nuclear weapon or the non-nuclear weapon." The non-nuclear one won by more than a six-to-one margin. Americans Talk Security, *Compendium*, 268.

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would lead to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. The public no longer sees an "extremely" or "very" serious threat from Soviet nuclear weapons (only 43 percent chose this); rather, attention has shifted to "terrorist and third-world possession of nuclear weapons" (74 percent) and even "nuclear waste and radiation from old nuclear reactors" (52 percent).[30]

Two-thirds have said they would be willing to pay higher taxes if both America and Russia would reduce nuclear weapons and replace them with non-nuclear forces. The strength of such sentiments is in doubt, however, because people are much more willing to say that they will spend more for something in the abstract than if they are faced with an explicit list of trade-offs.[31] Their true willingness is hard to measure with survey instruments. Political leaders basically have assumed that this particular trade-off would be unacceptable. But because so few leaders have tried to persuade citizens to pay more to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, the real degree of popular willingness remains unknown.

Overall, we see a rather sophisticated and coherent understanding of the basic principles which many mainstream nuclear strategists have been trying to convey. Americans are eager neither to surrender vital global positions nor to nuke their major adversaries.

Mutual Agreement, Not Unilateral Concessions

The delicate American support for no first use of nuclear weapons (for a mutual agreement on it with the Soviets, ambivalence about actual first use in war, but against a unilateral renunciation of first use) illustrates the fundamental centrism of most American opinion on security issues. Yet another illustration is from the politics of the nuclear test ban in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1956 presidential election, Adlai Stevenson campaigned for an end to American nuclear testing—sometimes with an explicit call for a unilateral cessation by the United States and sometimes simply without explicitly asking for a joint U.S.–Soviet agreement. His urgings fell flat. Partly the public had not yet come to perceive nuclear fallout as a very serious problem, but Stevenson's unilateralist approach condemned him anyway. Public opinion later became more concerned, and President Dwight Eisenhower initiated a unilateral cessation of American testing. This action still was not approved by a majority of the public, yet was accepted because of Eisenhower's perceived military expertise and because he was seen as more realistic on security matters than Stevenson.[32]

Here, as we shall see repeatedly, a leader perceived as hawkish can successfully take dovish initiatives that the public would reject from a dovish leader. If he is far ahead of the public, however, bureaucratic and domestic political pressures

[30] Americans Talk Security, Survey No. 13, Report No. 3, 4, 15, 19.

[31] Yankelovich and Doble, "The Public Mood," 45; Mueller, "Changes in American Public Attitudes," 324–325.

[32] Graham, *The Politics of Failure*, chap. 5.

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will build against him. Despite the cover given John Kennedy by the largely hawkish position he had staked out in decrying the missile gap and by talking tougher about Cuba than Richard Nixon did, Kennedy could not contain the pressures to resume U.S. nuclear testing. But when he finally concluded a bilateral agreement with Nikita Khrushchev to cease atmospheric testing, public endorsement was ready, as it had been for several years.

The phrase "unilateral disarmament" contains one dubious word and one clearly bad one. "Disarmament" is already suspect, because of the general existential acceptance of deterrence in a realist's world of competing states. On the one hand, given the widespread ambivalence about nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament may seem desirable. The nuclear freeze movement was supported across a wide variety of groups with divergent attitudes on other issues; as long as the question was asked (through 1984) a mutual and verifiable freeze commanded 75 to 80 percent approval.[33] It was partly to counter the freeze movement that President Reagan presented SDI as a way to make nuclear deterrence obsolete, and both he and Mikhail Gorbachev have struck resonant chords with their calls to abolish all nuclear weapons.

But whereas in the abstract many forms of disarmament may seem desirable, in practice people take the term as connoting unilateral action. And unilateral is the really bad word. Reduction (especially of nuclear weapons) is much more attractive by lacking this connotation associated with disarmament. Agreement, negotiation, inspection, and verification connote important contrasts to unilateralism.

As Table 1 showed, there is some readiness to take chances that the Soviets will cheat, and this readiness has risen. A decade or so ago 74 percent of Americans said that "unless the Soviets agree to on-site inspection, we should refuse to sign any arms control agreements with them." As late as 1986 and 1987, two-thirds said the Soviets "lie, cheat, and steal"; and 50 percent asserted "the U.S. shouldn't sign any agreements for arms control because "the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain."[34] Yet in January 1985 a 76 to 18 percent majority agreed that, "the United States should negotiate a nuclear arms limitation agreement even if there is risk that the Soviets would cheat." Whereas 81 percent of those familiar with the SALT II Treaty believed the Soviet Union had not lived up to its terms, 53 percent believed the United States had not done so either. Instead of putting the blame for cheating entirely on the Soviet Union, 73 percent of Americans agreed that "both the U. S. and the Soviets cheat on treaties to some extent; it's just part of the game."[35]

[33] Michael Milburn, Paul Watanabe, and Bernard Kramer, "The Nature and Sources of Attitudes toward a Nuclear Freeze," *Political Psychology* 7 (December 1986): 661–674.

[34] Kenneth Adler, "West European and American Public Opinion on Peace, Defence, and Arms Control in a Cross-National Perspective," *International Social Science Journal* 38 (No. 4, 1986): 589–600; Ronald Hinckley, "American Opinion Toward the Soviet Union," *International Journal for Public Opinion Research* 1 (Winter 1989): 242–257.

[35] Schneider, "Rambo and Reality"; *Gallup Report*, No. 249, June 1986; Americans Talk Security, *Compendium*, 215.

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By 1987 the balance between believing that the greater risk in an arms control agreement was in trusting the Soviets too much (43 percent) and in being too suspicious to enter into an agreement at all (41 percent) was about even. By March 1990 the populace split evenly on whether in reaching agreements on nuclear arms control the Soviets could "be trusted to keep their part of the bargain." Republicans and Democrats were indistinguishable on this issue. President Reagan's own apparent shift in attitude brought many Republicans along after him.[36]

The American public, however, treated Soviet unilateral disarmament moves with some skepticism, given its long-held suspicion of Soviet intentions and its convictions about the need for verification of arms control steps. Unilateral action may become more acceptable in light of recent changes in the Soviet Union, including the long unilateral suspension of all Soviet nuclear testing, the subsequent troop reductions in Europe, and actions to dispose of chemical warfare stocks.

Many arms control advocates welcomed the Soviet actions and sought a reciprocal policy by the United States. They envisaged a kind of tit-for-tat exchange of actions without prior negotiation: I make a unilateral concession, and then I look to see if you do something more or less equivalent. If so, then I move with another concession. This process, known sometimes as GRIT (gradual reduction of international tensions) is attractive because it shortcircuits the tedious and tangled process of negotiating equivalent concessions between the two superpowers. It was practiced successfully by Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1963, before Kennedy's assassination.[37] But the prompt, verifiable reciprocation of all concessions and agreements is important, perhaps more important to the broad political acceptability of arms control and disarmament than to the actual military importance of verification and inspection in the eyes of many experts.[38] So too is the verbal packaging: independent initiatives sounds much better than unilateral disarmament.

Bargaining from Equality: Confidence and Fear

Trust alone remains too insubstantial as a basis for the post-cold war Soviet-American relationship. If most Americans do not seek superiority in nuclear arms, neither are they ready to accept the implications of inferiority. In 1987 they were split evenly on whether "the continued arms race" or "falling behind the Soviets" was the greater threat to peace. If the arms race was a danger and not something America can hope to win, neither was it something the United States could afford

[36] Americans Talk Security, Survey No. 13, Report No. 2, 29; Richard Morin, "Democrats, GOP Aligning on Soviets," *Washington Post*, 30 January 1988.

[37] Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Amitai Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment," *Western Political Quarterly* 20 (June 1967): 361–380; Bruce Russett, *The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control* (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1983), chap. 7.

[38] On the INF agreement, for example, ACDA specialists regarded normal means of U.S. intelligence gathering as much more important than on-site inspection for verification.

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to lose.[39] Moreover, Americans have been readier to embrace arms control and disarmament at times when they feel the United States is not inferior. The Reagan years illustrate this well, and the attitude was reinforced by Reagan's rhetoric about achieving the INF (intermediate nuclear force) cuts only because the United States bargained from a position of strength. At a time (1987 and 1988) when most Americans opposed further increases in military spending, 58 percent or more nevertheless felt that the Reagan build-up had been necessary. Reagan's leadership ratings were higher for his handling of defense and Soviet-American relations than were his general ratings.[40]

In 1980 Americans were asked whether they preferred a policy emphasizing arms strength or one of a mixture of strength and negotiation. The policy simply of strength was preferred two to one. In the first two years of the Reagan administration the polls found strong endorsement of a "get tough" policy; fewer than one American in five wanted a "conciliatory" negotiating approach. But by 1988, with the same questions, only one in five advocated getting tough and two-thirds supported a reduction of tensions. And by 1987 the choice on strength or a mixture of negotiation and strength had shifted to 56 percent in favor of the latter. The domestic and international political environments had changed importantly. But perhaps the greatest difference stemmed from the military build-up during the interim. Two-thirds said that the build-up had been necessary, and 84 percent saw no need for any further build-up.[41]

In recent years most Americans have rarely perceived the United States as on balance ahead of the Soviet Union in nuclear strength, but neither have they often thought the United States was behind. As Figure 4 shows, most of the time 40 to 50 percent answered that the two countries were about even, and 30 percent or fewer saw the Soviet Union as ahead. This was true even in the late 1970s during the deterioration of détente and the Committee on the Present Danger's public relations effort to persuade the public that the United States had fallen behind. The public accepted the characterization of American inferiority only in the brief period between 1980 and 1983 following the events in Iran and Afghanistan. During those years the percentage seeing the two rivals as even often dropped into the 30s, and 40 percent or more believed the Soviets to be ahead.[42] That was probably an inaccurate representation of the nuclear balance at the time, but it faithfully reflected the rhetoric of the first Reagan presidential campaign and of the new administration's call for a build-up of American arms. Many people accepted that

[39] Kohut, "What Americans Want"; Yankelovich and Harman, *Starting with the People*.

[40] John Martilla, "American Public Opinion: Evolving Definitions of National Security" in Edward K. Hamilton, ed., *American's Global Interests: A New Agenda*, (New York: Norton, 1989), 280, 313.

[41] Daniel Yankelovich and Richard Smoke, "America's 'New Thinking,'" *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Fall 1988): 1–17; Robert Mandel, *Public Opinion and Superpower Strategic Arms* (paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, London, 1989).

[42] Small, *Public Attitudes Toward Building Nuclear Weapons*. They have been somewhat more likely to see the Soviets as ahead in conventional weaponry – in agreement with the experts that Soviet military advantage was greater in non-nuclear forces than nuclear ones.

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FIGURE 4

Who Is Ahead in Nuclear Strength?



assessment, and while they did so they were less receptive to calls for arms control negotiations.

Subsequently the proportion of the population seeing the nuclear balance as even rose to about half, and those seeing the Russians as ahead dropped usually to under 30 percent. From that perspective, negotiated arms limitation or reduction looked better. Cynicism and mistrust are associated with fear; greater trust with greater self-confidence. Public willingness to negotiate arms control agreements does not seem to require a sense of military superiority—fortunately, since that would likely provoke resistance from the Soviet side because of *their* perceptions of inferiority.

Many in the peace activist movement have simply not understood that fear is an unpredictable and often perverse motivator of action. They often assumed that if people could be sufficiently alarmed about the likelihood and consequences of nuclear war, they would demand disarmament and arms control. But it has not worked that way. Fear of world war peaked in the United States during the Korean War period—hardly a dovish era and one when support for military spending was also high. It then declined—a decline enhanced by the "lesson" of the Cuban missile crisis that we were strong and we won—and stayed relatively low until the early 1980s when, in common with opinion in virtually all countries, it peaked again. According to a Gallup (AIPO) survey in June 1981, 47 percent of the American populace thought that a nuclear war was likely in the subsequent ten years, and 60 percent said that they did not expect they personally would survive such a war.

Although those thinking a nuclear war to be probable were somewhat in the minority, they nevertheless at all times constitute a larger proportion of the popu-

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lation than in almost any other country for which we have public opinion data. The populace of the United States consistently ranks among the top two or three out of about thirty countries surveyed, sometimes matched by white South Africans. (European countries typically showed only 20 percent thinking war likely, despite being much closer to Soviet military might. This probably says something about the psychic costs of the cold war to its principal western protagonist.) Fears remained high in the United States as late as March 1988, dropping sharply only in a May 1989 survey. They have been much higher in the mass public than among elites, negatively correlated with education and socioeconomic status.[43]

Many people did support the idea of a freeze—mutual and verifiable—on nuclear weapons during the early 1980s. But they also strongly supported an arms build-up, as the administration saw their fear rooted in a sense of military inferiority. Support for greater military spending was at a twenty-five-year high from 1979 to 1982; the majority of Americans saw it as a means to deter war rather than as a provocation. Support for higher military spending, as well as fear of war, was also higher among Americans than anywhere else.[44] The widely-viewed and frightening film, *The Day After*, had little effect in changing people's views on what to do about the threat of nuclear war; they split between arms control/disarmament and "peace through strength," largely according to their earlier predispositions.

The uncertainties of fear-inducing communications have long been recognized among psychologists, beginning with some experimental work on how best to motivate people to brush their teeth. Psychological mechanisms for dealing with fears include not only vigilance and adaptive coping, but hyper-vigilance, evasion, buck-passing, and "bolstering" (a form of "looking on the bright side").[45] The trick is to produce a moderate amount of concern (or fear), but not so much as to induce people simply to avoid thinking or acting about the problem. Furthermore, people must be able clearly to envisage some effective action they can take; political activism on behalf of disarmament does not necessarily have this quality, especially at a time when the government in power exhibits every intention to resist the activists' pressure. Historians of postwar American culture agree that efforts to promote disarmament by frightening the population failed and even backfired.[46]

[43] John E. Mueller, "Public Expectations of War During the Cold War," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (May 1979): 301–329; Connie de Boer, "The Polls: Our Commitment to World War III," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45 (Spring 1981): 126–134, 131; *Gallup Report*, No. 255, December 1986, 6; Bruce Russett and Miles Lackey, "In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There's no Tomorrow, Why Save Today?" *Political Science Quarterly* 102 (Summer 1987): 259–272; Martilla and Kiley surveys 1987–89. Whatever the overt wording of the question, it may well be that elites answer in terms of a shorter time horizon (their own tenure in power, or their own lifetimes), whereas members of the public implicitly consider their full lifetimes and those of their children.

[44] Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, 3rd ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1989), chap. 9.

[45] Irving Janis and Ralph Mann, *Decision Making* (New York: Free Press, 1977).

[46] Tom R. Tyler and Kathleen M. McGraw, "The Threat of Nuclear War: Risk Interpretation and Behavioral Response," *Journal of Social Issues* 39 (Spring 1983): 25–40; S. Feshback and M.J. White,

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Attitudes toward SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars) illustrate the effect of nuclear fears as well as popular ambivalence about nuclear weaponry. The principle of strategic defense has long been highly popular among Americans, and its approval is not much related to ideological position on other issues or to perceptions of its cost or likely performance.[47] Majorities or pluralities favored antiballistic missile (ABM) systems throughout the controversy during the Johnson and Nixon administrations; significantly, support was weakest near the end of the debate (1969) when the ability of ABM to protect cities became most questionable.

Many questions about SDI were asked in the 1980s, and the results depended heavily on how the questions were phrased. Nevertheless, at least half the population consistently favored it (even in the context of a nuclear freeze), with about 40 percent opposed and the rest undecided. People said the United States should be doing more to protect people from nuclear attack. Popular support for SDI stemmed from real fears about the risks of nuclear war and the low probability of surviving it. Support was enhanced by referring to SDI as Ronald Reagan's proposal, and varied directly with the degree to which SDI was seen as improving those survival prospects, with 86 percent support for "a system that was perfect and could successfully defend against all incoming nuclear weapons." Support for a system preferred by many military experts—one "designed only to protect U.S. missiles, key military bases, and Washington, D.C., but not other areas"—dropped off to only 21 percent. Approval was reduced by referring to high costs or possible Soviet countermeasures.[48]

When continuing with SDI was offered as an obstacle to concluding other kinds of agreements with the Soviet Union, the populace split either way depending on how the question was worded and the strength of the arguments put forward. Approval of SDI went *up* in response to dovish arguments that it wouldn't work or that the Soviet Union was hostile to it. Americans had faith in their technology and a belief that if the Soviets didn't like a thing it couldn't be all bad. Overall, attitudes on SDI may change under different world conditions; its proponents nonetheless tapped a deep vein of popular sentiment.

"Individual Differences in Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms Policies," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (June 1986): 129–140; Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Spencer R. Weart, *Nuclear Fear: A History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). Howard Schuman, Jacob Ludwig, and Jon Krosnick, "The Perceived Threat of Nuclear War, Salience, and Open Questions," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (Winter 1986): 519–536, show that, save for the 1983–1986 period, Americans have not tended to cite the threat of nuclear war as one of the country's "most important problems," and that this is not sensitive to question wording. As they note, this can neither confirm nor refute the proposition that, by protective psychic denial, fears of war were kept largely below the surface of everyday consciousness.

[47] Davis Bobrow, "The Organization of American National Security Opinions," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Summer 1969): 221–239.

[48] Thomas Graham and Bernard M. Kramer, "The Polls: ABM and Star Wars: Attitudes Toward Nuclear Defense, 1945–1985," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (Spring 1986): 125–134; Eymert den Oudsten, "Public Opinion on Peace and War," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1986*, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1986).

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To the degree that people's fears of war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof "peace shield" (SDI). (Reagan aide Michael Deaver allegedly said he didn't know or care whether Star Wars would work, but supported it because it was "a great concept.")[49] But the basic yearning for protection can also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons invoke vivid images for a form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (though not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues.

A Range of Choice for Soviet-American Relations

"While all Presidents are required both to stop the Soviets and to maintain peace, the imperatives are given different weights for Presidents of different parties."[50] Dwight Eisenhower could conclude a compromise peace to end the Korean War because he was widely respected as a general and a war hero. Richard Nixon, with his record of anti-communism, could renew relations with "Red China" and reach agreements for détente with the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan, the most conservative president of the century, could get rapid ratification for his INF treaty after Jimmy Carter failed with SALT II. Elsewhere around the world one thinks readily of Charles DeGaulle, another general and war hero, ending the long French agony of the Algerian war and of Israeli hardliner Menachem Begin returning the Sinai peninsula to Egypt as part of a peace treaty. Of course one can readily produce counterexamples of perceived doves who nevertheless succeeded in dovish initiatives and of hawks who never tried anything of the sort. Nevertheless, examples like the ones listed above are numerous enough and important enough to suggest a general pattern that cannot be ignored.

It is not just a matter of these dramatic events, however, or simply of a hawkish leader being able to get away with dovish acts politically. Harry Truman's 1948 campaigns for his party's nomination and then for the presidency combined a nice rhetorical balance of toughness and peace, bolstered by the rally effect in the Czechoslovakian and Berlin crises and protected from charges of being soft on communism by the left-wing candidacy of Henry Wallace.[51] More generally, it is a matter of general expectations and the kind of freedom of action accorded to different kinds of leaders.

Whether accurately or as a reflection of his past rhetoric, almost any candidate

[49] Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1988).

[50] Irving Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 49.

[51] Robert A. Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections: 1940–1948* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974).

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for national leadership will be seen as in some degree toward the conservative or liberal end, the hawkish or dovish end, of political discourse. Leaders are elected by a majority vote; in political systems dominated by two major parties or two competing coalitions, the winner of any election will usually in some way represent either the Right or the Left. Yet in political systems where most voters are to be found somewhere within a broad center, candidates for national office will feel powerful pressures to draw their rhetoric and political appeal toward the center. Some will, of course, do this more than others, but typically one sees at least a symbolic move to the center after the presidential nomination has been secured. Because most voters are somewhere near the middle, they will be reassured when a president acts contrary to the ideological position they perceive him as holding. When he does so, he assures them that he is not far out of the central mainstream.

Miroslav Nincic speaks of "the politics of opposites" in American foreign policy, well illustrated by the Carter and Reagan years. Jimmy Carter was widely perceived as a dove; when he talked or acted tough (for example, the abortive Iran hostage rescue operation, or the post-Afghanistan sanctions against the Soviet Union) his approval rating rose. Ronald Reagan by contrast was seen as a hawk. His confrontational rhetoric was not so popular, and though the public approved of his military action in Grenada, they also approved his withdrawal of troops from Lebanon and negotiation of arms control with the Soviet Union. Carter's ratings systematically rose with tough actions; Reagan's with pacific ones. While few other presidents have had such clear dovish or hawkish public images as those two, the results suggest something important.[52]

They suggest why President Reagan's political advisers, to the consternation of some senior military officers like General Bernard Rogers, counseled him to conclude a European nuclear arms control agreement (the INF treaty) at a time in 1987 when his popularity was badly faded. Not only is the public more willing to accept negotiated arms control at times when it feels more secure about its own country's military strength, "the American public will be receptive to . . . arms control proposals of a president who it feels takes a harder line than it does."[53] As the next presidential election neared, a weakened Republican president could boost support for his party through an arms control agreement, a strategy much less effective for a Democratic president like Carter.

Does this mean that only hawkish presidents can act like doves and survive politically? That would be too strong an inference from recent experience. The Carter presidency, especially in its last two years, coincided with the decline of détente and among the public a growing concern that was a reaction to international events as well as to Carter's policies. His difficulty in continuing dovish policies was thus not surprising. And during the later years of the Reagan administration, the

[52] Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites," *World Politics* 40 (July 1988): 452–475.

[53] Kohut, "What Americans Want."

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warming international climate, as well as Reagan's hawkish cover, made his more moderate policies acceptable. Part of the difference between Carter's and Reagan's success with dovish policies was due to the skill of the latter's advisers in measuring the public pulse and tailoring the president's message to an acceptable mixture of toughness and conciliation.

Reagan's political advisers had already learned early in his presidency how to balance their packaging of a president who initially seemed too hawkish. When they warned him that given rising public and congressional opposition the Marines should be out of Lebanon well before the 1984 election campaign, he first said that House Speaker Tip O'Neill "may be ready to surrender, but I'm not." Yet the next day he redeployed the troops out to sea, while ordering a massive bombardment.[54] This was a case of disguising a retreat, which offended both the president and his supporters, with rhetoric and symbolic action. One can argue that it may have been good short-run politics but hardly an effective way to educate the public about the realities of global politics.

When the summit negotiations in Iceland broke down in October 1986, the immediate reaction was one of dismay. But after a week of polling, the White House staff was ready to put the president on television with a speech carefully crafted to punch the right buttons. The "shovel brigade" cleverly pictured the events not as a breakdown of strategic arms negotiations, but as a temporary but not necessarily permanent near miss for disarmament in which the president hung tough and refused to give up his SDI for the sake of achieving an immediate agreement. Repeated surveys supported his position by about a three-to-one margin, and his popularity rating rose moderately.[55]

Contemporary Soviet-American relations well illustrate an ambivalence of popular attitudes and policy preferences. For most of the cold war period, basic American attitudes toward the Soviet Union were highly negative; on a list of twenty-five or thirty countries toward which people could express their overall feelings, the USSR was always near the bottom. Figure 5 plots, on a temperature scale from +500 to −500, changes in popular attitudes toward the Soviet Union and China as recorded by American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) and National Opinion Research Center (NORC) national surveys. People are asked to rate a country on a scale of +5 "for something you like very much" to -5 "for something you dislike very much"; each of the scale positions is multiplied by the percentage of the population choosing that position and then these are summed to produce the temperature rating for each survey. As the graph shows, attitudes toward the USSR improved slowly into the détente era (early 1970s), cooled (while those toward China continued to warm) under the impact of détente's decay and the anti-Soviet rhet-

[54] Destler, et al., *Our Own Worst Enemy*, 271; Philip J. Powlick, *American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: The Case of Lebanon, 1982–1984*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Political Science Department, 1989).

[55] Americans Talk Security, *Compendium*, 1987, 283.

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FIGURE 5

Opinion Toward China and the Soviet Union



oric of the early Reagan administration years, and then recovered by 1989 to almost a neutral level, higher even than during détente.[56] The new cautious neutrality was also apparent when the *New York Times* asked people whether they thought of the Soviet Union as an enemy, a friend, or neither. In 1985, 54 percent said enemy, 36 percent neither, and only 5 percent friend. By 1988 the equivalent numbers were 30, 33, and 28.[57] It is hard to imagine a much more even spread across the board than the latter one.

Soviet leader Mikail Gorbachev's domestic policies and diplomatic efforts gained him substantial worldwide popularity. His popularity rating rose in 1988 to a level higher than Ronald Reagan's in most of Europe and very nearly to Reagan's in the United States. Moreover, assessments were positive in every voter group in the American population. Attitudes toward the Soviet Union itself were more complex, reflecting both optimism and continued suspicion. The optimism showed in estimates of whether relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were getting better or worse. In 1986, 60 percent of the population said "staying the same," and only 24 percent "better"; by 1988 the situation had more than switched, to 68 percent "better" and only 24 percent "same" (with just 5 percent "worse").[58]

[56] Attitudes toward China fell back less when détente cooled, and resumed improvement at a slower and steadier pace. Ratings since the imposition of martial law in June 1989 are not available. The apparent volatility of attitudes toward China is exaggerated by changes in the label used to identify the country. In the 1967 survey it was referred to by the (for Americans) unfavorable label of "Communist China"; and in 1972 and 1978 by the similarly unfavorable label of "Red China." In 1979, 1980, and 1983 it was "Mainland China/Communist China," and the others simply used the neutral "China." Unfavorable terms may lower the score about 50 points.

[57] Hinckley, "American Opinion Toward the Soviet Union."

[58] Americans Talk Security, Survey Report No. 7, *U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Shift from Confrontation to Cooperation* (July 1988), 115, 54.

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President Reagan once called the Soviet Union "an evil empire." In 1984, 56 percent of the population agreed with him in one survey and 55 percent in another. But by the end of 1987—even before the president himself said he no longer felt that way—the equivalent percentages in two surveys had fallen to 38 and 32. People also changed their assessment of Soviet foreign policy goals. In 1984, they were asked whether the Soviet Union was more interested in "achieving global domination" than in maintaining peaceful relations with the West or protecting its own security; 58 percent of the population chose "domination." By March 1990 only 20 percent said domination.[59]

This still did not necessarily mean that Americans trusted the Russians, particularly Russians other than Gorbachev himself. But in 1988 people said that Americans "should be thinking of peaceful solutions as well as aggressive ones; picking a fight with the Soviet Union is too dangerous in a nuclear world" (96 percent), and that "the U.S. and the Soviet Union must never settle their differences by going to war" (85 percent). More than 80 percent agreed that "the Soviet Union and the U.S. share a number of foreign policy interests such as prevention of war, arms control, and stabilizing relations between them," and almost as many concurred that Soviet external actions "often stem from genuine fears for Russian security." By early 1990 only 33 percent still regarded the Soviet Union as a serious or very serious threat to the United States, as compared with 76 percent in 1985.[60]

Here, then, is a version of the practical realism with which we began. Americans came to see the East-West conflict as a continuing struggle for influence, one that might go on for a long time. A powerful adversary would continue to probe for advantages; Americans must be prepared to resist. Yet they also became ready to settle for a balance of power in a realist's world. They see the greatest threat of "loss" as one where both sides suffer in an arms race or, worse, in a nuclear war. Hence most of them are ready to negotiate means to keep the peace and lower tensions. In this perception most Americans are neither hawks nor doves, but—in terms of the Harvard aviary—owls.

A major project presented Americans with four different images of the future, and through a series of surveys and discussion groups estimated the attractiveness of each. Each is characterized by a battery of statements too long to be repeated here, but we can get some of the flavor. One is labelled "U.S. gains the upper hand"; as suggested earlier, even as an ideal this attracted only a fairly small minority (24

[59] *Los Angeles Times* press release, 20 December 1987; Public Agenda Foundation and Brown University Center for Foreign Policy Development, *The Public, The Soviets and Nuclear Arms: A Mandate for the Future* (New York and Providence, R.I.: Public Agenda Foundation and Brown University, 1988); Yankelovich and Harman, *Starting With the People*; Americans Talk Security, Survey No. 13, Report No. 2, 22.

[60] Ole Holsti, *American Public Opinion on the Soviet Union* (Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1988); Public Agenda Foundation and Brown University, *The Public, the Soviets and Nuclear Arms*; Yankelovich and Harman, *Starting with the People*; Americans Talk Security, Survey Report No. 12, *Changing Perceptions of the Soviet Union, American Use of Force, and Nuclear Weapons*, January 1989, 58; Americans Talk Security, Survey No. 13, Report No. 2, 29.

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percent) of the population. Another, the isolationist option to "Defend only North America," was preferred by a mere 4 percent. The two leading choices were "Eliminate the nuclear threat; compete otherwise," with 28 percent approval, and "Cooperative problem solving," with 46 percent. The first of these was the more "realist," especially as it envisaged drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals rather than their abolition. It anticipated some agreements to reduce the danger of escalation to nuclear war, but the continuation of vigorous competition especially in the Third World. The vision of cooperative problem solving was more nearly "idealist," with images of a non-adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union like the one the United States now enjoys with China, and cooperation on a wide range of common problems such as nuclear proliferation, AIDS, and terrorism. It was not seen as a world devoid of Soviet-American rivalry, but one tempered by the need to collaborate against mutual threats to survival. Not all who preferred it really thought it would be achieved; for many the jury on Soviet intentions remains out.[61]

There *is* a touch of idealism in contemporary American attitudes, as there perhaps has always been. Despite their skepticism about Soviet intentions, most (57 percent) agreed that "The differences between America and the Soviet Union are not that great and permanent peace is possible. Therefore, summit talks should be used mainly to produce real progress in arms control and other efforts to arrive at permanent peace." Perhaps this is putting too many words into people's mouths: "permanent peace" is a heady phrase, and one can agree with the earlier parts of the sentence without buying into the last words. Yet even in a 1986 survey in which 83 percent of Americans said they were suspicious rather than trusting of the Soviet Union, it is instructive to see the reasons: 11 percent cited Soviet nuclear military power, 27 percent cited communist ideology, and 45 percent their "aggressive international behavior." In other words, they are not necessarily suspicious of the Soviet Union per se; as the Soviets drop communist ideology and act "better," attitudes change accordingly.[62]

One can imagine conditions wherein public attitudes on the matter of Soviet-American relations could change dramatically once again. Furthermore, democracy is hardly just a system of leaders listening to the vox populi and acting accordingly. Leaders do sometimes lead and can change attitudes as well as respond to them. Different leaders labor under different popular expectations, and thus have different kinds of opportunities both to shape attitudes and to maneuver within the political space those attitudes delineate.*

[61] Public Agenda Foundation and Brown University, *The Public, the Soviets and Nuclear Weapons.*
[62] Hinckley, "American Opinion Toward the Soviet Union."

* This article is adapted and updated from Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). I am grateful to Lisa Brandes for preparing the graphics, to Thomas Graham for comments, and to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for financial support.

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The Rise and Fall of Special Interest Politics

PAUL E. PETERSON

In his farewell address to administrative officials, President Ronald Reagan warned Americans against the power of "special interests" and "iron triangles." "A triangle of institutions—parts of Congress, the media and special interest groups—is transforming and placing out of focus our constitutional balance," he cautioned. "Some have used the term 'iron triangle' to describe what I'm talking about," he added. Its power "derives from its permanence" and "from its ability to focus debate and overwhelming resources—like campaign money and letter writing campaigns—on issues that don't command broad and intense national attention." An iron triangle of special interests, congressional subcommittees, and media hype worked to influence public policies in ways detrimental to the interests of the public at large. Because of its power, "the iron triangle has virtually shut off public debate. Special interest groups focus all their resources and members on this line or that in the budget. And Members of Congress . . . with the dependence on special interest campaign financing and their fear of bucking any group that is strongly committed to a spending program, take up the banner and join the charge." We need to remember that "the strength of our nation has never been with the Washington colony but with the American people."[1]

It is the burden of this article that Ronald Reagan's warning was already dated at the time he gave his speech. The problem that he identified had been receding

[1] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks to Administration Officials on Domestic Policy, 13 December 1988," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 24, no. 50, 19 December 1988, 1615–20.

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throughout his administration. Special interests may have been steadily gaining in influence throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but both during the Reagan years and during the initial years of the Bush administration, these groups lost much of the clout they had once acquired. Special interests were still an active part of the Washington scene, but the battles they were fighting were no longer taking place on favorable terrain. Defensive actions designed to protect advantages gained in the past were the best they could carry out. Often they settled for much less.

Defining Special Interest

The declining influence of the special interests was evident even in the way in which Reagan's farewell address was worded. As any undergraduate political science major knows, the third member of the fearsome iron triangle is the executive agency, not the news media. As Reagan himself pointed out, what gave special interests their power was their quiet, confidential, even clandestine mode of operations. Campaign contributions to key committee members, appointments to advisory boards within executive agencies, and the unnoticed movement of personnel between the public and private sectors have been the standard techniques by which special interests have shaped government policy. The special interest has traditionally seen the news media as an obstacle, not a fulcrum for action.[2]

This point depends, of course, on an objective definition of the concept special interest. As used by politicians, the specialness of an interest lies in the eye of the beholder. For most participants in the political process, it is my policy proposals, your urgent needs, and his special interests. And in this world of practical politics, "special" has acquired a twisted, reverse meaning. An interest is not special if it is particularly deserving but if it is particularly narrow, self-seeking, and disrespectful of the public good.

I shall attempt in this article a less partisan, more analytically useful formulation of the concept of special interest – one that encompasses both groups to which I belong as well as those I abhor. My proposed definition is nonetheless consistent with the way in which the word has been used by those, including Ronald Reagan, who have spoken of the pervasive influence of special interests, lobbyists, and iron triangles in Washington politics. As used here, an interest is special if it consists of or is represented by a fairly small number of intense supporters who cannot

[2] Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969); E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), chaps. 1–2; Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Trade Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1972); Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964): 676–715; Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966); Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in Anthony King, *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978). But see Nelson Polsby, *The Consequences of Party Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 134.

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expect that their cause will receive strong support from the general public except under unusual circumstances. Special interests have their greatest influence on public policy by identifying supporters within congressional committees and executive agencies that are most directly concerned with the problems of interest to them. They may also try to influence presidential candidates, congressional party leaders, and the writers of party platforms; and they may try to promote their cause through the mass media. If they can get a favorable news story or win an influential politician to their side, it is a triumph that they will exploit as best they can in the inside bargaining game at which they excel. But these special interests do not ordinarily have the political clout to compel the attention of political leaders seeking a broad base of mass support. Their concerns are usually not key components of the overall political strategy of the two major political parties, their priorities are seldom main themes in major political campaigns, and they are readily sacrificed by major political figures when they have bigger fish to fry. Or to change the metaphor, when elephants begin to dance, many special interest ants are trampled.

Many of these insects are hardworking, meritorious, needy members of the body politic. But their size and shape force them to use the cracks, holes, and gullies of the political ground in which they find themselves; they can do little to shape the overall terrain. Also, one cannot ascertain their efficacy simply by looking at the vigor with which they are working. Like ants, they try as hard—or harder—to stave off mass destruction as to extend their political reach.

This understanding of special interest excludes from consideration those powerful groups that can command the attention of major political figures and help shape the main political strategies of the two political parties. No matter how self-interested or undeserving these powerful groups may be, they do not fit the definition of special. For example, the interests of retired citizens can no longer be regarded as special. The retired are so politically self-conscious, their associations are so actively engaged, their ability to shape the agendas of presidential candidates is so massive, they must be regarded as major political players.

When special interests are distinguished in this way from the major political interests that shape the two-party struggle in American politics, then the changing role of the special interest in American politics becomes increasingly clear. At a time when resources were accessible and power was decentralized, the insects discovered many new cracks and holes in which they could prosper and multiply. In a later era of fiscal limits and concentrated power, the elephants trample the ants.

The Conventional Wisdom

This argument differs from what seems to be the current conventional wisdom on the role of interest groups in American politics. During the postwar years that wisdom has now made one complete cycle. Initially, scholars had little doubt about the extent of group influence. Building on the work of such progressives as Arthur F. Bentley, E. Pendleton Herring, and E. E. Schattschneider, the early contribu-

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tors to our postwar understanding portrayed groups as a pervasive, powerful part of the political landscape.[3] David Truman, Earl Latham, and Robert Dahl regarded groups as benign, while Grant McConnell and Theodore Lowi regarded them as pernicious; but on all sides there was general agreement that groups were both active and influential.[4]

In subsequent years this view was challenged by three quite different lines of argument and analysis. First, Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter's careful case study of the influence of groups in the formation of trade policy revealed that groups had limited staff, were short on cash, talked mainly to their friends, and shaped legislation by providing information, not by muscling members of Congress.[5] Second, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson discovered that groups were more concerned about maintaining their membership than influencing policy.[6] On many issues, seemingly powerful organizations avoided taking stands, engaging in controversy, or promoting policy innovation out of a fear of alienating one or another faction within their membership. Finally, Mancur Olson provided a new theoretical framework for thinking about group activities.[7] Instead of assuming, as did Bentley and Truman, that groups formed almost automatically, Olson explained the difficulties that groups had in convincing individuals to contribute to a collective benefit. Each individual could be expected to wait for others to act, hoping to reap the benefits from the results without making a contribution to the outcome. Group formation could occur only if the individuals being mobilized were small in number or if some selective inducements were used to get individuals to contribute to the common cause. In light of Olson's analysis, the issue was no longer group influence but their very existence.

At about the time the professional political science community had accepted this new wisdom, the number of interest groups in American politics increased exponentially.[8] In the wake of the civil rights movement, the war on poverty, Earth Day, and the formation of the Great Society, groups percolated up in places and around issues that had previously been of little significance. In due time the scholarly community took note of these changes, and a new respect for group influence

[3] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); E. Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: Norton, 1940); and E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, As Shown in the 1920–30 Revision of the Tariff* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).

[4] David Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971); Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952); Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*; and Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*.

[5] Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, *American Business*, pt. 4.

[6] Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961); and James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[7] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken, 1968).

[8] Jack Walker, "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America," *American Political Science Review* 77 (June 1983): 390–406.

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appeared—this time in studies of Congress. Calling themselves the new institutionalists, this new generation of scholars did not so much look at groups as examine the context in which they operated—namely, a political system in which the legislative branch had unusual constitutional powers. Approaching the subject in a manner reminiscent of the writings of Truman and McConnell, these new congressional analysts emphasized the influence of Congress over administrative decisions, the division of Congress into committees and subcommittees, and the need for each member of Congress to maintain support within his home state and district in order to stay in office. In a world in which power was divided, parties were of little significance, and politicians were responsive to organized constituent influences, narrow, specialized groups could have a great influence on government.

By the early 1980s the cycle was thus complete. A new conventional wisdom had emerged. It used a more technical language, drew upon quantitative sources of information, and took structures more seriously than did the original group theory, but the substantive conclusions that it reached were not much different from early postwar scholars: Congress shaped government policy, politicians organized Congress in ways to insure their own reelection, and special interests had inordinate influence.[9]

These three schools of thought are all limited by the generally static nature of their vision. Truman's theory had an all-encompassing definition of interest, and, therefore, group influence was everywhere evident. Olson's theory allowed for variation in the degree of group influence, but the factors producing the variation were specific to the groups themselves—their size and their access to selective incentives. According to the new institutionalism, Congress was organized in ways designed to facilitate the reelection of its members.

Yet within all of these traditions one finds suggestions that group influence will vary with the degree to which power is centralized and the extent to which strong, substantively committed political parties control policy alternatives. V. O. Key, especially, argued that strong, competitive political parties weakened the power of special interests.[10] Grant McConnell said that narrow, specialized groups had less influence on presidents than other politicians because presidents had larger, more diffuse constituencies.[11] Schattschneider pointed out that it was possible to weaken the influence of those with narrow, vested interests by broadening the scope

[9] Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes" in Gregory B. Mills and John L. Palmer, eds., *Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1984); Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Terry Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure" in John Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989); Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (February 1984): 165–79; Barry Weingast and Mark Moran, "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," *Journal of Political Economy* 91 (October 1983): 765–800.

[10] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964).

[11] McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*.

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of the conflict.[12] Dahl showed that political leaders, backed by organized political parties, could resist the demands of otherwise powerful groups.[13] Morris Fiorina hypothesized that the decentralizing reforms in Congress strengthened the hands of the special interests.[14]

If this scholarly consensus is correct,[15] then one might expect special interest group influence to vary within the national political system, depending on the extent to which parties dominate decision making and power is centralized in the hands of relatively few decision makers. One way of testing this proposition in the American context is by finding a measure of special interest influence that allows one to make comparisons over a broad time period. Then it may be possible to observe whether special interest influence is reduced as parties become stronger and the political system more centralized.

Measuring Group Influence

One way of estimating special interest influence is to measure the percentage of the gross national product (GNP) spent by the federal government on activities that are *not* of paramount interest to one or both of the two major political parties. It is a residual category that consists of all the federal money that is *not* spent on such items as financing the public debt, defense, programs for the elderly, and other programs that are central to the political strategies of one or both of the two major political parties, their presidential candidates, and/or their congressional leaders. It consists mainly of those items that are sometimes referred to as the domestic discretionary programs of the federal government. The word discretionary is at once misleading and quite to the point. It is misleading in the sense that all federal programs are discretionary; no legislation passed by Congress can prevent a future Congress from reversing or revising a policy. But the label is quite accurate in that the programs so labelled are those over which political leaders exercise *political* discretion—in the sense that they can spend more or less without sacrificing a high priority concern of one or another of the two parties.

These discretionary programs are a residual category—all those items that are not specially set aside as being politically difficult to cut. They thus approximate those programs that are of concern to special interests but do not command the more general interests of the two parties. To determine what is important only to the special interests thus requires that we exclude from the analysis those pro-

[12] Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People.*

[13] Dahl, *Who Governs?*

[14] Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone.*

[15] But see Samuel Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Era* (New York: Random House, 1969); Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960); and a critique of their work in Paul E. Peterson, "British Interest Group Theory Reexamined: The Politics of Comprehensive Education in Three British Cities," *Comparative Politics* 3 (April 1971): 381–402.

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grams that are so politically important that they cannot be dumped into an et cetera category.

The most obvious candidate for exclusion is the payment of the interest on the national debt. A default on the general obligation bonds and notes of the U. S. Treasury would have an immediate, far-reaching effect on the health of the national economy. No president, no party leader, and no responsible public official has advocated such a policy. Such a policy would have been economically disastrous and politically suicidal.

Excluding expenditures for national defense as being of general, not special, interest is perhaps more controversial. The Democratic party has in recent years favored lower expenditures than those proposed by the Reagan and Bush administrations; and allegations of contractor influence, to say nothing of the military-industrial complex, abound. Yet it can hardly be denied that defense policy was a highly salient political issue of great importance to the political strategies of the two parties. The Democratic party was careful to insist it wanted a strong, if less wasteful military capacity; and Republicans made a strong defense one of the key points by which they have differentiated themselves from the Democrats. The Michael Dukakis-in-a-tank picture has been credited as being one of the most effective of the negative advertisements of the 1988 presidential campaign, simply because Republicans scored heavily by denouncing Democrats as being soft on defense. Although special interests played a role in shaping the allocation of resources within the overall defense appropriation, the overall appropriation level was too central an issue during the cold war to be treated as politically peripheral.

Excluding social security from the special interest category may also raise eyebrows among some policy analysts. Although many experts feel benefits should be reduced in order to balance the budget or permit more adequate funding of more critical programs targeted toward a more needy population, associations of the elderly have mobilized their constituents more successfully than almost any other Washington lobby. Also, the elderly are more likely to vote than many other age groups.[16] As a consequence, politicians seem more afraid of the social security issue than any other. These points, however, only testify to the general political significance of programs serving the elderly. If Republicans have tried to embarrass Democrats for their softness on defense issues, Democrats have countered by casting doubt on Republican support for social security, medicare, and other programs that provide services and income support to retired members of the population. And just as Democrats vow their commitment to a strong defense, so Republicans, despite the partisan charges made against them, claim that they too are committed to a social security program. Thirty years ago the elderly may have been considered just another special interest to which the parties could give half-hearted attention, but after the expansion of social security and the establishment of the medicare program in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these interests became such

[16] Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 46–50.

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an entrenched part of the political regime that the major political parties ignored the opinions of senior citizens only at great political cost.

Just as the interests of the elderly have become of general political concern, so have the interests of the truly needy who receive public assistance from broadly-based programs. These individuals receive cash assistance, food stamps, free medical care, and, in many cases, housing assistance. The programs are regarded by both political parties as part of the national safety net that has been constructed to help those in greatest financial need. If Republicans attempt to cut these programs, Democrats come quickly to their defense while decrying at the same time Republican attempts to "balance the federal budget on the backs of the poor."

Not all programs that are defended in the name of the poor and the needy have a sacrosanct political position. The poor who receive emergency energy assistance, or obtain subsidized public sector employment or benefits from community development corporations, or any of a host of other federal programs that serve only a relatively small segment of the poverty population are not beneficiaries of programs to which the parties attach high priority. These programs arbitrarily benefit some poor people and not others, often as the result of local administrative decisions. There is no nationally determined rationale that specifies who is to be included and who is to be excluded from these programs. Program survival thus depends upon the political efforts of special groups that defend the specific, rather narrow interests of those groups involved with and receiving benefits from these government programs.

We have saved the most difficult classification problem—agricultural interests—until last. Withholding the label "special" from agricultural interests may strike urbanites as rather peculiar. Farmer demands for price supports and commodity restrictions would seem to be the quintessential example of the way in which an interest group, an executive department, and congressional subcommittees work together to win concessions that benefit one sector of the American economy. All these elements are present in agricultural politics, to be sure, but there is another one as well: the key role that the farm states play in the competition between the two parties for control of the United States Senate. One person-one vote plays very little role in the processes of political representation in the one branch of the national government that is most open to partisan political change. Agricultural interests in southern, midwestern and western states have great influence in statewide elections, and for either political party to ignore the power of agriculture very likely means sacrificing control of the Senate. As a result, broad, bipartisan support for expensive agricultural policies has been a constituent part of American politics since the New Deal.

The special interest programs include everything that remains in the federal budget after interest on the debt, defense, programs for the elderly, safety-net, and agricultural programs have been excluded. It includes programs for science, space, health, education, training and employment, transportation, commerce, housing, energy, veterans, environment, and aid to local governments. If the special interests are gaining in influence, these are the programs that should be growing in size, for

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these are the programs that only occasionally become subjects of great national debate and only episodically become a significant element in the broad political strategies of the two political parties.

To estimate the influence of the special interests we shall calculate the percentage of the gross national product spent by the federal government on activities of concern to them. We use the percentage of GNP instead of the total cost in current or constant dollars as our measure of the size of a federal program, because the percent of GNP controls not only for inflation but also for the changing size of the national economy. In other words, by charting spending independent of changes in economic resources, we can measure fluctuations in the political influence of special interest groups.

The Good Old Days

If this measure of policy outcomes provides us with a reasonable estimate of special interest influence, then the power of special interests increased substantially between 1962 and 1980. During these years the total cost of these federal programs expanded in size from 3.6 to 5.6 percent of GNP (Figure 1). This increment is over and above any increases that occurred as the result of inflation, increases in the size of the population, or increase in the economic capacity of the nation. Significantly, overall federal expenditures grew only from 20.1 to 22.8 percent of GNP during this same period (Figure 2). In other words, growth in special interest programs equals three-fourths of the entire increase in the total size of the federal budget during these two decades. It was a great time to be a special interest.

Some may argue that this growth in special interest programs was itself a function of party strategies and commitments. The New Frontier and, even more, the Great Society enacted new and expanded federal programs as part of the Democratic party's much heralded War on Poverty. And in fact the size of these programs did expand by nearly 1.2 percent of GNP during the Kennedy-Johnson years. But special interest programs grew by another 0.8 percent during the Nixon-Ford years. Partisan changes slowed the growth rate but hardly brought it to a halt.

Three factors contributed to the proliferation of special interest influence during this period: the ease with which economic resources could be converted into fiscal resources available to the federal government; the peace dividend; and the decentralization of the policy-making system within both the executive and legislative branches.

Politically accessible economic resources. It might be thought that the enhanced position of the special interests in the 1960s and 1970s was simply a function of a growing economy. But in fact, group influence continued in the 1970s well after economic growth had sunk from 4.4 percent between 1960 and 1973 to 2.9 percent between 1973 and 1979.[17] And in any case, our measure of group influence con-

[17] Barry Bosworth, *Tax Incentives and Economic Growth* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).

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FIGURE 1
Domestic Discretionary Programs as a Percentage of GNP, 1962–89



Source: *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1991* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), table 3.3.

[1] Nondefense energy programs.

[2] Department of Commerce and housing credit.

[3] Education, training, employment.

[4] Health research and training.

[5] General government and administration of justice.

[6] General purpose fiscal assistance—revenue sharing and block grants.

trols for changes in the size of the economy over time. In retrospect it seems that the key financial factor was not so much the strength of the U. S. economy as the ease with which economic resources could be translated into revenue by the federal government. During these two decades tax increases occurred regularly, continuously, and silently as inflation shifted taxpayers into higher income categories liable to higher rates of taxation. Only once during this period was it necessary for a president to ask Congress for an increase in the income tax, and even that was only a temporary tax surcharge passed at the height of the Vietnam war.[18] Otherwise, presidents and Congresses were able to enact tax cuts that did not seriously erode the fiscal base of the government. It was a politician's—and a special interest group's—dream world: silent tax increases; noisy, widely publicized tax cuts.

Peace dividend. Equally important was the fiscal dividend that became in-

[18] Paul E. Peterson, "The Politics of Deficits" in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *The New Direction in American Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

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FIGURE 2
Federal Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1962–89



Source: *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1991* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), table 3.3.

creasingly hefty after the Vietnam war came to an end. As the 1960s began, Americans were spending more than 10 percent of their gross national product defending the country's interests in the cold war. After declining somewhat in the early 1960s they climbed back to 10 percent at the height of the Vietnam war. But defense expenditures shrank steadily as the war slowly wound down and the cold war gave way to détente. At the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, U.S. expenditures on defense had shrunk to 5 percent of GNP, releasing large sums of money for domestic programs (Figure 2). Much of the newly available money went for the politically popular retirement and safety net programs; together, they expanded from 4.3 to 9.5 percent of GNP. But as we have seen, new monies also became available for special interest programs.

Decentralization of policy making. The political engine that drove the growth in special interest programs through Democratic and Republican years alike seems to have been the decentralized policy-making system that evolved in the 1960s and 1970s. During these years Congress changed from a conservative, budget-sensitive, seniority-minded, southern-directed institution to an assembly of well-staffed, policy energetic, electorally sophisticated politicians. Power shifted from committee chairs downward to subcommittee chairs and outward to the floor of Congress. The staff resources of individual members and subcommittee chairs doubled and tripled. Campaign finance contributions increased exponentially. Members of Con-

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gress traveled home more frequently, sent constituents more mail, and provided citizens more casework assistance than ever before. Membership on committees and subcommittees by members with a constituent interest in the programs they oversaw became a more pervasive practice than ever before. Even within the appropriations committees, it became accepted practice for subcommittee members to become advocates of the agencies they were supposed to be "watching."[19]

Centralizing institutions that could be expected to brake these expansionary forces were noticeably weakened. The presidency was distracted and weakened by Vietnam and Watergate. The House Rules committee was enlarged and brought under the control of the Democratic Caucus. The chairs of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees lost the commanding authority Wilbur Mills had enjoyed. The party leaders in Senate and House were no longer towering titans whose displeasure was feared. Instead, they became adept at orchestrating the legislative process and faithful servants to party members.

The advantages to special interests of these changes in Congress and the presidency are obvious. As Congress became more decentralized, fragmented, policy-minded, and sensitive to constituent concerns, special interests found numerous niches in which to place and promote their favorite programs. Centralizing institutions were unable to prevent these programs from wending their way through the labyrinthine legislative process.[20]

The Decline of Special Interest Politics

It was this world of special interest politics that Ronald Reagan attacked in 1980. Promises, promises, he said, were all that one could expect from the Democratic party. It was time for tax cuts, budget cuts, and the elimination of waste, fraud, and abuse from the federal budget. And in his first year in office he so changed the terms of the debate that the power of special interests was transformed overnight.

Decline of special interest spending. It is little understood how dramatically the opportunities for special interests have changed since 1980. In 1980 special interest spending was peaking at 5.6 percent of GNP; by 1989 it had fallen to 3.7 percent, roughly the same level that it had been in 1962. In other words, the world of special interests contracted back to the same level that existed before the New Frontier, the Great Society, Watergate, congressional reforms, the peace dividend, inflation-induced bracket creep, and all of the other forces that had seemingly transformed American national government.

The contraction of interest group power was obscured by the fact that it occurred at a time when the overall fiscal size of the federal government remained as high as it had been when Ronald Reagan took office. Federal expenditures in 1989 were 23 percent of GNP, approximately the same as they had been in 1981.

[19] Kenneth Shepsle, "The Changing Textbook Congress" in Chubb and Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?*; Joel Aberbach, *Keeping a Watchful Eye* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990).

[20] Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone*; Shepsle and Weingast, "Legislative Politics."

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During the 1980s, programs that came under the protection of one or another of the two major parties were treated relatively generously. Defense expenditures expanded from 5.7 to 6.1 percent of GNP, as Ronald Reagan and his Republican followers made a stronger defense a fundamental policy commitment second only to a permanent reduction in the size of federal revenues. Retirement and health care programs for the elderly and safety-net programs for the poor remained at the combined level of 9.6 percent of GNP, only somewhat less than the 10 percent level they had reached at the end of the Carter administration. Agricultural programs expanded in order to counter the decline in the value of farm products on the world market and to compensate for the catastrophic drought experienced in the late 1980s. The interest costs on the greatly enlarged national debt expanded from 2 to 4 percent of GNP. (See Figure 2.)

All of these politically protected components of the federal budget survived Reagan tax cuts and antispending rhetoric basically intact. Those programs most favored by Republicans—deficit financing and national defense—grew in size. The one supported by a bipartisan coalition—agricultural assistance—also did well. The Democratic programs—social security, medicare, and safety-net programs—were not able to expand, but because the Democratic party gave them the highest priority, neither were they reduced in size.

Who lost? The special interests. And they lost quite uniformly. As can be seen in Figure 1, nearly all the special interest programs were reduced by roughly the same proportion. While other components of the national budget were holding their own or expanding, these programs were being cut by 30 percent—from 5.3 to 3.7 percent of GNP—and reduced to the levels that had existed in 1962.

The factors that adversely affected the power of the special interests were, once again, threefold: the increased difficulty of translating economic resources into fiscal ones; the disappearance of the peace dividend; and the increased centralization of power in Washington.

Difficulty of translating economic resources into fiscal resources. The first year of the Reagan administration was its most decisive. In two dramatic pieces of legislation the president obtained from Congress a major tax reduction, a sharp increase in the nation's defense budget, and deep cuts in discretionary domestic programs. Of these policy innovations, the tax cut, together with the indexation of income tax brackets, may have been the most far-reaching and permanent; for the tax cut made deficit politics central to the legislative process throughout the ensuing decade.

The size and significance of the tax cut was only partially understood at the time.[21] The impact was greatly enlarged by three factors that Reagan budget planners did not take into account when they initially proposed a 30 percent cut in the income tax. First, Democrats proposed very large alternative cuts—which Reagan enthusiastically accepted as cuts that could be made in addition to his own proposals. Second, Senate Republicans insisted on indexing tax rates, thereby

[21] David Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).

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FIGURE 3

Federal Expenditures and Revenues as a Percentage of GNP from 1960–89 with the Deficit Between Revenues and Expenditures



Source: *The Economic Report of the President, 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), table C-76.

eliminating bracket creep and making permanent the tax cuts that otherwise would have been slowly eroded by inflation-induced bracket creep. Third, the inflation rate between 1982 and 1984 was much lower than anticipated; when the indexation provision of the law became effective in 1984 much less bracket creep had occurred in the preceding three years than policy makers had anticipated.

The size of the tax cuts was in fact so large that Congress, anticipating dramatic shortfalls in revenue, retracted in 1984 some of the cuts that had yet to come into effect. But even after this so-called tax increase of 1984, the revenue flow of the federal government was sharply reduced at a time when government expenditures were either remaining high or actually increasing (Figure 3). The size of the deficit was so large it seemed to threaten the long-term economic well-being of the country, and every policy issue was being debated in terms of its impact on the budget deficit. There was no way to reduce the deficit except through budget cuts or highly visible, politically unpopular tax increases. With the president discovering that adamant opposition to a tax increase was a potent weapon against the "tax, tax, spend, spend," Democrats, it became a time when politicians had to establish clear priorities as to what was important and what was not. Important were policies that could affect the balance of power between the two parties. Less important—indeed, even unimportant—were special interest demands.

End of the peace dividend. Second only in importance to the tax cut of 1981 was the end of the peace dividend. With the Russian invasion of Afghanistan,

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the era of détente had come to an end, and both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan pledged themselves to sharp increases in defense spending. The defense build-up began in the waning days of the Carter administration, the very time that support for special interest spending showed the first signs of softening. As the Reagan Administration pushed for still larger defense increases, the pressures on the domestic side of the budget intensified, and the most vulnerable parts of the domestic budget—the special interest programs—took the biggest hit.

Centralization of power. Finally, the structure of power in Washington became increasingly centralized. On the executive side, power shifted from the domestic departments and agencies to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the White House staff. When David Stockman assembled within the OMB the capacity to determine most of the domestic budget as well as to shepherd it through Congress, he curtailed the ease with which agencies could make a case for their own programs within the executive branch as well as their capacity to build alliances with congressional subcommittees. In addition, the Reagan administration changed the rules for appointment to cabinet and subcabinet positions. In prior administrations, acceptability to the interests served by the department or agency ranked high among the qualifications for political appointment. Reagan's advisers were more interested in making sure that these appointments were responsive to the president's agenda and would not develop close ties to career public servants, clientele organizations, or congressional subcommittee members and staff. One leg of the old iron triangle was amputated.[22]

The changes on Capitol Hill were no less dramatic. With the fiscalization of policy, budgetary decisions were postponed until the end of the legislative session, and virtually all items were considered in one large omnibus bill that covered almost the entire range of the federal budget. The president's supporters were the first to discover the effectiveness of this tactic when they combined new authorizing and appropriating legislation into one large Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act that promulgated the large domestic budget cuts of 1981. But once the Democratic party recovered from the initial Reagan onslaught and gained more self-assurance, it too discovered that combining many budgetary items into one large piece of legislation could be an effective policy strategy. Bolstered by an increased majority in the House in 1982, the Democrats forestalled presidential vetoes by combining domestic and defense expenditures into one large budget. As a result, most budgetary decisions in the 1980s were the product of negotiations between congressional party leaders, top White House staff, and OMB officials. In 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1990 these negotiations were protracted disputes that were finally resolved only after the fiscal year had ended, veto threats had been made, government workers had been told that only essential employees should

[22] Terry Moe, "The Politicized Presidency" in Chubb and Peterson, *The New Direction*; Lester M. Salamon and Michael S. Lund, eds., *The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1984); Samuel Kernell, "The Evolution of the White House Staff" in Chubb and Peterson, *Can the Government Govern?*

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report to work, temporary continuing resolutions were passed, and a last minute accord was finally reached. On other occasions (both before presidential election years and as George Bush was enjoying his honeymoon year)—1984, 1987, 1988, and 1989—summit negotiations were held early enough so that the budget could be constructed in a somewhat less frantic atmosphere. But whether or not budgeting was highly confrontational, the main participants in the final negotiations were party leaders and top presidential advisers.[23]

In this highly centralized decision-making context, party interests took precedence. The highest priorities of the Democratic party were social security, medicare, other retirement programs, and the safety net. The Republicans gave priority to keeping the tax cuts and committing more resources for defense. Within these constraints both sides did their best to keep the budget deficit from escalating still higher.

The losers were the domestic agencies, the authorizing committees, and the appropriations committees. Budget resolutions drafted by the budget committees and backed by the party leaders took precedence over the fragmented, decentralized decision-making system that had facilitated programmatic expansion in earlier decades. The results were steep cuts in programs affecting special interests.

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act formally recognized this new structure of power. This legislation required across the board budget cuts necessary to bring the budget into balance gradually over a five-year period. The legislation was designed to reduce budget deficits automatically: if Congress proved unable to keep appropriations from running in excess of anticipated revenues by no more than the amount allowed by law, then budget cuts were to occur automatically through a process called sequestration.

The law in operation did not reduce actual deficits as quickly as called for in the original legislation. Congress postponed the effective date by which deep reductions in the size of the deficit were to occur; estimates of revenue by the OMB were overly optimistic so that actual deficits exceeded projected ones; the costs of repaying savings and loan debts were shifted off the official budget; and Congress found enough other "smoke and mirrors" devices that promised more deficit reduction than actually happened.

Yet Gramm-Rudman-Hollings had its effect both substantively and politically. It perpetuated a highly centralized budgetary decision-making process by creating a crisis atmosphere in which fiscal policy was being made. And within the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law itself, interest on the debt, certain defense programs, social security, and safety net programs were exempted from automatic sequestration, giving them a privileged position that protected them during the high-level negotiations at which budget cuts were made. After all these considerations were taken into account, programs dear to the hearts of the special interests simply had to be sacrificed.

[23] Steven Smith, *Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989); Roger Davidson, "The New Centralization on Capitol Hill," *Review of Politics* 50 (Summer 1988): 345–64; and Shepsle, "The New Textbook Congress."

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In short, the special interests do not stand much of a chance when the political decisions involve retrenchment rather than expansion. When tax increases are politically painful, when the peace dividend is no longer at hand, and when power is centralized in the hands of party leaders, party interests become paramount. Specific, narrow, parochial interests, no matter how worthy, will suffer. Whether the elephants fought—as they did in 1981, 1983 or 1985—or danced—as they did in 1984, 1987, and 1989, the ants were trampled.

Conclusions

These signs of the decline of special interest influence must be interpreted cautiously. The data we present relate only to the fiscal policies of the federal government. We have no quantitative data on the extent to which special interests are benefitting from tax expenditures, regulatory policies, or trade restrictions. But impressionistic evidence in these policy areas is not inconsistent with the conclusions that we have drawn from the fiscal data we have presented. The 1986 tax bill has been widely proclaimed as one of the most successful efforts to eliminate tax loopholes from the federal revenue-raising system, a defeat of the special interests that most political analysts thought was unimaginable.[24] The process of government regulation was greatly centralized within the executive branch. Departments and agencies could no longer promulgate new regulations without first informing OMB of their intention to do so, then receiving OMB permission to hold hearings on the regulation, and finally winning OMB approval of the final regulations. The consequence of these new procedures was to greatly restrict the issuance of new requirements. Although these activities were declared to be without the requisite legislative authority in 1990 by the Supreme Court in *Dole v. United Steelworkers of America*, it is unclear whether OMB will change its procedures or find an alternative legal basis for justifying them. Finally, the politics of trade in the United States have yet to succumb to parochial interests to the extent that was generally expected in the early 1980s. Even after the U. S. balance of trade shifted decisively to the negative side, Congress has proven reluctant to require restrictions on trade, preferring instead to grant discretionary powers to the executive branch.[25] Indeed, Congress approved with relatively little controversy a common market agreement with the Canadians. And within the executive branch, restrictions on trade have been promulgated only episodically and inefficiently.[26] At a time when pressures from special interests have escalated, policy has changed hardly at all.

[24] Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, *Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

[25] I. M. Destler, "United States Trade Policymaking in the Eighties," (Paper prepared for the Conference on Politics and Economics in the Eighties, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., 1990).

[26] David B. Yoffee, *Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

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Our findings thus support the thesis that strong parties and centralized decision making leave interest groups in a relatively disadvantageous position. This was not the only factor that changed in the 1980s; in addition, fiscal deficits were high, the process of increasing taxes became more painful, and the peace dividend disappeared. Since these factors changed more or less simultaneously and there was a good deal of mutual interaction among them, we cannot be certain how much each contributed to the changed political position of the special interests. But at the very least there seems to be a correlation between the degree to which political processes are decentralized and the political influence of special interest groups.

Are these permanent changes in the American political system, or will special interests find a way to win renewed access to the policy-making system? Long-range prognostications are difficult to make, but it is our estimate that the world of the 1960s and 1970s will not soon be recreated. A new peace dividend may emerge in the 1990s. It is conceivable that defense expenditures could drop to 3 or 4 percent of GNP, well below the lows they reached in the early years of the Carter administration. Although this may give special interests some new opportunities, a complete turn around is unlikely. The competition for the resources released for nondefense purposes will be intense. Deficit reduction will undoubtedly become a high priority, and this goal by itself could absorb the entire reduction in the cost of national defense. Programs for the retired are becoming increasingly expensive, as the number of retirees increases and the cost of health care continues to rise at a rate faster than overall increases in the cost of living. The case for expanding the safety net to address the needs of the homeless, the underclass, and the permanently poor remains a powerful one; and if resources become more plentiful, the paradox of poverty among wealth could become an increasingly salient political question. Unless tax indexation is eliminated or an alternative way of raising taxes easily is found, and unless power once again shifts from party leaders to congressional subcommittees, one must not expect the peace dividend by itself to bring back the good old days of interest group liberalism. Reagan's warning in his farewell address seems as outdated as George Washington's caution against making entangling alliances.*

* I wish to thank Mark C. Rom and Robert Lieberman for their research assistance. This article is adapted from a version recently published in Mark P. Petracca, ed., *The Transformation of Interest Group Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

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The Superpowers and an Arab-Israeli Political Settlement: The Cold War Years

JEROME SLATER

From about 1950 until the end of the cold war in the late 1980s the Arab-Israeli conflict became entangled in the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The prevalent view in the United States was that the Soviet Union sought to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to drive the West from the Middle East and secure its own domination over the area. From this perspective, Soviet ambitions were antithetical to the prospects for a settlement of the conflict that would protect the legitimate security interests of Israel, America's principal regional ally. For these reasons the United States ignored various Soviet proposals for mutual superpower disengagement from the Middle East and sought to exclude the Soviet Union from diplomatic efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In some ways American policy succeeded: the Soviets became increasingly less influential in the Middle East from the early 1970s onward, and the United States was able to unilaterally mediate partial Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements in the mid-1970s and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979. However, the price of this success was high. The argument of this article is that American policy was based on misperceptions about Soviet interests, objectives, and behavior in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result of these misperceptions the cold war was exacerbated, there were several near-confrontations between the superpowers, and—most importantly—opportunities to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict were squandered.

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Moreover, the argument has more than historical significance. While the cold war confrontation is now rapidly yielding to far-reaching U.S.–Soviet cooperation, including perhaps the beginning of efforts at joint action to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will be something of a miracle if Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev manages to survive multifaceted internal crises and remain in power. One possibility is that Gorbachev will be succeeded by more traditional Soviet leaders with more traditional definitions of Soviet national interests. However, the implication of the historical reassessment offered here is that even in that case there would be no reason to expect a drastic change in Soviet policy in the Middle East and no necessary conflict between U.S. and Soviet interests in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Alternatively, Gorbachev may survive, but even he is unlikely to accept U.S. domination of the peace process and the exclusion of the Soviet Union. In 1987 he wrote: "We are not bent on elbowing the United States out of the Middle East—this is simply unrealistic. But the United States should not commit itself to unrealistic goals either. The main thing is to take the interests of all sides into consideration."[1] To be sure, three years later the Soviet Union is in such disarray that it is not clear that it will survive as a unified state, let alone as a superpower whose interests must be taken into account. On the other hand, it would certainly be premature to write it off, especially in the Middle East where the Soviet Union—or, Russia—has had enduring security, economic, and political interests. Indeed, political stability in the Middle East may now be even more critical to the Soviets, for fundamentalist Islamic nationalism threatens to spread to Soviet Central Asia, exacerbating the Soviet nationalities problem and perhaps undermining the very territorial integrity of the Soviet state.[2]

For these reasons, even as it has drastically retrenched in most areas of the world, the Soviet Union has remained active in the Middle East and continues to insist on an international conference under the joint auspices of the superpowers to mediate a comprehensive settlement of all Middle Eastern problems, including the present Gulf crisis as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict. I shall argue that the Soviets have consistently sought a genuine political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict since at least the late 1960s and probably earlier; given that fact and given the Soviet Union's continuing influence with the major actors in that conflict, especially Syria and perhaps the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the

[1] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 174. Gorbachev reiterated this position at his summit meeting with President George Bush in September 1990: "I think that everything that is taking place in the Middle East is a matter of concern to us, of equal concern [as to the United States]." Press conference, *New York Times*, 11 September 1990.

[2] Note the recent statement of Vitaly Naumkin, deputy director of the Oriental Institute of Moscow: "This [the Middle East] is still a vital region for the Soviet Union—financially, geographically and strategically. It's important for our security. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism on the Arabian peninsula could have a direct impact on our southern Muslim republics." Quoted in the *Buffalo News*, 8 September 1990.

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United States should seek actively to engage rather than exclude the Soviet Union in an effort to reach a comprehensive settlement, regardless of Gorbachev's fortunes.

What Were the Soviet Objectives?

As many scholars have noted, there have been two theories of Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict.[3] The dominant one and the one on which U. S. policies were based is that Soviet policies reflected radically expansionist objectives. The minority view, argued by a number of academic specialists, is that Soviet policy was essentially defensive.

The archetypical cold war interpretation was that Soviet policy was part of a long-range, planned strategy of global expansionism, motivated by some combination of revolutionary ideology and traditional Russian imperialism and expansionism, especially along Russia's southern periphery. Taking advantage of the post-World War II "vacuum" left by the decline of western power and the resulting political instability in the Middle East, the Soviets moved in, tactically aligned themselves with the emerging radical, nationalist, anticolonialist forces in the area, and used the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means of penetrating the Middle East. The overall Soviet goals were to eliminate western influence, establish Moscow as the dominant power in the area, threaten vital western communications and sea routes, outflank NATO, gain a stranglehold on Middle Eastern oil, and thereby put severe pressure on Western Europe, Japan, and perhaps the United States itself. Lyndon Johnson, in an assessment that reflected the basic viewpoint of every postwar American president from Harry Truman through Ronald Reagan (only partially excluding Jimmy Carter) put it this way: "The Soviets used Arab hostility toward Israel . . . to push moderate Arab states toward a more radical course and to provide a Middle East base for expanding its role in the Mediterranean, in Africa, and in the areas bordering on the Indian Ocean. . . . The expanding Soviet presence in this strategic region threatened our position in Europe. . . . If they gained control of the seas, the oil, and the air space of the vast arc between Morocco and Iran, all that had been done since President Truman's time to achieve stability and balance in world politics would have been endangered."[4]

[3] See esp. Richard Herrmann, "Soviet Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Political Science Quarterly* 102 (Fall 1987): 417–440.

[4] Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Popular Library, 1971), 288. Dennis Ross, currently a high Bush Administration official responsible for U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, earlier argued that although the Soviet Union is cautious and may not have a master plan in the Mideast, there as elsewhere it seeks to undermine the United States, supplant U.S. influence with its own, and become "an arbiter over oil flows" to the West. Ross, "Soviet Decisionmaking for the Middle East" in Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Mark A. Bruzonsky, eds., *Security in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987). Academic specialists emphasizing the expansionist nature of Soviet policy include Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1982); Theodore H. Friedgut, "The Soviet Union in the Middle East" in Israel Stockman-Shomron, ed., *Israel, the Middle East, and the Great Powers* (Jerusalem: Shikmona Publishing Co., 1984); J.C. Hurewitz, *The Soviet-American Rivalry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Walter Laqueur,

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Since the 1970s, however, the dominant position among academic specialists has been that while Soviet policy was basically expansionist, it was cautious, pragmatic and to a considerable extent reactive rather than planned. On the one hand, the Soviets recognized the value of the Arab-Israeli conflict to their goals of eliminating western influence and expanding their own; but on the other hand, after 1967 they also feared the potential of Arab-Israeli wars to precipitate unwanted confrontations with the United States. Therefore, while the Soviets took advantage of targets of opportunity when they presented themselves and sought to "probe for soft spots" in the Middle East, they avoided direct attacks on vital western interests. Their preferred scenario for the Arab-Israeli conflict was to keep the pot boiling while ensuring that it didn't boil over, so as to maintain a prolonged stalemate or a state of no war, no peace.[5]

The alternative or minority theory of Soviet behavior is that it was best explained not in terms of expansionist objectives at all, whether motivated by ideological/revolutionary goals or those of traditional Russian imperialism, whether planned or reactive, whether reckless or cautious. Rather, it is proposed, all actual Soviet behavior in the Middle East from World War II until Gorbachev can be explained in terms of a combination of traditional defensive concerns, the ongoing dynamic of the cold war or geostrategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Soviet aspirations to be recognized and accepted as a superpower equal in influence and prestige to the United States.[6]

The Struggle for the Middle East (New York: Macmillan Press, 1969); Barry Rubin, "Reshaping the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Summer 1990); Steven Spiegel, "Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East" in Steven L. Spiegel et al, eds., *The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East* (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1988).

[5] For typical statements of this view, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East" in Harry S. Allen and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Israel, the Middle East, and U. S. Interests* (New York: Praeger, 1983); Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow and a Middle East Peace Settlement," *Washington Quarterly* 8 (Summer 1985); Robert A. Hunter, "Seeking Middle East Peace," *Foreign Policy* 73 (Winter 1988–89); Paul Jabber and Roman Kolkowicz, "The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973" in Steven S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1981); Roman Kolkowicz, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East" in Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, eds., *The USSR and the Middle East* (New York: John Wiley, 1973); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union's Imperial Policy in the Middle East," *Middle East Review* 15 (Fall/Winter 1982–1983).

[6] The most important works in this genre include L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); George W. Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967–1972" in Alexander A. George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Breslauer, "On Collaborative Competition" in George W. Breslauer, ed., *Soviet Strategy in the Middle East* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Yair Evron, *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Galia Golan, *Yom Kippur and After* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Ilana Kass, *Soviet Involvement in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978); Ephraim Karsh, *The Cautious Bear: Soviet Military Engagement in Middle East Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985); Karsh, *The Soviet Union and Syria* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988); S.N. MacFarlane, "The Soviet View of the Utility of Force in the Third World" in Paul Marantz and Blema S. Steinberg, eds., *Superpower Involvement in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985); MacFarlane, "The Middle East in Soviet Strategy" in Aurel Braun,

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Soviet defensive objectives included Russia's traditional concern with the safety of its southern flank along the 1800 mile border it shares with countries of the Middle East, its more recent concern with "capitalist encirclement,"[7] its desire for secure access to the Mediterranean through the Black Sea and the Straits of the Dardanelles, its concern to protect the sea lanes and lines of communications that link the Baltic and Black Seas to the Soviet Far East,[8] and perhaps most importantly of all, its concern with the deployment of American aircraft carriers and submarines in the Mediterranean that posed a direct nuclear threat to the Soviet homeland. Thus the Soviet acquisition of land, sea, and air base rights in the Middle East after the early 1960s can be explained in terms of a desire to monitor U.S. naval forces, develop an antisubmarine warfare capability, and generally to counter the American strategic threat.

In addition, the Soviets clearly were also motivated by the desire to be accepted as a superpower of equal standing and influence to the United States.[9] Indeed, much of their behavior could be interpreted simply as emulation of the United States. In this view, the Soviet military presence in the Mideast played the same function as the Sixth Fleet did in U.S. policy: to show the flag, to deter intervention against its clients by its superpower rival, and to maintain the capability to intervene if necessary to protect a client state threatened by allies or proxies of its adversary.[10]

There is no evidence, it is further argued, that the Soviets ever sought to seize the oil resources of the Middle East or otherwise deny the West access to them. Rather, insofar as oil played any role at all, the Soviet concern was to maintain

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ed., *The Middle East in Global Strategy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987); MacFarlane, "The Soviet Union and Conflict Management in the Middle East" in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987); Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987); Seth P. Tillman, *The United States and the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), chap. 6.

[7] In the mid-1960s Nikita Khruschev privately explained his Middle East policies as being designed to prevent western domination and "encirclement" of the Soviet Union. Quoted by Mohammed Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 91. See also the assessment of Harold Saunders, a former high State Department official specializing in the Arab-Israeli conflict: "The Soviets since the early 1950s had felt threatened by what they saw as a U.S. network of relationships in the Middle East intended to encircle the Soviet Union, contain its influence, and deny it an active presence." Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition and Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Arena" in Alexander A. George et al, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 552.

[8] See the analogous U.S. concern with *its* sea lanes and lines of communication in the Caribbean. For a brief discussion, see my "Dominoes in Central America," *International Security* 12 (Fall 1987).

[9] On the influence of this factor in Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Breslauer, "On Collaborative Competition"; and MacFarlane, "The Soviet Union and Conflict Management in the Middle East." Breslauer cites Leonid Brezhnev's well-known comment in 1977: "There is no problem anywhere that can be solved without the Soviet Union or in opposition to her" (p. 17).

[10] Robert Harkavy, "Strategic Access, Bases and Arms Transfers" in Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer, eds., *Great Power Intervention in the Middle East* (Elmsford, N.J.: Pergamon Press, 1979).

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future access for itself against the time when its domestic oil production would no longer meet its needs. However, as the Soviets themselves pointed out, they needed only normal commercial relations for this purpose, not domination, let alone the exclusion of the West.[11]

Most importantly for our purposes, in this alternative theory of Soviet policy, the Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli conflict is best explained not in terms of Soviet exploitation of a golden opportunity, but rather as a dangerous trap, a quagmire, into which the Soviets were reluctantly and largely unwittingly drawn and from which for years they sought to escape—but not unconditionally, only with their security, prestige, and credibility intact. The preferred Soviet solution for this predicament was a compromise political settlement of the conflict to be presided over and guaranteed under the joint auspices of the coequal superpowers.

In the reevaluation of Soviet policy that follows, particularly of its long-standing efforts to bring about a negotiated political settlement, I shall argue that this minority interpretation is far more persuasive than the dominant one—on which American policy was based. Soviet behavior was quite inconsistent with the view that it sought to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to establish domination over the Middle East.[12]

How the Soviets Were Drawn In

As is well-known, the initial Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of active and strong support for the creation of Israel. In 1948 the Soviet Union supported Israeli independence in the United Nations, was the first state to provide de jure diplomatic recognition of Israel, allowed substantial Jewish emigration to Israel from the Soviet Union and from Eastern Europe, and, most importantly, provided Israel with substantial arms through Czechoslovakia.

Most historians argue that the major Soviet purposes in its early support of Israel were to diminish British influence in the Middle East (by supporting the

[11] Evgeni M. Primakov, "Soviet Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict" in William Quandt, ed., *The Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988). Note also Khrushchev's remark that western fears that oil supplies were threatened by the Soviet Union were absurd, because the Soviets didn't need Arab oil, the Arabs needed to sell it to the West, and any interference with western access could lead to nuclear war. Indeed, according to Heikal, Khrushchev went so far as to warn the new radical nationalist regime in Iraq in the 1950s that it should reassure the West that its oil supplies would not be threatened, so as to avoid the possibility of nuclear war. Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar*, 98.

[12] In this respect, my assessment differs from that of Herrmann, who argues that none of the differing theories of Soviet behavior can be either validated or falsified. Strictly speaking, of course, this is correct—"proof" or "refutation" is beyond the capabilities of historical analysis. However, what historical analysis *can* show is that the weight of the evidence is far more consistent with one interpretive theory than another. In another—and crucial—difference with Herrmann, I argue that serious Soviet efforts at disengaging from the Arab-Israeli conflict through a political settlement began no later than 1968, not in 1984 as he suggests. And if follows from this that American efforts at excluding the Soviets from the Arab-Israeli peace process did not become "unreasonable" only in the 1980s, but far earlier.

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Jewish revolt against British control of Palestine), to win friends in influential circles in the West, and to support an emerging socialist state in the region. However, within several years Soviet support for Israel had ended. This shift in policy has been attributed to a variety of factors: a rectification of a Soviet tactical mistake in which Stalin realized he had alienated the Arabs, who were far more numerous and presumptively more powerful than the Israelis; disappointment at the weak-tea socialism of the Israeli Labor government; alarm over the pro-Zionist enthusiasm of Soviet Jewry; and Stalin's own growing anti-Semitism.[13] Whatever role these factors may have played, however, surely at least as relevant was Israel's own fateful decision to shift from its initial foreign policy of neutrality in the cold war to one of alliance with the West.

By the early 1950s then, Soviet policy was clearly shifting toward the Arabs. In mainstream interpretations, it was the active Soviet support of the Arabs after 1955 that introduced the cold war into the Arab-Israeli conflict and created a potential superpower confrontation. However, the historical evidence strongly suggests that the converse is the case: it is the cold war that brought the Soviet Union into the Middle East and led to direct Soviet support for the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of the first steps in this process was the Israeli decision to seek arms from the United States in early 1950; although Washington declined direct involvement, it did help facilitate the Israeli acquisition of arms from Britain and France. Several months later, Premier David Ben-Gurion decided to support the West in the Korean War and to abandon nonalignment. Both of these decisions provoked angry denunciation from the Soviet Union.[14]

Undoubtedly of greater importance, though, was the Eisenhower administration's decision in the early 1950s to actively extend the containment policy to the Middle East, principally through support of the Baghdad Pact, which was to have been an alliance between Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, organized, armed, and financed by the United States. The Baghdad Pact sought to extend NATO and the western alliance system to the Middle East, completing a ring of pro-western, American-armed states around the entire European, Middle Eastern, and southern Asian periphery of the Soviet Union.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union considered the Baghdad Pact to be a direct threat to its security: "the establishment of foreign military bases on the territory of the countries of the Near and Middle East has a direct bearing on the security of the USSR."[15] The USSR warned that if the United States proceeded with the pact it would be forced to take countermeasures. Before it took such action, though,

[13] On the origins of Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Arthur J. Klinghoffer, *Israel and the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985); Arnold Krammer, *The Forgotten Friendship* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1974); Walter Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959).

[14] For a brief discussion of these decisions, and their consequences, see Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); and Nadav Safran, *Israel, the Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 338–340.

[15] Soviet statement of April 1955, quoted by Karsh, *The Soviet Union and Syria*, 1.

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on several occasions in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that the Middle East be neutralized and demilitarized by means of superpower arms limitation agreements under which both sides would refrain from arming client governments.[16] However, the United States ignored the Soviet warnings and proposals—as it was repeatedly to do in the next thirty years—and proceeded with plans to implement the Baghdad Pact.

The Baghdad Pact was also aimed at Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, for Nasser was leading the nationalist, anticolonialist, anti-western revolutionary forces in the area and seeking to destabilize pro-western governments. He was, therefore, regarded by the United States as an ally, if not a proxy, of international communism. Under the pact, British power, supported by the United States, would be reintroduced into the Middle East; Egypt would be isolated; and its most bitter Arab enemy, Iraq under a pro-British monarchy, would be strengthened. As a result, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for military support—motivated, to be sure, not only by the threat posed by the Baghdad Pact but also by his conflict with Israel.

The initiative for an Egyptian-Soviet military pact, then, came from Egypt rather than from the Soviet Union, and there is evidence that the Soviets responded to it with some reluctance and without considering the wider implications of their action in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[17] Moreover, the Soviet motivation was essentially defensive and reactive—to strengthen an Arab regime that was opposing western domination in the area and to balance impending French arms sales to Israel.[18] Nonetheless, the 1955 Soviet decision to join in an alliance with Nasser and provide arms to him was to have fateful consequences.

The Baghdad Pact and later the Eisenhower Doctrine, under which the United States asserted the unilateral right to send troops to protect any Middle Eastern government that was endangered by overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism, created the first significant convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and Egypt and precipitated rather than contained Soviet influence in the Middle East. Moreover, opposition to the Baghdad Pact was one of the causes of the July 1958 revolution in Iraq that replaced a pro-western government with a radical, anti-western, anti-Israeli one—and spelled the end of the Baghdad Pact itself. But by far the most significant consequence of the extension of the containment policy to the Middle East, as well as the U.S. refusal to consider repeated Soviet proposals for neutralization and demilitarization of the area, was that the superpowers, as an unforeseen and unplanned by-product of the cold war, became deeply involved on opposite sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

[16] Klinghoffer, *Israel and the Soviet Union*, 39. Heikal reports that in the mid-1960s the Soviets again suggested solutions to the Arab-Israeli problem based on arms control agreements, *Sphinx and the Commissar*, 168.

[17] Heikal, *Sphinx and the Commissar*, 197, 276; Laqueur, *Soviet Union and the Middle East*, 190; Uri Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms The Third World* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1980), 172. Formally, the arms deal was between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, a Soviet attempt to avert unnecessary provocation to the West.

[18] Jon Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 12–13.

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The Superpowers and the Peace Process

In the next fifteen years, on four occasions—the 1956 Sinai war, the 1967 war, the 1970 Canal war, and the 1973 Yom Kippur war—the United States and the Soviet Union became enmeshed in Arab-Israeli conflicts that they did not plan, did not seek, sought to prevent, but in the end could not control. On several occasions, especially in 1967 and 1973, the superpowers may have come close to war with each other. Nonetheless, as unwelcome as these dangerous confrontations were, each side had sunk too much in the way of resources and, more importantly, prestige, credibility, and commitment to simply walk away.

In 1956 Israel, in response to growing Palestinian guerrilla raids from the Sinai and alarmed by the influx of Soviet arms into Egypt, attacked Egyptian forces in the Gaza strip. Another purpose of the Israeli attack, publicly proclaimed, was to discredit Nasser so that he would be overthrown. Thus the gauntlet was thrown down to the Soviet Union, whose arms were being captured and whose major ally in the Middle East was being directly threatened. The United States itself was in fact bitterly opposed to the war, had sought unsuccessfully to dissuade it, and had threatened severe economic sanctions against Israel in order to force it to end the war. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union sent a threatening message to Israel, warning it that the war was placing in question the very existence of Israel as a state. Western intelligence observed military movements in the Soviet Union, evidently designed to give teeth to its threat to undertake military action against Israel if it did not comply with a UN ceasefire resolution. Faced with these immense pressures from both the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel ended its advance and later withdrew from the Sinai.

Following the Sinai war, in 1956 and again in 1957 the Soviets renewed their earlier proposals for superpower agreements for mutual nonintervention in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern states, for the renunciation of the use of force, for abstention from the creation of conflicting alliances, and for "a reciprocal refusal to deliver arms to Middle Eastern countries."[19] Once again, the United States refused even to discuss the matter; its premise presumably was that the Soviets had neither legitimate interests nor real power in the area and could therefore be safely ignored. With Washington's adamance making a diplomatic settlement impossible, both sides then extended their commitment to their clients, and the cold war polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict deepened. Between 1956 and 1967, the Soviets replaced the arms the Israelis had captured or destroyed with even more modern ones, though they were careful not to provide enough tanks or aircraft to give Egypt the option of a surprise attack on Israel.[20] At the same time, the United States began providing arms to Israel, particularly anti-aircraft systems, tanks, and combat planes.

[19] The quote is from a Soviet note, as described in Paul Jabber, *Not by War Alone* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 41. For another discussion of the Soviet proposals and the western rejection of them, see Heikal, *Sphinx and the Commissar*, 76–77.

[20] Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs*, 32–33.

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The Soviet role in the 1967 Six-Day War was clearly an unintended consequence of its deepening commitments to Egypt and Syria. During spring 1967 there was a rapid escalation of the familiar cycle of Palestinian guerrilla raids against Israel (this time originating primarily from bases in Jordan, but sponsored by Syria) and increasingly massive Israeli retaliations. Moreover, Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol repeatedly warned that unless the raids ceased, Israel would engage in a massive military attack on Syria and even "march on Damascus in order to overthrow the Syrian government."[21]

In early May the Soviet Union told Syria and Egypt that its intelligence had learned that Israel was massing troops along the Syrian border in preparation for a major attack on 17 May. Responding to these reports, Egypt moved troops into the Sinai for the first time since 1956. A number of accounts of these events—and the American intelligence assessment at the time—agree that although the specific Soviet reports of Israeli troop mobilization and an impending attack were false, the Soviets had genuine reason to worry that such an attack was only a matter of time and that their motivation was to force Egypt to make good on its commitment to help defend Syria.[22]

Thus the Soviet motivation was essentially defensive and its intention was to deter war, not provoke it. While the Soviets were unhappy with Syrian support of the Palestinian guerrilla movement,[23] they were determined to protect the Syrian government—and later the Nasser regime in Egypt—from a complete military defeat that would not only be another humiliation for Soviet arms and credibility as an ally, but might lead to the collapse of their major Arab allies; Soviet expulsion from Egypt, Syria, and perhaps elsewhere in the Middle East; and the unilateral domination of the area by the United States.

The Soviet hope, then, was that the Egyptian troop movements, precipitated by Moscow's warnings of Israeli mobilization, would deter an Israeli attack on Syria. Initially, moreover, this was the Egyptian purpose as well. However Nasser, who was no Soviet puppet and could not be controlled by Moscow, became car-

[21] The quote is from Rabin, 11 May 1967, on Israeli radio, cited in Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 105. On 12 May the *New York Times* quoted a high Israeli official, believed to be Eshkol: "if Syria continues a campaign of sabotage in Israel it will immediately provoke military action aimed at overthrowing the Syrian regime." Cited by Jabber and Kolkowicz, "The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973," 419-20. On 14 May Rabin made a similar statement, cited by Brecher, *Decisions*, 361; other Israeli military spokesmen openly spoke of the Israeli "option . . . of the invasions and conquest of Damascus," as quoted in Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1988), 129.

[22] Schlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs*; Jabber and Kolkowicz, "Arab-Israeli Wars"; Safran, *Israel, the Embattled Ally*. The U.S. intelligence assessment is quoted by Lyndon Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 289. An internal memorandum written by Harold Saunders, then the National Security Council's primary Middle Eastern specialist, stated that "the Soviet advice to the Syrians that the Israelis were planning an attack was not far off." The declassified memo is quoted by Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 59.

[23] Jabber and Kolkowicz, "Arab-Israeli Wars," 420.

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ried away by his success in reoccupying the Sinai and took a number of other steps, including the deliberate whipping up of mass war fever in the Arab world, which ended with the preemptive Israeli attack of 6 June.[24]

Once again, events that the superpowers did not intend and could not control nearly precipitated a direct Soviet-American confrontation during the war. As Israeli forces moved off the Golan Heights and began advancing toward Damascus, ignoring UN ceasefire calls, the Soviets warned the United States that they were on the verge of "necessary actions, including military" that could lead to a "grave catastrophe."[25] The United States responded by warning the Soviets not to intervene and moving the Sixth Fleet into position to resist any Soviet military action. At the same time, though, Washington warned Israel to end its advances and accept a ceasefire; Israeli compliance with U.S. pressures ended the crisis.

From 1967 through 1973, the Soviets followed a dual-track policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first track was the rebuilding of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces so that they would be capable of deterring or defending themselves against an Israeli attack and strong enough to negotiate from a position of strength for a political settlement rather than have one imposed upon them. On the other hand, the Arab states were denied the level and kind of offensive military capabilities, especially surface-to-surface missiles and modern fighter bombers that might have tempted them into an attack on Israel, particularly within its pre-1967 borders. Moreover, the Soviet advisers and technicians that were stationed in Egypt and Syria after 1967 retained operational control over the most highly advanced weapons and in other ways acted as a restraint on the indigenous military forces.[26]

The second track emphasized negotiation to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even earlier, from the outset of its alliance with Egypt and Syria in the 1950s, the Soviets had refused to countenance the elimination of Israel and repeatedly had made

[24] This is the standard account of almost all historians of the 1967 war. For a detailed account of the escalatory process and the outcome that no one intended, see Safran, *From War to War.* For Egyptian inside accounts that confirm these accounts of Soviet policy and the process by which Nasser allowed the situation to get out of hand, see Heikal, *Sphinx and the Commissar*; and the memoirs of Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

[25] Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1987), 142.

[26] The serious scholarship on Soviet arms sales to the Arab countries is virtually unanimous on the various limitations, reflecting an overall policy of not providing arms that would provide either Egypt or Syria with an offensive capability. The most important works are the following: Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East"; Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs*; Golan, *Yom Kippur*; Fred Halliday, *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981); Jabber and Kolkowicz, "The Arab-Israeli Wars"; Safran, *Israel, Embattled Ally*; Amnon Sella, *Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); Dina Spechler, "The Soviet Union in the Middle East" in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., *The Limits to Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979); Spechler, "The USSR and Third-World Conflicts," *World Politics* 38 (April 1986). See also the inside accounts of Egyptian anger at Soviet reluctance to provide the modern weapons they wanted, even for a limited war designed to put pressure on Israel in the occupied territory, let alone for a full-scale attack on Israel proper: Heikal, *Sphinx and the Commissar*, 193–202; Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 219–221, 225–231.

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that clear to Cairo and Damascus.[27] Moreover, during that period the Soviets made several proposals for the neutralization and demilitarization of the Middle East that had been ignored by the West. However, the near catastrophe of the 1967 war clearly impressed upon Moscow the necessity for a renewed effort for a political settlement; so even as the Soviets moved to rebuild the Egyptian army, they began pressuring Nasser to agree to accept the existence of Israel and to negotiate an end to the conflict.[28]

As a result of this renewed Soviet emphasis on political settlement and the resulting limitations on the arms it was willing to provide Egypt, the Soviet-Egyptian alliance was subject to severe strain, eventually leading to President Anwar Sadat's decision to break with the Soviets in the early 1970s. Moreover, during this period the United States was actively seeking to expel the Soviets from the Middle East. As a result, the Soviets moved to maintain their Middle Eastern presence by strengthening their alliance with Syria and forming new ties with Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO. Although these were the most rejectionist forces in the Arab world at that time, the Soviet actions did not demonstrate that they had lost interest in a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. What they showed was that the Soviets were determined not to be expelled from the area. In short, in order to continue to be able to play the game of nations as it was played in the Middle East, rather than cede sole influence to the United States, the Soviets had little choice but to find such allies (as well as to regain the naval and air base rights they had lost in Egypt) as they could.[29]

Put differently, although the Soviets genuinely wanted a political settlement, they also clearly intended to remain a superpower and therefore did not want just *any* settlement, but only one that would recognize, preserve, and legitimize their on-going presence and role in the Middle East. The best way to do that would be for the superpowers to join together in negotiating, supervising, and guaranteeing a formal and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.[30]

[27] For example, Khrushchev told Nasser that he must accept the fact that Israel exists rather than pursue the "wholly unreasonable goal" of trying to destroy it. Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 345. In his own memoirs, Anwar Sadat confirms that the Soviet Union never tried to conceal from Egypt its support for Israel's right to exist. See *In Search of Identity*, 297.

[28] Following the war, a study of *Pravda's* reporting on Middle Eastern affairs has shown that Soviet policy "unequivocally condemned Arab extremism" and bellicose rhetoric that proclaimed the forthcoming destruction of Israel: "Nobody in the world . . . [can agree to] the annihilation of the state of Israel," *Pravda* warned. Quoted in Ilana Kass, *Soviet Involvement in the Middle East*, 50. For other discussions of the Soviet pressures on Nasser, see Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*; and Jabber and Kolkowicz, "Arab-Israeli Wars."

[29] For similar assessments stressing the factors of Soviet prestige and credibility rather than expansionism, see Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985); Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization* (New York: Praeger, 1980); MacFarlane, "The Middle East in Soviet Strategy"; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[30] For a similar assessment, see Golan, *Yom Kippur and After*, 130. For a discussion of the repeated Soviet efforts to cooperate with the United States in reaching a peace settlement between the 1967 and 1973 wars, see Spechler, "The Soviet Union in the Middle East."

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For a brief period after the 1967 war, it appeared a settlement might be at hand as superpower policy appeared to be converging.[31] During the early fall, U.S. and Soviet negotiators reached an agreement on the basic principles for a settlement, which would be negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. In November 1967 these principles were adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 242, which has been supported by the Soviet Union and has remained the basic framework for a peace settlement ever since. Resolution 242 called for "the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East" based on the following principles: "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict, . . . termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, . . . freedom of navigation through international water-ways in the area, . . . just settlement of the refugee problem," and the "guaranteeing [of] the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."[32] In other words, the superpower framework called for "territory for peace," or Israeli withdrawal from territories it captured in the 1967 war in exchange for an internationally-guaranteed full peace. Moreover, the Palestinian question was treated only as a refugee problem rather than one of self-determination, and there was no mention of the creation of a Palestinian state.

The significance of 242 should not be underestimated. As Alfred Atherton, a former high State Department official who participated in the 1967 negotiations, has remarked, 242 represented "a clearcut Soviet commitment to a settlement under which the Arabs would for the first time recognize Israel's right to exist."[33]

However, both the Arabs and the Israelis in effect rejected 242. Syria and Egypt joined with other Arab states at the Khartoum summit conference in September 1967 in a statement that in principle accepted the necessity for a political settlement but rejected recognition and formal peace with Israel or even direct negotiations with it. At the same time Israeli policy, which for a brief period of time after the June war had been based on the principle of exchanging the conquered land in return for real peace, soon changed; Israel began moving toward consolidating its control over the occupied territories. As neither superpower was willing to make its economic and military assistance to its clients dependent on their agreeing to the principles of 242, the peace effort foundered.

[31] Harold Saunders, who participated in the process, has written that "the Soviets were willing to support a negotiated peace settlement . . . while the United States for a moment that summer supported total Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the conflict." Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition," 552. For other accounts of the post-1967 negotiations, see Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East"; and Benjamin Miller, "Perspectives on Superpower Crisis Management and Conflict Revolution in the Arab-Israeli Conflict" in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987).

[32] The text of UN 242 is printed in Quandt, *The Middle East*, Appendix A, 445–446.

[33] Alfred Atherton, "The Soviet Role in the Middle East," *Middle East Journal* 39 (Autumn 1985): 692.

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Nonetheless, in January 1968 the Soviets presented their own peace plan based on UN 242 including the principles of Israeli withdrawal over a two month period, the end of the state of war, the creation of demilitarized zones, and a resolution of the refugee problem.[34] There was little U.S. or Israeli interest, and at about the same time the United States began delivery of sixty-eight Phantom jets to Israel.

In late 1968 the Soviet Union again resumed its diplomatic efforts to get a settlement, presenting a proposal to the incoming Nixon administration for the implementation of 242. The proposal clearly sought to meet some of Israel's security concerns and made some concessions toward Israel's insistence on direct negotiations: it called for "contacts" among the belligerents to discuss the details of a settlement, included provision for the creation of demilitarized zones along Israel's borders and the indefinite stationing of UN peacekeeping forces in those areas, and introduced the idea of a formal superpower commitment to and guarantee of the settlement.[35]

In the next few months there were "persistent Soviet approaches to start a dialogue with the United States to try to advance mediation of an Arab-Israeli settlement."[36] In them Moscow made still further concessions: the Soviets would support direct negotiations between Israel and its adversaries; Israeli forces would not be required to withdraw from the occupied territories before an overall comprehensive settlement was in place; Palestinian refugees might be resettled with compensation in Arab countries, rather than returned to Israel; and the Soviet Union would bring pressures to bear on its clients to accept this framework.[37]

The Nixon administration was sharply divided on how to respond to the Soviet proposals.[38] The State Department, including the professionals specializing in the Arab-Israeli conflict and Secretary of State William Rogers, considered the proposals to be serious ones and accepted the unavoidability of a Soviet role in a political settlement. Henry Kissinger, however, emphatically did not: the Soviet position in his judgment was one-sidedly in favor of the Arabs, "offered no hint of possible compromise," "amounted to blanket support of the hard-line Arabs," and as such was "an obvious nonstarter."[39]

Kissinger's remarkable dismissal of Soviet diplomacy, so at odds not only with

[34] Klinghoffer, *Israel and the Soviet Union*, 63.

[35] For discussions of the Soviet proposal see Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," 72–73; Kass, *Soviet Involvement in the Middle East*, 71–72; Safran, *Embattled Ally*, 432.

[36] Saunders, Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition," 555.

[37] Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," 85; Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Canal War* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1974), 75–76.

[38] There are five insider accounts of the Nixon administration and the Arab-Israeli conflict: Alfred Atherton, "The Soviet Role in the Middle East"; Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982); William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Harold Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition." All of them stress the profound differences between Kissinger and the State Department on how to respond to the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Soviet role in particular.

[39] The quotations are from Kissinger, *White House Year*, 346, 349; *Years of Upheaval*, 600.

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the analysis of the State Department specialists but also with the clear historical record and the plain meaning of Soviet proposals, can only be understood in the context of his overall perspective on Soviet foreign policy. In his view, the Soviets were seizing upon the Arab-Israeli conflict to advance their geopolitical global goals and to drive the West from the Middle East. Therefore, the United States had to exclude the Soviets from Middle Eastern diplomacy, not cooperate with them, especially since the successful completion of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement would legitimize and institutionalize the Soviet presence and influence in the region. There was "no gain" for the United States, Kissinger wrote, in pursuing an active policy of seeking a settlement until a stalemate demonstrated that the Soviets were unable to produce progress.[40]

On the other hand, Rogers and the State Department wanted to explore the Soviet proposals, so Kissinger rather cynically allowed them to proceed, but without the intention of following through. Indeed, when it appeared that breakthroughs might be at hand, he resorted to delay and obfuscation to string out the process, at one point exploding at a State Department official who appeared to be taking the process too seriously: "I told [Joseph] Sisco in 1969 that we did not want a quick success."[41]

Nonetheless, the State Department continued its discussions with the Soviet Union, and in November 1969 presented the Rogers Plan to Israel, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. The U.S. proposal called for UN-mediated talks between Israel and Egypt to negotiate an agreement based on the following principles: the establishment of a timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied in 1967; an official end to the state of war between Egypt and Israel; the establishment of secure and recognized borders; the creation of demilitarized zones along the frontier; Israeli freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal; a "fair settlement of the refugee problem"; and mutual recognition by Israel and Egypt of "each other's sovereignty, political independence, and the right to live in peace within secure boundaries free from threats of force."[42]

There was clearly a very close similarity between the U.S. proposals and the Soviet position, which had been made public in July 1969; the major difference was that the Rogers Plan applied primarily to the conflict between Israel and Egypt over the Sinai, while the Soviet proposals extended the same principles to Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the West Bank. The Rogers Plan clearly had been formulated to maximize the chances of Israeli acceptance; nonetheless, the Israelis quickly rejected it. Shortly afterward Egypt followed suit, insisting on an unconditional Israeli withdrawal and no direct negotiations with Israel.[43]

[40] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 351.

[41] Ibid., 354. Kissinger is quite frank in describing his strategy of deliberately undercutting the bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations through evasion, delay, and obfuscation.

[42] Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 89–90.

[43] On the Israeli and Egyptian reactions to the Rogers Plan, see Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, 113ff. According to Heikal, Nasser was annoyed at the "remarkable similarities" between the Soviet and American peace plans, *Sphinx and the Commissar*, 195.

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With the peace process stalemated, the 1969–1970 Canal War escalated with Israeli-Egyptian artillery battles along the Suez Canal. In the early stages of the conflict, the Soviets refused to increase weapons deliveries to Egypt. However, in September 1969 the United States delivered to Israel a large number of its most advanced jet fighter-bombers, qualitatively increasing the Israeli air capability; in early 1970 Israel began using those aircraft for deep penetration bombing raids against military and industrial targets in the Egyptian heartland, even into the suburbs of Cairo. One of the major purposes of the raids, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan announced, was to bring home to the Egyptians their military vulnerability and inferiority, and thereby "topple Nasser."[44]

In the spring of 1970 Nasser went to Moscow to demand Soviet assistance, threatening otherwise to resign in favor of a new government that would turn from the Soviet Union to the United States.[45] Under these new circumstances the Soviets reluctantly agreed to provide anti-aircraft systems, Soviet advisers to operate them, and Soviet combat pilots to fly air defense missions in Egyptian planes, although they continued to refuse to provide Mig-23s, their most advanced fighter-bomber aircraft. Though the State Department considered that Israel's escalation and calls for the overthrow of Nasser were provocative and the Soviet action clearly defensive, Kissinger dismissed Soviet motivations as irrelevant.[46] In his judgment, Soviet actions, whatever had precipitated them, "represented a strategic threat that had to be dealt with." The Soviets were using their military presence "to enhance [their] geopolitical influence"—presumably unlike the United States—and therefore (he openly proclaimed at a press conference) had to be "expelled" from the Middle East.[47]

In effect, the Nixon administration simply dismissed the possibility that the Soviets saw themselves as responding to an escalation by the United States and its client, Israel. Rather, the administration saw the increased Soviet military commitment to Egypt as a geopolitical "challenge," to which the United States had to respond.[48] As a result, the United States sent still more offensive weapons to Israel, while the Soviets continued to furnish only defensive ones to Egypt.[49] With the United States committed to maintaining Israeli offensive capabilities and overall military superiority, regardless of Jerusalem's intransigent political position and military hubris, the Israelis lost any remaining incentive to negotiate on the basis of the Rogers Plan.

[44] Whetten, *Canal War*, 90.

[45] Heikal, *Sphinx and the Commissar*, 253; Sadat, *In Search of Identity*.

[46] Harold Saunders later wrote that the Israeli escalation had left the Soviets no choice but "to restore Egypt's defensive capability." Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition," 556. On the reaction of other working-level State Department officials to the Israeli escalation and the Soviet response, see Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 95.

[47] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 579–580.

[48] Atherton, "Soviet Role in the Middle East"; Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East." Quandt writes that Nixon and Kissinger not only rebuffed the Soviet bid for a cooperative approach in 1970, but seized upon events to "stand up" to Moscow, *Decade of Decisions*, 108–109.

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In late summer 1970 the United States mediated a ceasefire of the Canal War, which was proving increasingly costly to both Israel and Egypt and which had precipitated several clashes between Israeli and Soviet pilots. The Soviet Union then resumed its efforts for a negotiated settlement; and in the fall Nasser, under continuing Soviet pressure, reversed himself and announced Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers Plan.[50] Throughout 1971 the Soviets continued to deny Sadat military support for the resumption of the war of attrition, even though Israel remained adamant and the United States accelerated its delivery of advanced attack aircraft to Israel.[51] Moreover, it has recently been revealed, during 1971 Soviet officials secretly met with Israeli authorities and offered to resume diplomatic relations with Israel and to guarantee its security, following a general settlement based on the restoration of the 1967 boundaries; Israel was not interested.[52]

Despite the Soviet efforts and the major shift in policy by Egypt, the situation remained deadlocked. Nixon and Kissinger had no interest in a compromise settlement, especially one that was totally rejected by Israel, now regarded as a major American strategic ally in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the Soviets persisted, and in the May 1972 Soviet-American summit conference Brezhnev warned Nixon and Kissinger of the dangers of a new Arab-Israeli war and urgently called for joint superpower negotiations for a peaceful settlement.[53] At the conference Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed upon "general working principles" for an overall settlement, which included still another Soviet concession: the principles stated that border rectifications between Israel and its neighbors were possible and omitted the usual qualifier "minor." Thus, the Soviets were no longer calling for total Israeli withdrawal, a very important modification of the principles incorporated into UN 242.

Instead of exploring the significance of the progressive Soviet concessions, Kissinger simply dismissed them. His explanation for doing so could hardly be more revealing: "I have never understood why Gromyko accepted them [the new working principles], unless it was exhaustion. . . . In all events, the principles quickly found their way into the overcrowded limbo of aborted Middle East schemes—as I had intended."[54] Just to make sure we don't miss the point, Kissinger adds: "The US-Soviet dialogue on the Middle East remained in abeyance, which was where we wanted it."[55]

As a result of the lack of either U.S. or Israeli interest in a genuine compromise, Egypt and Syria decided to break the stalemate by a limited attack on Israeli mili-

[49] Whetten, *Canal War*, 94.

[50] On the Soviet pressures and Nasser's decisions to accept the Rogers Plan, see ibid., 106–107, 115. According to Whetten, the Soviet Union was not only pressuring Egypt, it warned its ally Iraq that Soviet aid would be discontinued if Baghdad opposed the peace process.

[51] Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition," 557.

[52] Moshe Zak, *Jerusalem Post*, 17 February 1989.

[53] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, chap. 11.

[54] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1294.

[55] Ibid., 1300.

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tary positions in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Almost surely the Yom Kippur War of 1973 could have been avoided and with it a dangerous near-confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel and the United States had simply ignored all the indications of both Soviet and Egyptian flexibility. Israel was convinced that the Arabs had no military option and that a diplomatic stalemate worked in its favor, allowing it to "create facts" in the territories—that is, permanently incorporate Sinai and the Golan Heights into Israel. In this judgment, it received full support from the United States, which shared the Israeli view of the desirability and viability of the status quo and was additionally motivated by the desire to exclude the Soviet Union from the Middle East and militarily strengthen an American strategic asset. As a result, throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s the Nixon administration increased its military assistance to Israel, undercut the State Department by shifting its diplomatic position to one nearly indistinguishable from that of Israel, and deliberately sabotaged the highly promising possibility of joint superpower action to bring about a settlement.

Following the 1973 war, though, diplomacy resumed. Nixon, Kissinger tells us, privately wanted to take advantage of the war to have the United States and the Soviet Union jointly impose a comprehensive peace in the Middle East; however, Kissinger talked him out of it, arguing that "we had never seen one shred of evidence [that the Soviets] were willing to separate themselves from the hard-line Arab program."[56] To be sure, publicly the United States committed itself to a multilateral approach through an international Geneva Conference. But in practice, Kissinger ignored multilateralism and a search for a comprehensive peace in favor of unilateral U.S. mediation of partial disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria in the mid-1970s: "Soviet cooperation was necessary to convene Geneva; afterward, we would seek to reduce its role to a minimum. The peace conference could soothe Moscow's nerves. . . ."[57]

Moscow was not very "soothed," though, and bitterly complained of its exclusion from the diplomatic process in violation of the 1972 summit conference agreements stipulating that Mideast negotiations would proceed under joint U.S.-Soviet auspices. The Soviet complaints, Kissinger cheerfully admits, were "perfectly true." The United States took advantage of détente, he goes on, to exclude the Soviets: "Our strategy sought to reduce the Soviet role in the Middle East because our respective interests in the area . . . could not be reconciled, at least as long as the Soviet Union identified itself only with a maximum Arab program and did nothing to induce compromise on the part of its clients. . . ."[58]

As a result of Kissinger's misinterpretation or misrepresentation of Soviet position, which hardly could be accurately characterized as wedded to "the maximum

[56] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 550–551.

[57] Ibid., 755. Kissinger entitles the chapter in which he deals with the 1970s Middle East negotiations, "Caging the Bear." On the exclusion of the Soviet from the step-by-step diplomacy of the post-1973 war period, see also Atherton, "Soviet Role in the Middle East," 698–702. To be sure, Israel and Egypt also opposed Soviet involvement in the mid-1970s negotiations.

[58] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 943–944.

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Arab program," the early 1970s became a tragedy of lost opportunities, first to avoid the 1973 war, later to use the war to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To be sure, Kissinger did successfully preside over Israeli-Egyptian-Syrian negotiations that resulted in the important disengagement of forces agreements in the Sinai and Golan Heights. However, the step-by-step diplomatic approach quickly ran out of steam, for it stopped well short of dealing with the central issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Palestinian issue.

There was one final opportunity for joint superpower leadership for a comprehensive settlement. In October 1976, in his lead speech before the 25th Party Congress and in a major foreign policy speech in March 1977, Brezhnev reaffirmed the Soviet position of seeking a settlement based on the principles of UN 242, fleshed out along the lines of Soviet and Rogers Plan proposals as they had been developed in the past decade: the end of the state of war; normalization of relations as soon as a phased Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories was completed; a mutual commitment of all sides to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; the establishment of demilitarized zones to be policed by UN peacekeeping forces; and joint superpower guarantees of the overall settlement. In addition, Brezhnev proposed that the superpowers agree on measures to limit the arms race in the Middle East, returning to the Soviet position of the 1950s.[59]

Carter and his leading foreign policy officials, National Security Council Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, were initially strongly sympathetic to seeking a comprehensive settlement in cooperation with the Soviet Union. The intellectual framework for the Carter administration's policy was based on a 1975 Brookings Institution study that argued that the United States should seek the constructive involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East negotiating process, since there was no question but that the Soviets had a considerable capacity to obstruct a settlement from which they were excluded.[60] As a result, Vance and Gromyko entered into new talks, culminating in the Joint Soviet-U.S. Communique of 1 October 1977, which called for the convening of a new international Geneva peace conference, co-chaired by the superpowers, to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The principles of the settlement would be the withdrawal of Israeli forces from "territories" occupied in the 1967 war; "the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate

[59] The text of the 1976 speech is published in Amnon Sella, *Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East*, 161–164; the text of the 1977 speech appears in Golan, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization*, 93.

[60] Report of a Study Group, *Toward Peace in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975). Two members of the Brookings group, Brzezinski and Quandt, joined the administration – Brzezinski as National Security Adviser and Quandt as the leading Middle East specialist on the NSC staff. In addition, Secretary of State Vance felt that "as a practical matter the Soviet Union, with political interests in the region and as a patron of several Arab states, should be accorded a role in negotiations that would help to dissuade it from undermining our efforts." See Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 164.

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rights of the Palestinian people"; the inclusion of "representatives of the Palestinian people" in the negotiations; the "termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence"; "the establishment of demilitarized zones and the agreed stationing in them of U.N troops or observers"; "international guarantees of such borders"; and the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union in these guarantees.[61]

Although the Soviet Union was now supporting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state led by the PLO, the joint communique did not call for such a state or specify the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. On the other hand, the U.S. position had shifted slightly, from support for the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinian people to that of their "legitimate rights."

However, the new strategy never got off the ground. The Israelis, of course, were strongly negative, and in the United States domestic criticism of Carter was strong. In November Sadat made his sudden dramatic decision to go to Jerusalem to pave the way for what amounted to a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, to be negotiated between the parties under the sole auspices of the United States, excluding the Soviet Union. Finally, in the last two years of the Carter administration the cold war intensified, leading the administration, "like its predecessors . . . [to] make opposition to Soviet influence the cardinal principle of its own Middle East policy."[62]

With the coming to office of the Reagan administration and its single-minded emphasis on strengthening the anticommunist, anti-Soviet "strategic partnership" between Israel and the United States, the comprehensive approach came to an end.

Conclusions

Even before Gorbachev, Soviet behavior in the Middle East belied the premises upon which American policy was based. There was little evidence of a strategy of expansionism or aggression, as opposed to one of seeking influence, leverage, and allies—just like the United States. Throughout over forty years of active involvement in the region, the Soviets provided little support of indigenous communism or revolution in the area, and there was no direct Soviet military intervention. Even the threat of intervention was rare, coming in the context of the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, when it appeared that Israeli military successes would endanger the regimes—and perhaps the capitals—of Egypt and Syria, which were the Soviet Union's major allies in the Middle East. Finally, the Soviets consistently refused to provide the level and quality of offensive weapons to their allies that would tempt them into attacking Israel within it pre-1967 boundaries,

[61] The text of the 1 October statement is printed in Quandt, *The Middle East*, Appendix B, 447–448.

[62] Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, 156. See also Quandt, *Camp David*, for a discussion of the factors behind the shift in the administration's policy after the 1 October joint communique.

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and they used their political influence with those allies—not always successfully—to seek to dissuade them from initiating any wars against Israel at all.

Nor is it persuasive that the Soviets sought to keep the pot boiling in the Arab-Israeli conflict or to continue a situation of no war, no peace, so that they could exploit the conflict as a means of expanding their influence in the Middle East. On the contrary, because of their fear that the Arab-Israeli conflict could get out of hand and precipitate a superpower conflict, the Soviets consistently sought to insulate the Middle East from the cold war and, that failing, to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict by a compromise political settlement. The clear Soviet preference for a compromise political settlement was not at the price of unilateral U.S. domination of the Middle East. Motivated by defensive concerns about the security of their southern borders, the drive to achieve recognition as a superpower equal in status and influence to the United States, and concern about their "credibility" (like the United States in Vietnam), the Soviets supported only those settlement plans in which they would retain their influence and presence in the Middle East, preferably through a coequal guarantor's role with the United States. Thus they successfully defeated American efforts to exclude them by finding new allies eager to obtain Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military assistance—even if those allies (Syria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO) were from the Arab rejectionist front.

In the past it was neither feasible nor desirable for the United States to exclude the Soviet Union from the Middle East and from efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the possible collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower, it may certainly be more feasible for Moscow to be excluded in the future, but it is no more desirable—regardless of what happens to Gorbachev. The geography and history of the Russian/Soviet role in the Middle East suggests that however the Soviet Union emerges from its current crisis, its interests in the area are likely to be enduring. For the foreseeable future there will continue to be a close parallelism in American and Soviet goals in the Middle East, as the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis has dramatically demonstrated. Both seek stability, oppose Iraqi expansionism as well as the spread of fundamentalist Islamic nationalism, and fear the consequences of a new Arab-Israeli war. In short, both are status quo powers concerned above all with the preservation of the existing order.

Given this parallelism, the conditions are present—as indeed they have been for many years—for a renewed U.S.-Soviet effort to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even with the drastic decline in Soviet international power, the Soviets continue to exercise great influence over Syria, and they have at least some influence with the PLO. Past history suggests that a joint Soviet-American commitment to a comprehensive peace is a necessary condition for a settlement. While it may not be a sufficient condition, the combination of incentives and pressures that the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together, could bring to bear on the major actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict might well be the difference between a comprehensive settlement and a catastrophic war.

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The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System

ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN

This article examines the evolution of the Brazilian defense industry within the context of the international system. Few, if any, developing countries have contributed more to conventional arms proliferation in recent years than Brazil. In less than a generation, Brazil went from being a traditional arms importer, dependent on the United States and Western Europe, to one of the world's top ten exporters with 1987 sales valued around $1 billion.[1] It became the largest exporter of wheeled armored vehicles, and it now produces main battle tanks, jet aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. Many of these products entered service in regional conflicts, notably the Iran–Iraq war, where they have won their battle stars. Brazilian equipment is noted for its toughness and reliability.[2]

I argue that the Brazilian defense industry can only be understood with reference to both economic *and* security factors. My analysis suggests that opportunities for the industry's growth were made possible by a propitious set of conditions that arose in the international economic and security environments during the 1960s and 1970s. Those circumstances, however, have been changing over time. Today,

[1] See Richard F. Grimmett, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers, 1980–1987* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 9 May 1988); Marlise Simons, "Gulf War Spurs Brazil Arms Makers," *New York Times*, 25 January 1988; "Decline in Sales for Brazilian Manufacturers," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 23 January 1988, 121.

[2] P. Lock, "Brazil: Arms for Export" in Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds., *Arms Production in the Third World* (Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1986), 91.

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Brazilian policy makers and industrialists face an altered international environment, one that in the future may constrain the industry's growth rather than promote its expansion.

Historical Background

Although the realization of a sophisticated arms industry is of recent origin in Brazil, it has long been a cherished goal of the armed forces. The military has played a prominent role in Brazilian economic development since World War I; at that time the country lost its access to world markets and suffered severely as a result. From the 1920s onward, national security considerations were explicitly incorporated into the state's industrial policies. In building a steel industry, for example, such questions as technological choice, location, and ownership (domestic vs. foreign, state vs. private) were decided primarily on security rather than economic grounds. Reflecting on the lessons of World Wars I and II, the Brazilian army sought to build an industrial base that could provide for civilian and military needs in the event of war or blockade.[3]

As economist Patrice Franko-Jones has argued, the early development of the Brazilian arms industry cannot be understood apart from the general pattern of industrialization that characterized the country after World War II. Owing to the failure of the private sector to engage in capital-intensive projects, the state took the lead in building the infrastructure required by a modern civilian economy and military-industrial complex. Since defense was viewed in Brazil, as elsewhere, as a public good, the government funded research and development programs, and it created new military institutes, such as the Center for Aerospace Technology founded in 1945. These institutes trained the engineers who served not only in the military, but also in cutting-edge civilian industries. In the early postwar years many of Brazil's military programs were undertaken in partnership with the United States.[4]

During the heyday of "import-substituting industrialization" in the 1950s and 1960s, the linkage between economic growth and national security became expressed in the philosophy of *seguranca e desenvolvimento* (security and development). The conceptualization of this philosophy was the central task facing professors at the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), which brought together military officers and civilian elites for a period of intense study. The ESG was characterized by virulent anticommunism, especially after the Cuban Revolution; radical activity in Brazil was viewed as part of the international "struggle between east and west in which there could be no neutral position."[5] ESG students were taught that Brazil

[3] See Ethan B. Kapstein, "Economic Development and National Security" in Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World* (London: Elgar, 1988), 136–151.

[4] Patrice Franko-Jones, "Public-Private Partnership: Lessons from the Brazilian Armaments Industry," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 29 (Winter 1987–88): 46–48.

[5] E. Bradford Burns, *Nationalism in Brazil* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 121.

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was a major battlefield in the cold war, which must be fought with political and economic weapons, as well as military ones.[6]

Until the 1960s, Brazil imported the bulk of its weaponry from the United States. But as the United States became bogged down by the Vietnam conflict in 1967 and 1968, arms deliveries to traditional clients in the developing world were reduced. To the Brazilian military—and to other Third World clients—the United States began to appear unreliable as a security partner.[7] In 1968, owing to Washington's refusal to supply fighter aircraft, Brasilia turned to France, purchasing Mirages instead. Thus began the shift toward European military suppliers. Between 1968 and 1972, Brazil purchased nearly $500 million in military equipment from Western Europe; during this period it received only $76 million in military aid from the United States.[8]

This shift in arms purchases marked an important first step in the reorientation of Brazil's foreign policy. In Latin America it was generally believed that the "revolution" that brought the Brazilian military to power in 1964 had been executed with the active assistance of the United States. Throughout the continent Brazil was viewed as a U.S. proxy, and this undermined its regional initiatives. During the 1970s Brasilia sought to distance itself from Washington and strengthened its ties with countries in Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Cooperative projects with Western European firms in the nuclear and military technology areas were critical to Brazil as it pursued an independent or nonaligned foreign policy. Growing bilateral tensions with the United States later in the decade, particularly over human rights, strengthened Brazil's resolve to act independently.[9]

Unlike bilateral military relations with the United States, arms cooperation between Brazil and Western Europe "included the gradual transfer of production technology, from direct supply of the first units to local assembly and ultimately indigenous manufacture."[10] Such companies as the British military electronics firm Ferranti established subsidiaries in Brazil or negotiated licensing agreements with Brazilian manufacturers. These contacts between European and Brazilian firms were—and continue to be—instrumental to the arms industries' progress.

The contrasting approaches to arms transfers exemplified by the United States on the one hand, and many Western European countries on the other, points to the importance of focusing on economic as well as security factors in any analysis

[6] Kapstein, "Economic Development and National Security."

[7] I thank Jorge Domínguez for highlighting this point.

[8] Ronald Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), 51.

[9] Riordan Roett, "Brazil and the United States: Beyond the Debt Crisis," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27 (February 1985): 1–16; Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil's Relations with Latin America: A Pattern of Bilateral Cooperation," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 28 (Summer 1986): 67–99.

[10] Lock, "Brazil: Arms for Export," 81. On the export strategies of European arms makers during this period, see John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (New York: Praeger, 1972).

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of the arms industry. Since the end of World War II, the unit cost of weaponry has increased dramatically. Of the western democracies, only the United States has maintained a sufficiently large internal market to amortize the costs associated with weapons development. Faced with severe economic constraints, policy makers and arms manufacturers in such countries as France and Britain began in the 1950s and 1960s to look overseas for markets. Developing countries, including Brazil, were able to exploit Europe's need to sell arms by negotiating attractive packages that included not just weapons purchases, but technology transfer as well. From the perspective of the arms seller, these transfers at least promised a future stream of revenues from licensing fees.[11]

Contrary to the contention of some analysts, the Brazilian arms industry that emerged in the late 1960s was *not* established as an export sector from its inception.[12] Instead, its primary goal was to meet the military requirements of the armed forces, as the government attempted to respond to a complex set of threats. The demands of the services prompted activity in both the public and private sectors. Entrepreneurs built defense equipment in low-tech areas, with the armored car manufacturer Engesa (which had previously produced trucks) being perhaps the most prominent example. State firms focused on capital-intensive programs; the aeronautics company Embraer, which is now the world's sixth largest aircraft manufacturer, provides a case in point. The export drive began many years after most Brazilian defense firms were established.

The Brazilian military government needed to respond to three different challenges in the internal and external environments. First, there were internal "threats" emanating from various radical organizations, and during the 1960s the military focused on counterinsurgency operations against urban guerrillas. The military was ruthless in dealing with its opponents; torture and human rights violations were widespread. By 1973–1974 the internal threat had been all but eliminated.[13]

Policies for coping with internal problems also had an important economic dimension. The government viewed the poor of the northeast and the southern cities (that is, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) as raw material for radical movements, and it encouraged their migration to the vast emptiness of the Amazon. A human and environmental tragedy subsequently unfolded as unsuitable land was cleared for farming. At the same time the military was given the mission of securing the region from drug traffickers and other outlaws; this has remained

[11] See Stanley and Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms*; Andrew Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Edward A. Kolodziej, *Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and its Implications for the International System* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). For a perceptive review article of Kolodziej that places the French arms industry in comparative perspective, see Nicholas Ziegler, "Review," *French Politics and Society* 7 (January 1989).

[12] See, for example, Herbert Wulf, "Developing Countries" in Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg, eds., *The Structure of the Defense Industry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 333.

[13] David J. Myers, "Brazil" in Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., *Security Policies of Developing Countries* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), 54–56.

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one of its prominent tasks to the present day and has catalyzed the development of military equipment capable of operating in this difficult environment.[14]

A second challenge was to Brazil's sovereignty. Owing to its economic dependence on the north and its military weakness, Brasilia could neither act autonomously at home nor even assert such vital national interests as territorial integrity. Brazilians resented the ability of First World states to "rob" their national resources, as the French allegedly did in overfishing the country's Atlantic waters during the 1960s. The feeble Brazilian navy was powerless to react to this French invasion, and in subsequent years efforts were made to rebuild the Brazilian navy through direct purchases and licensing agreements. Today the Brazilian navy is building its own warship.

Other threats to sovereignty existed because the government depended on First World states for technology, investment, and military hardware. This dependence from the military's perspective gave foreign suppliers leverage over domestic policies. Brasilia became increasingly aware of this form of dependence during the 1970s, as the United States refused to ship arms in light of the military government's human rights violations. Indeed, conflict with the United States over human rights provided a major catalyst to the arms industry.

Third, the government was concerned with Brazil's regional hegemony in South America. Throughout the postwar era, Brazil has viewed itself as the continent's dominant power. By and large, Brasilia has used its influence wisely, relying on negotiation rather than military operations to settle its territorial and boundary disputes. Further, Brazilian diplomats traditionally have been active in mediating other continental tensions. As Jorge Domínquez has pointed out, Brazilian foreign policy was an important contributor to "the maintenance of interstate peace in South America."[15] But during the 1970s, Brasilia became increasingly aware that it lacked the military force to support its diplomatic objectives. A series of regional problems, including disagreement with Argentina over the La Plata river basin, the Beagle Channel conflict between Chile and Argentina, and the Falklands or Malvinas war caused Brazilians to realize that they could not shape events within their supposed sphere of influence.

Communist aggression in West Africa and Central America during the 1970s increased Brasilia's concern about its regional position. The Cuban and Soviet military involvement in Angola and the establishment of Soviet naval bases across the narrow waist of the South Atlantic heightened Brazil's sense of insecurity, especially at a time when the country was making a substantial investment in offshore oil drilling. In 1970 Soviet naval units spent about 200 ship days in the South Atlantic; by 1980 this had climbed to 2,600 ship days.[16] At the same time, the San-

[14] "Brazilian Defense: Full Speed Ahead," *Defense and Foreign Affairs* 15 (March 1987): 33.

[15] Jorge I. Domínguez, "Latin American International Conflicts and the Threats of War" in Jagat S. Mehta, ed., *Third World Militarization* (Austin, Tex.: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1985), 143.

[16] Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 197.

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dinista revolution in Nicaragua caused the Brazilian military further anxiety about Soviet and Cuban influence.[17]

Given a shared set of concerns in Washington and Brasilia over communist expansion, analysts could be forgiven if they expected relatively close bilateral relations in this issue-area. Indeed, during the late 1970s and early 1980s suggestions were floated that the United States make greater use of Brazilian naval and air bases. A precedent existed from World War II, when Brazil provided the American military with base support before ultimately entering the conflict on the Allied side.[18] Hopes for greater cooperation, however, were quickly dashed. As retired U.S. Ambassador John Crimmins told a congressional hearing in 1982, "Brazil has shown . . . no readiness to enlist in a significant way with us." A common bilateral approach to the communist threat in South America stood in opposition to Brazil's nonaligned foreign policy.[19]

It is thus incorrect to assert, as some analysts have done, that Brazil has perceived no prominent threats in the international security environment. To be sure, the country has enjoyed a privileged geopolitical position, and the low level of direct military threat is indicated by military budgets that are generally in the range of one percent of gross national product (GNP). But this figure hides the other, more subtle concerns that have shaped national security policy. Prominently, the defense budget does not include the cost of national industrial policies that have encouraged the growth of defense-related industries. Public sector investment in Brazil, for example, climbed to nearly 6 percent of GNP during the late 1960s, when companies including the nuclear energy monopoly Nuclebras and the aeronautics firm Embraer were founded.[20] At the same time, the government began to encourage the development of an indigenous computer industry. By the mid-1970s, perhaps twenty-five state firms were involved in military production, in addition to a handful of private companies.[21] This production, it must be emphasized, was initially directed toward domestic rather than export markets.

In its formative stage, therefore, the Brazilian arms industry grew in the context of a set of economic and security concerns that could not be addressed satisfactorily by arms purchases from the developed world. Indeed, from Brazil's perspective the nation demanded an indigenous weapons capability. As former Air Force Minister Joelmir Campos Macedo declared, "it is a condition of security that each nation manufacture its own armaments."[22] The economic development process,

[17] See Schneider, *Brazil*, 45–51, 75; Renato P. Dagnino, *Aspectos Technologicos E Economicos do Armamentismo* (Campinas, Brazil: Unicamp, July 1985).

[18] Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map" in Uri Ra'anan, et al., *Arms Transfers in the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 12.

[19] Schoultz, *National Security*, 183.

[20] Ethan B. Kapstein, "Brazil: Continued State Dominance" in Raymond Vernon, ed., *The Promise of Privatization* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 128–129.

[21] Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 83.

[22]. Quoted in Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, "Developing States and the International Security System," *Journal of International Affairs* 34 (Spring/Summer 1980): 59–88.

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which was shaped with national security objectives in mind, provided the infrastructure that made arms manufacture possible. The expansion of the steel and strategic minerals sectors, the growth of the oil monopoly Petrobras, the founding of Embraer and Nuclebras—all were tangible expressions of the "security and development" philosophy. The Brazilian government also encouraged import substitution in defense-related areas by the emplacement of high tariff barriers and quotas on imports. During this period, many licensing agreements were reached, primarily with Western European suppliers, which further encouraged domestic production of defense-related equipment. By the 1970s, Brazil had in place a "potential arms production base," which ultimately allowed it to capitalize on growing market opportunities in the export sector.[23]

Arms Exports

These opportunities were once again made possible by factors in both the economic and security environments. From the macroeconomic perspective, the shocks caused by the oil crisis of 1973–1974 and the high real interest rates that followed exacerbated the country's external debt problem and forced it to export an increasing percentage of gross national product. According to one analyst, an "oil for arms" policy was developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Brazilian industrialists, working closely with diplomats in various embassies, targeted arms sales and countertrade deals at such Middle East clients as Iraq and Libya. The latter provided particularly attractive marketing possibilities, as it had become something of an international "pariah" state.[24]

The economic imperatives to export were supported by changes in the foreign policy environment. During the Ford and Carter administrations, bilateral tensions between Washington and Brasilia reached postwar highs as the military regime's human rights abuses were criticized. In 1976 the U.S. Congress passed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which Andrew Pierre has labeled "the most significant piece of legislation dealing with arms transfers since the enactment of the Mutual Security Act more than a quarter of a century earlier."[25] Among other provisions, the act prohibited arms transfers to any country that engaged "in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." In debating the renewal of a long-standing military aid agreement with Brazil in 1976, many members of Congress pointed to the military government's record of torture and arbitrary arrest. Irate, the Brazilian government unilaterally cancelled the mutual defense agreement that had been signed by the two countries in 1952. Brasilia accused Washington of "moral imperialism" and "interference" in its internal affairs. This furthered Brazil's determination to become an arms manufacturer in its own right.[26]

[23] Wulf, "Developing Countries," 333.
[24] Lock, "Brazil," 97.
[25] Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, 50.
[26] Dagnino, *Aspectos*, 8; Pierre, *Global Politics*, 33.

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The bilateral conflict over human rights has been viewed as a watershed event in the development of Brazil's arms industry.[27] Washington's heavy-handedness demonstrated to skeptical Brazilians the value of putting scarce resources into weapons manufacture; otherwise, the state was vulnerable to external manipulation. Since that time, there has been virtually no public debate concerning the arms industry. Questions are only now being raised as the expenses associated with the industry are rising.

Ironically, this bilateral dispute occurred precisely at the same time the United States was trying to gain Brasilia's support for its nuclear nonproliferation policies. Brazil had only recently signed an ambitious nuclear cooperation agreement with West Germany, which Washington believed was in violation of the spirit of its nonproliferation efforts. Tensions over conventional arms transfers did little to bolster Washington's position on the nuclear front.[28]

In launching its arms export drive, Brazil was able to capitalize on the perceived weakness of Washington in the post-Vietnam era. A Brazilian observer of the arms industry, Renato Dagnino, has indicated that in marketing weapons to Third World states the industry could exploit anxieties about the reliability of the American supplier. Brazilian officials told potential clients that with Washington everywhere on the defensive the "periphery's problem" had become one of "finding its own means of defense."[29]

If one characteristic can be associated with Brazil's arms exports, it is their linkage to the state's overall foreign policy. With Brasilia bent on carving an independent role in world affairs—a task that was especially challenging in light of its ongoing tensions with Washington and chronic economic problems—arms sales provided a means by which the country could advance national goals "without forfeiting its international standing."[30] Through weapons sales Brazil could earn hard currency while enhancing its role among the nonaligned nations.

This integration of arms sales and foreign policy cannot be understated. Brazil views itself as *primus inter pares* in the Third World context, and in recent years it has challenged the United States on a number of global agenda issues, including the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and expansion of economic exclusion zones. (Brazil declared its 200-mile limit before the United States accepted such unilateral extensions.) Arms sales are another manifestation of Brazil's effort to become an independent force in world politics—one that must be listened to and negotiated with on the bilateral and multilateral levels.[31]

Only France among the West's major exporters has integrated arms sales and

[27] See Selcher, "Brazil's Relations with Latin America," 68; Alexandre de S. C. Barros, "Brazil" in James Everett Katz, ed., *Arms Production in Developing Countries* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), 79.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Dagnino, *Aspectos*.

[30] Barros, "Brazil," 73.

[31] Riordan Roett, "Brazil and the United States: Beyond the Debt Crisis," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27 (February 1985): 11.

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foreign policy to the same degree as Brazil. The French, like the Brazilians, believe that arms exports fulfill both national economic and security objectives. It could be argued that France, like Brazil, has also consciously sought to challenge superpower dominance of world politics. Further, in both countries, policy decisions regarding arms sales are made by a small group of officials, with public debate almost nonexistent.[32]

The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Itamaraty*) has thus been active in seeking opportunities for Brazil's arms manufacturers (and other export industries, it should be emphasized). Diplomats serve as salesmen, speaking with local defense ministries about procurement while promoting the benefits of dealing with Brazilian manufacturers and the Brazilian state. The government has been able to tell potential buyers that unlike many western states or communist bloc suppliers, it views arms sales as purely commercial transactions. It is indeed ironic to find government officials stressing the nonpolitical nature of arms sales.[33] A brochure from the private arms firm Engesa expresses well the underlying philosophy: "Engesa as a true ally neither creates dependence nor imposes commitments."[34]

The Brazilian government has frequently been criticized for its no-strings approach to arms sales. To be sure, the government's stated policy is that it does not use arms exports "as an instrument of foreign policy," and it makes no effort to control the use or resale of its equipment. Nonetheless, all arms exports must be approved by PNEMEM, the national program that monitors military sales, and some general guidelines have been formulated. Specifically, Brazil does not sell arms to guerrilla groups; to both sides in a conflict; to "unstable" governments; to countries on the brink of war. Of course, skepticism has been expressed by outside observers regarding the vigor with which Brasilia applies even these general guidelines.[35]

Today Brazil exports weapons to some forty countries. Sales are concentrated in the Middle East, suggesting that Brazil has profited nicely from the various regional conflicts, particularly the Iran–Iraq war. Iraq has been in recent years the single largest buyer of Brazilian arms, purchasing over $1 billion in equipment from 1980 to 1987, or one-third of Brazil's arms exports.[36] During the conflict Iraq purchased 200 or more armored vehicles from the manufacturer Engesa, and it was the first customer for the Astros 2 multiple launch rocket system built by Avibras. Indeed, the war's end poses a problem for these Brazilian manufacturers, which relied on the conflict for generation of new orders.[37]

[32] Ziegler, "Review."

[33] I thank Jorge Domínguez for highlighting this point.

[34] Engesa, *Military Products* (São Paulo, Brazil: n.d.).

[35] George D. Smith, "Brazil's Arms Industry and Implications for the Future," (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces Research Project #A-26, 1987); Franko-Jones, "Public-Private Partnership," 60.

[36] Grimmett, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers*, 51.

[37] Ian Kemp, "The International Arms Industry: A Final Casualty of the Iran-Iraq War," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 30 July 1988, 164–165.

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TABLE 1

Arms Transfer Agreements with the Third World, 1980–1987 (in $USMM)

Country	Total Sales
USSR	122,425
USA	55,567
France	32,330
United Kingdom	17,265
China	11,060
Italy	8,535
West Germany	6,130
Czechoslovakia	4,190
Spain	3,835
Brazil	3,545
South Korea	3,270

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1980–1987* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 9 May 1988), 51.

The volume of Brazilian arms exports has been the subject of controversy. In a 1987 report the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimated sales for the period 1981–1985 "from $1.2 billion to $10 billion."[38] More recently a CRS analyst valued arms deliveries for the period 1980–1987 at $3.5 billion.[39] An article in the *New York Times* asserted that 1986 sales alone totaled $1.5 billion, while *Jane's Defence Weekly* put the figure at $2 billion.[40] *Jane's* reported that 1987 sales had dropped to $800 million.[41]

The variation in statistics suggests the difficulty in establishing a data base for the arms industry. Export figures are culled from a number of sources, including corporate annual reports, government foreign trade figures, newspaper articles, and officials in government and industry. Traditionally, the industry has pumped up its numbers in the interests of publicity. Some highly touted sales, such as Engesa's billion dollar main battle tank sale to Saudi Arabia, have not been consummated. In any event, as indicated by Table 1, Brazil is now among the leading exporters to Third World countries.

From a macroeconomic standpoint, the defense industry comprises only a small share of the country's economy. Brazil's gross domestic product in 1986 totaled $264.5 billion, and the contribution of the industry, with foreign and domestic sales of perhaps $2 billion, constituted less than 1 percent of the total. From the perspective of hard currency earnings, the industry is of greater importance. Its dollar earnings are just behind those of the coffee complex ($2.4 billion), steel

[38] Arthur Manfredi, Jr., et al., *Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential of Non-Major Military Powers* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 24, April 1987).

[39] Richard F. Grimmett, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers*, 61.

[40] Simons, "Gulf War"; Kemp, "Final Casualty."

[41] "Decline in Sales for Brazilian Manufacturers," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 23 January 1988, 121.

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($2.3 billion), and capital goods ($2.2 billion). These dollars, of course, are vital to debt repayment, dividend repatriation, and payment for imports.[42]

But the defense industry's dollar earnings must be treated with caution. Much of the equipment sold by the industry uses *imported* technology—for example, communication and fire control systems from France. Since this technology makes up a substantial portion of the overall price of military hardware, the *net* impact of defense earnings is perhaps 50 percent less than the gross revenue. Increasingly, Brazil is attempting to produce or assemble the technology domestically, lowering the dollar costs associated with weapons production.

Until recently Brazilian firms produced only low-tech weapons, including wheeled armored vehicles, light aircraft, patrol boats, artillery, and hand guns. The fear of future competition from other Third World arms industries, on the one hand (particularly South Korea, which produces a similar line), and projected demand from its customers on the other, has driven the industry to develop a range of advanced systems, including main battle tanks, jet aircraft, missiles, and corvettes. In these markets, the defense industry will face competition from First World producers. Brazil is thus in a transition phase from supplier of cheap weaponry to producer of high technology. This transition is not without substantial risks.

The fate of the industry is tied to the success of the major weapons programs now being developed. These include Engesa's Osorio main battle tank; Embraer's AMX jet fighter, which is being codeveloped with the Italian firms Aermacchi and Aeritalia; Cenabra's Inhauma-class corvette; and the advanced missiles being built by the firms Avibras and Orbita. Unlike the simple weapons marketed by Brazil until recently, these are big ticket items that have claimed and are still claiming substantial investment in research and development.

As the Brazilian defense industry grows in sophistication, the financial requirements on the firms must likewise increase. This will inevitably lead to rising demands on public coffers and in turn to a political debate concerning the industry's contribution to Brazil's economic growth. The political consensus that has to date supported the arms industry may crack as public funding rises.

The increasing capital needs of defense firms are apparent in recent corporate requests for state assistance. In December 1987, for example, Engesa received $65 million from the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) to help finance its Osorio tank program. Engesa has trumpeted this product as its next major export item, though its commercial success is much in doubt.[43]

The Osorio illustrates well the constraints on Brazil as it enters the world of high-tech weaponry. On the basis of comparative tests, the tank is apparently in a league with its American and European counterparts, although it is considerably less expensive. But the manufacturer does not have a large internal market to help defray developmental costs, and therefore must rely on exports if profits

[42] Data from Bank of Boston, *Brazil in Figures: 1987* (São Paulo, Brazil: Bank of Boston, 1987).

[43] "BNDES Loans for Brasilias and Osorios," *Gazeta Mercantil* (International Edition), 14 December 1987.

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are to be made. Last year it was reported that the Osorio had won a competition in Saudi Arabia and that tank sales might total $4 billion. Execution of this sale, however, depends on an acceptable financing package, which the cash-strapped Saudis now require. This is an area in which the Brazilians are simply unable to compete with First World suppliers, given the country's economic problems and limited access to international capital markets.[44] Brazil's inability to finance big ticket sales could be a major impediment to the industry's future growth. As John Stanley and Maurice Pearton observed several years ago, "credit terms . . . determine a procurement decision."[45]

Economic ills also plague the navy's corvette program. During the late 1970s, the navy decided to build a new, Brazilian-designed corvette, called the Inhauma class. A special company, Cenabra, was formed to oversee this venture. The navy's idea from the outset was to combine state, local, private, and foreign capital (in the form of technology) in the creation of the corvette.[46]

Initially, the navy planned to order twelve corvettes, an amount that may have justified the costs associated with the program. But Brazil's economic difficulties have hurt the military no less than other sectors, and now the navy has cut its own order to four; accordingly, the ship must be exported. But the naval marketplace is saturated, and many potential customers lack the cash to purchase corvettes that are priced at $115–200 million. The cash crunch is especially obvious in West Africa, which had been viewed as a potential market for the ship. The Inhauma now appears to be an economic disaster. Indeed, the private sector firm involved in corvette production, Verolme, has recently signaled its intention to diversify away from military business. The company reported a substantial loss for 1987, the year production of the ship began. Based on the Inhauma experience, it is doubtful whether Brazil will soon construct more advanced naval vessels, including submarines, as had once been anticipated.[47]

The AMX fighter aircraft, coproduced with the Italians, provides yet another example of Brazil's high-tech gamble. In addition to being purchased by the Brazilian and Italian air forces, the AMX is being targeted at those countries that seek to replace their aging fleets of U.S.-made A-4 Skyhawks, Russian MIGs, or French Mirages. The plane, which was supposed to cost $10 million a copy, has been subject to the same type of inflation familiar to those who follow weapons procurement in the West, and it now appears the plane will sell for twice that amount. Reportedly, Brazilian air force leaders "are only lukewarm" about the program; they would have preferred to buy an air superiority fighter off the shelf, rather than build from scratch a ground attack aircraft.[48]

[44] "In the Big League," *Gazeta Mercantil* (International Edition), 12 October 1987.

[45] Stanley and Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms*, 110.

[46] Information on the *Inhauma* program was derived from interviews with public and private sector officials in Brazil during December 1987 and visits to three naval shipyards.

[47] "New Route for Verolme," *Gazeta Mercantil* (International edition), 12 December 1988.

[48] Edward H. Kolcum, "Economic Pressures Shape South American Defense Issues," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 14 March 1988, 81–82.

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The same story can also be told for missiles. Today Brazil is in the process of developing a number of surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles; it is also building a satellite launch vehicle. These programs reflect not only a sophisticated domestic aerospace industry, but also technology-sharing agreements with such countries as Canada, the Soviet Union, and China.[49] The missiles are intended to support domestic weapons programs, like the Inhauma corvette and AMX. Civilian programs that include the development of a meteorological satellite are also to be exported. But the research and development costs of these missile programs have been high, while the export market has become increasingly competitive. At the same time, the date for introduction of several new missiles has consistently been pushed back.[50]

The Osorio, Inhauma, AMX, and missile programs suggest constraints on more than the opportunities for the Brazilian defense industry. Within a decade, Brazilian manufacturers have leaped a technological level, but with that jump has come increasing demands for capital. Given Brazil's severe economic difficulties, which include hyperinflation and an external debt of over $100 billion, the wisdom of providing capital for such purposes has become questionable. Indeed, it suggests that the Brazilian manufacturers may have to retreat a step, again becoming niche players in the world defense market, producing low-tech items rather than advanced weapons systems.

So long as the export market was booming, it was possible for Brazil's defense manufacturers to dodge their long-term financial problems. Now the firms must cope in a less hospitable environment. Over the past ten years, the industry has been extremely dependent on sales to the Middle East, profiting largely from the interminable Iran–Iraq war. With the absorptive capacities of several Mideast regimes nearing their limit and with that war at an end, the market for Brazilian military hardware must diminish. Nor can Brazil be expected to resupply Iraq during the 1990 Gulf crisis. Already, Brazil is facing the problem of getting its Iraqi war debts repaid.[51] In 1989 Iraq defaulted on its payments on loans from Avibras and Engesa, forcing those firms to seek protection from creditors.[52]

On the macrolevel, the international arms trade experienced rapid growth during the 1970s and 1980s, with sales in 1987 totaling some $35 billion. But based on work in progress and the placement of new orders, the market appears to be

[49] Manfredi, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation*, 17; "Brazil Calls on China to Help Break Technology Monopoly," *Financial Times*, 5 July 1988.

[50] See William Perry and Juan Carlos Weiss, "Brazil" in James Everett Katz, eds., *The Implications of Third World Military Industrialization* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), 112; "Brazilian Defense: Full Speed Ahead," *Defense and Foreign Affairs* 15 (March 1987): 34–35; John Cushman, Jr., "The Race to a More Elaborate Arms Race," *New York Times*, 3 July 1988. For a more optimistic assessment of Brazil's missile program, see Lauro Ney Menezes, "Na Strategia de Dominio do Espaco," *Politica e Estrategia* 6 (January–March 1988): 138–142.

[51] "Brazil Proposes Third Party Arbitration," *Gazeta Mercantil* (International Edition), 12 December 1988.

[52] James Brooke, "Gulf Crisis Has Brazil in a Tailspin," *New York Times*, 27 August 1990.

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shrinking. Unfortunately for arms manufacturers, the competition for pieces of this smaller market pie is greater than ever, as a number of new weapons systems are just entering world trade. The Brazilian-Italian AMX jet fighter, for example, faces three or four competitors in the market for low-cost ground attack aircraft.[53]

The Brazilian defense industry thus cannot be expected to maintain the growth rates that have characterized it until recently. In fact, the challenge for Brazil will be to maintain the markets in which its firms have already made inroads. This will test not only Brazilian industrialists, but also the diplomats in foreign posts who play such a vital role as salespeople for their country. From the perspective of domestic politics, the problem for the defense firms is one of industrial adjustment. The state can allow the market to work and let some firms die, or it can provide subsidies at the expense of other programs. The question is: Who will pay the costs associated with the defense industry's adjustment as the boom ends? The military? The Brazilian taxpayer? The entrepreneurs themselves? These questions will become prominent in Brazil in the years ahead.

U.S.-Brazilian Bilateral Relations

Given the economic problems facing Brazil's defense industry, it might be concluded that the United States can afford to adopt a laissez-faire attitude towards such exports. This would be incorrect. Insofar as Brazilian weaponry and arms from other countries contribute to the destabilization of the international security environment, the issues associated with diffusion must be placed prominently on the policy agenda. Furthermore, Brazil clearly has impressive capabilities in defense-related areas, and this raises troubling questions should some future Brazilian government place increased emphasis on weapons development despite the economic costs. In addition, it is possible that the arms industry will seek joint-venture partners, especially in the Mideast, in the areas of military research and development. From the perspective of international security, the United States has a vital interest in containing the proliferation of advanced weaponry throughout the Third World.

It might be added that U.S. concern with Brazilian economic development also makes defense spending a legitimate topic for bilateral discussions; indeed, the relationship between defense spending and economic development is deserving of further study and political debate not just in the Brazilian context, but throughout the developing and industrial worlds.[54] Since the U.S. government and

[53] Richard W. Stevenson, "No Longer the Only Game in Town," *New York Times*, 4 December 1988; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook: 1988* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 175ff.

[54] For two reviews of the literature, see Lisa Grobar and Richard Porter, "Benoit Revisited: Defense Spending and Economic Growth in LDCs," University of Michigan Research Seminar in International Economics, Discussion Paper no. 205, June 1987; Steve Chan, "The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems," *Orbis* 29 (Summer 1985): 403–434. See also Doug Bandow, "Aid Money that Just Buys Guns," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 June 1988.

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private commercial banks devote substantial financial resources to Brazil, officials and bankers have a right to express their views on Brasilia's economic priorities. Further, it would be useful to learn from the Brazilians themselves how they view the impact of defense-related spending on the civilian economy.

Unfortunately, the current state of U.S.-Brazilian bilateral relations is not conducive to talks on military issues. Brasilia and Washington are deadlocked in three areas relevant to arms control: first, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT); second, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA); finally, the question of "irresponsible" arms sales to such countries as Libya. In that Washington has been inconsistent in its dealing with other countries on all three of these items, this has only further poisoned relations with Brasilia.[55]

Nuclear nonproliferation is a regional as much as a bilateral issue. Simply, Brazil refuses to sign the NPT so long as Argentina also remains intransigent. Other nonsignatories include India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa. Since Washington does not have particularly good relations with either Brasilia or Buenos Aires, it has been unable to act as honest broker and thus overcome the suspicions that still separate the two regional powers. Ironically, in recent years Argentina and Brazil have cooperated in selected areas of nuclear research and development. Nonetheless, Brazil became more steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT after the Malvinas conflict and the attendant fears about the role of the military in Argentine society.

The GSOMIA presents a different set of complications. The purpose of the agreement is to prevent the unauthorized transfer of U.S. technology to third parties. Brazil has argued that the agreement is unduly restrictive, and it refuses to seek Washington's approval for every transaction that may involve American technology. Brazil views GSOMIA as an unwarranted and cumbersome intrusion on its sovereignty.

The final issue, that of arms sales to irresponsible states and to nonstate actors, is the most difficult. Brazil does not block arms sales for moral reasons, and it makes no effort to control indirect sales. This approach is anathema to Washington. In light of the Iran-contra affair, however, the U.S. government has lost a great deal of credibility in this area; Washington is in no position to lecture Brasilia about who should and who should not receive weapons.

Brazilians understand the principles that lay behind Washington's policy in each area; what they resent are the inconsistencies. For example, Brazil has long wanted to buy a supercomputer for its weather service. Washington has refused to grant an export license, citing the NPT and GSOMIA. But India was permitted to buy a Cray supercomputer, despite New Dehli's nuclear weapons capability and its refusal to sign the NPT. To Brazilians this is suggestive of the value the United States places on its bilateral relationships with South American countries.

In its effort to stymie the Brazilian weapons industry, the U.S. government has

[55] Much of the information for this section was obtained in interviews with Brazilian and U.S. officials in Washington and Brasilia conducted in 1987 and 1988.

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pursued a policy of technological denial since the mid-1970s. It has prevented the type of military cooperation that would permit Brazil to produce or assemble American weaponry, or to purchase high technology like supercomputers that could assist the arms industry. Washington has also tried to restrict the diffusion of weapons technology on a multilateral basis. On 16 April 1987, the United States and six of its allies announced a policy that is intended to stem the flow of technology "that could contribute to the acquisition of nuclear-capable missiles by additional countries." It is important to note that this multilateral policy statement is neither a treaty nor an executive agreement; each national government will be responsible for the regulation of arms-related transfers.[56]

Doubts may be cast upon the efficacy of a policy of technology denial. Despite the missile agreement, European firms have found a ready market for their weapons systems and components in Brazil at the expense of American companies. Among the European companies active in the Brazilian defense market are the British military electronics producer Ferranti, the Belgian rifle manufacturer FN, the Swedish gun company Bofors, and the French aerospace firm Aerospatiale. Brazil has also promoted bilateral technology-sharing agreements with China, and the Soviet-Brazilian relationship has developed significantly in recent years. As a result of Brazil's diverse supplier base, Washington's leverage over Brasilia has been significantly reduced.

In a recent report, the Panel on U.S.-Brazil Relations recommended a number of specific steps that the two countries could take in order to improve the bilateral relationship. Within the security area, the panel suggested:

- increased reciprocal activity in space research;
- cooperative action to combat international drug trafficking and domestic use;
- joint commercial development and production of air, land, and sea defense systems for possible deployment by both national armed forces;
- identification of alternatives to current U.S. regulations of third-party transfers and sensitive technology protection;
- shared technical training methods for armed forces while Brazil modernizes communications techniques, data processing, disaster response, and interservice operations;
- student and faculty exchanges of national war colleges, service schools, and research institutes.[57]

This latter recommendation deserves particular emphasis. Despite tensions with Washington during the 1970s, many members of the Brazilian military still have a strong attachment to the United States, and they continue to respect American military equipment and training. Contacts at this level build mutual respect and can contribute to the maintenance of a stable bilateral relationship. The impor-

[56] Manfredi, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation*, 8.

[57] Panel on U.S.-Brazil Relations, *The United States and Brazil: Structuring a Mature Relationship* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1988), 4–5.

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tance of the Brazilian military as a national institution should not be underestimated. Exchanges of military students are a low-cost yet effective way of educating Brazilian officers with regard to U.S. concerns over conventional arms proliferation.

A cooperative strategy must be built on the recognition that the United States and Brazil share vital interests in Latin American economic development and democratization. But if negotiations are to succeed, Washington must treat Brasilia as an equal and be willing to engage in the same type of give and take that has characterized its dealings in defense-related areas with such countries as India. At the same time, serious bilateral talks on military issues would signal to the Brazilian government and people that the time has come to reflect on the malign consequences both for the domestic economy and for international security of conventional arms proliferation.

Conclusions

This study of the Brazilian arms industry suggests that its growth must be understood in the context of the international system. The industry developed as a manifestation of Brazil's self-conscious attempt to become an independent force in world politics and *primus inter pares* in the Third World context. Brasilia has been determined to advance its agenda in economic, resource, and military affairs, even if this has meant challenging the existing pattern of international relations, particularly American hegemony in the western hemisphere. In short, Brazil has viewed an indigenous arms industry as crucial to its project of building political power.

The international system has provided both opportunities for and constraints on the industry's expansion. The arms trade has opened up to new entrants in recent years, a development made possible by the global diffusion of technology and modern industrial capability. At the same time, the United States—once the world's largest arms supplier—has suffered a decline in its market share, a reflection in part of domestic political preferences. These factors have favored arms manufacturers that can produce military hardware at competitive prices.

In terms of the security environment, regional conflicts, especially the Iran–Iraq war, have provided a rich source of revenue for the new arms producers. Other purchasers of Third World weaponry have included the oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia and Libya. Increasingly, the newly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia offer potential markets for the world's arms salespeople.[58]

But developing world arms industries also face important constraints. To the extent that the new entrants adopt a strategy of producing ever-more sophisticated technology, they face increasing cost structures and thus greater demands on domestic factors of production, including human and financial capital. In that countries like Brazil are unable to obtain voluntary loans from the international

[58] John Berthelsen, "Arms Merchants, Frustrated Elsewhere, Find Richer Pickings in Southeast Asia," *Wall Street Journal*, 5 January 1989.

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financial community, the dedication of resources to defense industries means that crucial "guns vs. butter" trade-offs must be made. Further, the economic crunch makes it all the more difficult to finance big ticket sales to customers that are unwilling or unable to pay cash.

The international security environment is also, thankfully, providing a less hospitable environment for arms salesmen. The end of the cold war, the Iran–Iraq war, and the Namibia agreement are among the recent settlements that have dimmed expectations for growth in the arms trade. The 1990 Gulf crisis may provide a temporary fillip for the sophisticated U.S. and Western European defense industries, but it is unlikely to result in many sales for Brazil. Economic and security factors, therefore, are placing constraints on the new entrants, just as these factors once provided opportunities for growth. The Brazilian arms industry thus exemplifies a bold attempt on the part of a Third World state to challenge existing patterns of international relations. To the extent that the effort has paid dividends by increasing Brazil's freedom of action, it must be deemed a success. But it cannot be forgotten that a price has been paid—economically in the form of resource diversion away from more productive uses, politically in the form of confrontation with the United States and growing world criticism of the country's cavalier arms sales policies. As the costs associated with weapons production continue to grow, Brazilian officials will have to make difficult choices concerning the future of their country's arms project.

* The author wishes to thank Jorge Domínguez, Aaron Friedberg, Andrew Moravscik, and Nicholas Ziegler for their comments and the Olin Foundation for its financial support.

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Ghosts of Arms Control Past

PAUL F. DIEHL

It is an old cliché that the future is merely a repetition of the past. Yet the formulation of public policy relies heavily on precedent. As analyses of the budgeting process have demonstrated, prior governmental action significantly influences the timing and configuration of future actions.[1] Continuity in U.S. policy has been particularly evident in the area of arms control. Negotiations between the superpowers have most often focused on issues suggested by or left unresolved at earlier parlays. The upgrading of the Hot Line agreement is a recent illustration of this point. Current arms control issues also reflect this tendency; the pursuit of a comprehensive test ban is a logical follow-up to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

Prior arms control policies continue to shape future negotiations for two primary reasons. First, arms control negotiations have been explicitly designed as continuing enterprises; agreements were sought on relatively narrow grounds, and more difficult issues were left to further discussions. In addition, many agreements were constructed as interim instruments serving as bridges to future efforts at arms limitation in the same issue area. Beyond that strategy, prior arms control policies have influenced future initiatives because of the impact of bipartisanship in foreign policy. In the first twenty years of the post-World War II era, foreign policy was made primarily through consensus, and its direction was not the subject of divisive political debate. Correspondingly, changes in the political composition

[1] The classic study demonstrating this effect is Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).

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of the White House or Congress did not prompt dramatic reversals in arms control policy. The Nixon administration built upon the groundwork for SALT I laid by Lyndon Johnson, and with some exceptions the Ford and Carter administrations continued previous policy in the area.

In this article the focus is on the impact that SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) II had on arms control policy during the first term of the Reagan administration. SALT II offers a unique case study in several ways. First, it is an unratified agreement with no legal obligation for the parties to abide by its provisions.[2] The Reagan administration faithfully observed the ratified Panama Canal Treaty, even though its opposition to that pact was at least as intense as to SALT II. If SALT II influenced the arms control policies of the Reagan administration, it could be a testament either to the treaty's latent effects or evidence of the Reagan administration's support for the treaty. As is quite clear, however, the latter is the opposite of what public statements by administration officials indicate.

Second, studying SALT II is unique in that it represents an instance in which one administration repudiated the policies of its predecessor. With respect to SALT II, Ronald Reagan repeatedly referred to the treaty as "fatally flawed" throughout the 1980 campaign and during his first term. Although there is always some reassessment of policy when a new administration takes office, such a wholesale rejection of a predecessor's foreign policy is almost unprecedented. Bipartisanship on arms control issues persisted even after the general breakdown of consensus on American foreign policy following the Vietnam war. One might expect under these circumstances that the Reagan administration would completely ignore SALT II in its formulation of arms control policy or shape that policy with the perceived drawbacks of the treaty in mind. Yet this expectation is far from self-evident and may need modification as a result of this investigation.

Agenda Setting and SALT II

As an organizing theme for this analysis, I focus on the agenda-setting function (or lack thereof) performed by SALT II. Traditionally, agenda setting has been used to signify the process and order by which certain issues gain salience and are acted upon by decision makers. Policy outcomes are in part determined by the sequence of actions taken and the priority given to selected problems.[3] Strengthening of drunk driving laws, for example, did not occur until after the issue be-

[2] Signatories to a treaty, however, are required to refrain from any actions prior to ratification that would undermine the purposes or effects of the treaty. How long this period extends, especially when the likelihood of ratification is low, remains unclear.

[3] For an extensive discussion of agenda setting in American government, see John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983); and Paul Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter (with notes on Ronald Reagan)* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982).

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came salient to decision makers and to the public as the result of a campaign by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and other groups.

The salience of arms control relative to other issues in the Reagan administration is not the topic for investigation, rather the concern is with arms control policies as reflected in the options and bargaining strategies pursued during Reagan's first term. In effect, this study focuses on the setting of the agenda content or the identification and selection of alternatives in the arms control issue area. Paul Light calls this the "single most important step in the presidential policy process."[4] To what extent did SALT II define the arms control agenda of the weapons systems to be controlled? How did SALT II influence the negotiating position of the Reagan administration? What are the reasons for such an impact, if any? Was that impact consistent over the first term of the Reagan administration? These and other questions will form the primary bases for investigation.

The results of this inquiry can offer some insights into the determinants of arms control policy during the Reagan administration. Beyond a better understanding of how security policy was made during this decade, the results also may reveal some differences in agenda setting between the foreign and domestic policy contexts.

The Incrementalism Model

A prominent approach to agenda setting that does not focus on the influence of interest groups or key policy actors is incrementalism – the process by which policy evolves through small, gradual deviations from existing standards and practices.[5] Rather than reconstruct policy anew at each interval, decision makers rely on past actions, making only slight adjustments as they go along. The effect of incrementalism is most evident in the budget process. Rather than a zero-based budgeting approach, allocations for the next fiscal year are requested and approved in relation to the budget in the current fiscal year. Accordingly, much of a given agency's programs can be better accounted for by reference to inertia rather than new initiatives. In seeking to explain the size of the defense budget, the previous year's allocation (t-1) accounts for most of the variance in a given year's budget (t).[6]

There are various explanations for the power of incremental effects. One might first point to the bureaucracy as a source of this power. Although administrations

[4] Light, *The President's Agenda*, 105.

[5] The incrementalism mode of policy making is illustrated by Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*; and Charles Lindblom, *The Policy Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968). Empirical support for incremental effects at the state level is given in Richard Hofferbert and John Urice, "Small Scale Policy: The Federal Stimulus versus Competing Explanations for State Funding of the Arts," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (May 1985): 308–329; and Andrew Cowart, "Antipoverty Expenditures in the American States: A Comparative Analysis," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (May 1969): 217–236.

[6] Charles Ostrom, "Evaluating Alternative Foreign Policy Decision-Making Models: An Empirical Test Between an Arms Race Model and an Organizational Politics Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21 (June 1977): 235–266.

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may change, the actors in the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy are civil servants who remain in place despite an alteration in the prevailing political winds. These actors were the ones who helped develop and implement earlier policy; correspondingly, they have a vested interest in its continuance. They generally resist disturbing regularized procedures and the possibility of sacrificing pieces of one's own turf. Even policy makers desiring changes in current policy are able to make alterations in a limited way and must be content with major changes in the long term, at best.

Many leaders also feel legally, morally, or politically constrained by the actions of their predecessors. The president may be unable to change policy if existing legislation prohibits such action or commits the nation to another course of action for a set or undefined length of time; the War Powers Resolution is an example of just such a restriction. The president may also be limited by what is politically prudent or perceived to be morally proper, regardless of a desire to alter policy. The commitment not to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until it recognized Israel, made during the Nixon administration, has persisted over almost two decades. Only when the first two of Richard Nixon's successors left office did they openly advocate dealing with the PLO.

An incremental approach to policy making, however, is not always the undesirable process that may be implied above. Slight modifications of existing policy have the benefit of being reversible should those alterations be judged harmful to or inconsistent with policy goals. A wholesale rejection of prior policy and subsequent failure of its replacement could leave a policy vacuum. Slight changes in foreign policy are desirable in that they give allies and rivals alike time to acclimate; some consistency in policy is necessary to prevent misperception and ensure smooth relations.

On the face of it, one might expect that the SALT process would have a significant effect on arms control policy. This was the intent of those who formulated and carried out the policies under SALT. Carter Secretary of State Cyrus Vance illustrated this thinking when he said: "We are only part way up the ladder—the answer is to strengthen our grip and keep climbing—And when SALT II is ratified that is exactly what we will do—SALT III."[7] Similar sentiments were echoed by Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee: "[SALT II] was designed as a stepping stone . . . to prepare the ground for broader arms control measures."[8]

Despite these intentions, SALT II was never ratified; and it was the Reagan administration's stated policy to formulate a better plan. Why then should one look at possible incremental effects emanating from that treaty? It is important to assess SALT II's impact despite the seemingly adverse conditions in which it was placed. If SALT II were to influence the policy process in a significant way, then it speaks

[7] Cyrus Vance, "Limiting the Strategic Arms Race," Current Policy no. 73 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1979), 3.

[8] Les Aspin, "Freeze? Why Not Just Okay SALT II?" *Washington Post*, 15 April 1982.

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to the importance of prior policy on future actions, regardless of the attitudes of the current policy elites. It also indicates that scholars and policy makers should pay close attention to the legacy left by certain actions and agreements devised by the Reagan administration. In addition, reference to the incremental model provides a method by which deviations from the model can be identified. Once identified, the differences can be measured and explained.

Although the design for SALT II was for it to be a bridge to future arms control molded in the same image, the actual impact of the treaty was not as simple as the incremental model might indicate or SALT advocates would have liked. Nevertheless, Reagan administration policy was influenced by provisions of the treaty it disavowed.

The More Things Change. . . .

The most notable evidence of SALT II's influence on Reagan arms control policy was his administration's adherence to the treaty until November 1986. This may seem ironic in the light of Reagan's campaign speeches against the treaty as well as numerous statements by his advisers and other members of his administration. Yet the first pledge by the administration to continue observance came very early in Reagan's first term, less than two months after inauguration.[9] However, this pledge was far from a clear cut endorsement of the treaty. The administration agreed not to undercut SALT II; this is not quite the same as formal adherence, but it did indicate that the United States would not be the first one to violate the accord. In deciding not to exceed the limits on weapons imposed by SALT II, the administration bound itself to an agreement that had no legal standing and to which it was strongly opposed. How did SALT II come to have such a strong impact?

There are several reasons for the lingering impact of SALT II, but perhaps the most important is the minimal constraints associated with continued compliance. Adhering to SALT II would not disturb any U.S. plans for modernizing its weapons systems. Thus planned deployments of Trident or MX missiles essentially could go on as scheduled. The treaty imposed numerical ceilings on launchers, but the United States had no plans to increase significantly the size of its nuclear arsenal, only to improve its capability. In this instance, the lack of constraints associated with prior policy eased the way for a continuation of SALT II.

The Reagan administration decision to follow SALT II cannot be explained fully by the lack of constraints imposed by the treaty. Surely, had the treaty inhibited Reagan administration plans, SALT II would have been renounced immediately. Yet given the vehemence of the administration's feelings against the treaty, other factors needed to be operating in order to save the treaty. First, the treaty actually offered some benefits to the American strategic position.[10] It prevented the Soviets

[9] Arms Control Association, *Countdown on SALT II* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1985), 19.

[10] For a summary of the valuable features of SALT II, see Lloyd Cutler and Roger Molander, "Is

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from dramatically increasing the size of their stockpiles and from introducing an assortment of more threatening land-based missiles. In particular, SALT II provided for a cap of ten warheads on Soviet SS-18 missiles. Without that restriction, the Soviets might have added up to twenty additional warheads per missile, tremendously increasing the vulnerability of U.S. forces. The administration may not have been pleased with SALT, but a world without it was judged to be even less desirable. Also included in the agreement were important provisions for notification and definitional statements that had taken years to negotiate. The administration did not want to abandon these aspects of the treaty, even though it was not satisfied with some of the numerical limits or the verification procedures.

Finally, the administration was sensitive to the domestic and international political costs encumbered by a wholesale rejection of the treaty. Over time, the administration felt increasing pressure from congressional sources to make progress on arms control matters. The Senate had even passed a resolution indicating that the United States should continue to support SALT II provisions. In the absence of any alternatives, the administration used adherence to SALT II as a symbolic means of demonstrating good faith and preventing an erosion of support for its defense programs. Exceeding the SALT II limits would only seem to give further ammunition to those critics who charged that Ronald Reagan was not seriously interested in arms control.

The administration also had other political motives for continuing to abide by the agreement. Nervous European allies were in the midst of spending political capital of their own in order to permit deployment of U.S. Pershing missiles on their soil. Successful deployment, with as little public protest as possible, depended on the assertion that the United States would negotiate seriously for arms reduction. A rejection of the SALT II treaty would have undermined European efforts to deploy the missiles and would have created further tension over arms control policy between the allies.[11]

Despite criticism of SALT II, abiding by the agreement did provide significant political benefits. First, alleged violations of SALT II were further ammunition in the Reagan campaign to expose alleged Soviet duplicity. In addition, the violations also fit the view of the Soviets held by administration members; there was a tendency to seize evidence of violations as it confirmed the prevailing view. A cynical view might also suggest that the administration emphasized Soviet violations of SALT II in order to provide a ready excuse for exceeding the treaty limits at a later time. There was significant political pressure to continue adherence to the treaty. By citing repeated Soviet violations, the administration could shift the responsibility for abandoning the agreement to the Soviets.

There Life After Death for SALT?" *International Security* 6 (Fall 1981): 3–20; and Walter Slocombe, "Why the U.S. Should Stick to SALT II," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 August 1986.

[11] Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 222.

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A Negative Precedent

It was more than a symbolic action when the Reagan administration abandoned the SALT acronym for START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in labeling the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The bargaining positions advanced by the administration were dramatic breaks with SALT history. Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the impact that SALT II had on the formulation of that new policy. In surveying the Reagan arms control record, much of the strategy and some of the proposals were developed with SALT II and its predecessor in mind; SALT acted more as a negative precedent, however, than as a positive set of guidelines.

Throughout the first term of the Reagan administration, a set of general principles about arms control has governed policy.[12] These principles served as litmus tests that each arms control proposal or bargaining position had to pass and appear to have been developed with reference to the perceived flaws of SALT II. The first principle was that any arms control agreement must mandate *significant reductions* in weapons stockpiles. In the SALT agreements, ceilings were established on weapons systems, but some of these limits were above current force levels; in effect, the treaties permitted mutual military build-ups. As it turned out, the Soviet Union was the side that made the most of this opportunity. Reagan administration officials regarded SALT as a means of enhancing Soviet capabilities and not *real* arms limitation.[13]

The Reagan administration wanted a mechanism to stop future Soviet build-ups. They regarded SALT II as a failure and instituted the requirement for reductions as a partial solution. By adopting this principle, the administration moved away from the "control and manage" approach to arms control evident in SALT to what has been called the "reversalist" approach.[14] The former emphasizes regulation of a rivalry so that competition does not become so intense as to prompt a crisis or confrontation; the latter seeks a rollback of prior arms competition and tries to inhibit new growth in weapons systems.

The second principle guiding Reagan arms control efforts was *equality.* This is a difficult concept to define operationally, especially in relation to nuclear weapons systems. Because the Soviet and U.S. nuclear forces are dissimilar in many ways, negotiations often have relied on simple numerical counts of warheads and launchers to define equality. This approach was not entirely satisfactory to the

[12] The set of principles is evident in a number of speeches and statements by the president and members of his administration. They are most clearly stated in *Public Papers of the President, 1982* [hereafter *PPP*] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1984), I, 308; *PPP 1983*, I, 676.

[13] See statements by Kenneth Adelman, "Arms Control and Openness," Current Policy no. 916 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987), 2; and "Arms Control: Turning the Corner?" *Department of State Bulletin* 86 (October 1986): 7.

[14] Lisa Shaw, "Nuclear Arms Limitation Policy: Building A Consensus" in Paul Viotti, ed., *Conflict and Arms Control: An Uncertain Agenda* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 43–60.

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Reagan administration. To them, equality meant not only numerical equality, but more of a symmetry in force composition and equality in the actual effect of the agreement.

Part of the reason for stressing the equality principle was the administration's view that SALT II gave significant advantages to the Soviets. Viewed from one perspective, the limits in SALT II were equal, for they provided for offsetting advantages.[15] Yet from another perspective, the superpowers' forces remained asymmetrical; this became the basis for the Reagan administration's opposition. The president repeatedly cited the failure of SALT II to place restrictions on the Backfire Bomber and SS-20 missiles as evidence of the treaty's inequity.[16] That the treaty also placed no limits on French and British nuclear forces was ignored. Equality for the Reagan administration signified that each leg of the triad had specified limits (limited mixing), and all threatening Soviet nuclear weapons were included in the agreement.

The Reagan administration also blamed the large Soviet build-up on flaws in the SALT process. "[D]uring . . . the seventies . . . we were unilaterally disarming and they were in . . . the greatest build-up of military strength in world history."[17] An equal agreement would never have permitted such an effect in the administration's eyes. The principle of equality (defined in terms of raw numbers, force symmetry, and actual effects) was a product of the SALT experience and its perceived shortcomings.

The third principle of arms control governing Reagan administration policy was *verification*. In developing this principle, the administration harkened back to its objections to SALT II. In a House report, there were specific recommendations to rely in part on experience with past agreements in making decisions on verification.[18] The Reagan administration followed this line of reasoning in developing its own criteria for verification. Although prior administrations insisted on verification as a component of any arms agreement, the Reagan administration made the requirement more stringent in light of the SALT experience. In the past, the standard was defined as "adequate" verification; this generally indicated the ability to detect meaningful or strategically significant violations. President Reagan now insisted that verification be "effective."[19] This implied that one side could detect most, if not all, violations committed by the other side.

The reason for this shift can be traced back to the Reagan administration preoccupation with Soviet cheating. Past experience with SALT I and II, as well as with other agreements, suggested to the administration that the Soviets could not be

[15] United States, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, 99th Cong., 2nd sess. *Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms Control* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987), 147–148.

[16] Typical of this argument are *PPP 1981*, 710, 957.

[17] Ibid., 1983, I, 465.

[18] U.S. House, *Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms*, 188.

[19] Ibid., 192.

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trusted to abide by provisions of arms control treaties.[20] Much of the attack on SALT II centered on the alleged shortcomings in the area of verification. The lesson that the administration drew from this experience was that any arms control agreement must minimize the margin for Soviet violations.[21] Correspondingly, officials began to question the pillar of SALT verification procedures, the exclusivity of NTM (National Technical Means).[22] The Reagan administration insisted that some type of on-site or more obtrusive means of inspection would be required before approval of any future agreement.

The final requirement was that any arms control agreement must *enhance stability*. Exactly what constitutes nuclear stability has been a much debated topic. Yet in the context of the arms control negotiations as viewed by the Reagan administration, the principle signified the invulnerability of U.S. strategic forces to Soviet attack. Much rhetoric has been directed at the so-called window of vulnerability, through which American land-based missiles would be subject to a preemptive strike. In order to preclude this possibility, it was believed that restrictions must be placed on the most threatening of the Soviet forces, their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

President Reagan and his advisers were influenced here again by the SALT II treaty. Some claimed that the biggest failure of the agreement was that it did not lessen U.S. ICBM vulnerability and hence was destabilizing.[23] The solution in the eyes of the administration was to formulate an arms agreement that closed the window of vulnerability left open by SALT with an emphasis on limiting Soviet land-based forces.

The four principles of arms control formulated by the Reagan administration were each in part a reaction to the SALT II treaty. A case might be made that administration officials simply compiled their major objections to SALT and constructed the governing principles in order to meet those objections. This is not to say that similar provisions might not have appeared in the absence of SALT II, but that treaty was the reference point used when developing a set of guidelines; the particular configuration of those guidelines is a testament to SALT II's role as a negative precedent in the formulation of arms control policy.

Some might contend that the principles above were a smokescreen for a Reagan administration that was not interested in arms control. In effect the Reagan ad-

[20] This is evident in the Reagan administration report on Soviet compliance with arms control treaties. See Department of State, "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control" (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987). Similar logic and a set of arguments on how prior agreements have not inhibited Soviet programs is contained in William Harris, "Arms Control Treaties: How Do They Restrain Soviet Strategic Defense Programs," *Orbis* 29 (Winter 1986): 701–708.

[21] "Inadequate verification was one of the major flaws of SALT II . . . we will insist that any START agreement be effectively verifiable." Edward Rowny, "START in a Historical Perspective," Current Policy no. 563 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, 1984), 2.

[22] Charles Gellner, "The Reagan Administration: Negotiating Arms Control with the Soviet Union" in Viotti, *Conflict and Arms Control*, 34.

[23] Robert Kagan, "Why Arms Control Failed." *Policy Review* 27 (Winter 1984): 31–32.

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ministration did not merely reject the SALT framework, it rejected all arms control efforts. Indeed, President Reagan pursued a peace-through-strength strategy for most of his first term; this strategy rarely assigned a prominent place to arms reduction efforts. I think it is a mistake, however, to adopt such a boldly cynical view. The recent INF (intermediate nuclear force) treaty and the framework (50 percent reductions) developed for a START treaty match the administration's principles. Although it would be incorrect to imply that Reagan administration officials were strong arms control proponents, it would also be misleading to characterize their arms control principles as purely rhetorical.

Reagan Arms Control Proposals

Although the Reagan administration was guided by SALT II in formulating basic arms control principles, the impact of that treaty was considerably less in the formulation of new arms control proposals. This is not to say that SALT II exercised no impact on the various alternatives presented since 1981; rather, the impact was limited and it seemed to dissipate over time.

In any new administration there is an initial period of policy reevaluation, in which prior policy is reviewed and changes are contemplated. This process generally has been a lengthy one with respect to arms control; almost a year may pass before any substantive decisions are reached.[24] During the Reagan administration, the process took longer than most. It was almost a year and one-half before the administration was ready with an arms control proposal of its own. Part of the delay may be attributable to the low priority given to arms control issues in the first year of the Reagan presidency. Yet significant disagreements among various actors in the policy-making process contributed to this period of indecision.

In the early stages of policy reformulation, there was still some support for an agreement resembling SALT II. In particular, the military remained supporters of the treaty, albeit without tremendous zeal.[25] This contrasted sharply with the attitudes of the new political appointees, who were militantly opposed to SALT II. Even though a new administration had assumed office, the framework of SALT II had its advocates and the treaty remained part of the initial debates on arms control.

The contrast between the SALT position and that advocated by the "hardliners"

[24] An exception was the Carter administration's new arms control plan, which was presented to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1977. This quickly formulated plan represented a dramatic break with the progress made for a SALT II treaty by the Ford administration. The proposal was summarily rejected by the Soviets, and the Carter administration reverted back to the SALT framework.

[25] Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 261. I rely heavily on Talbott's account of Reagan policy making during this period. Although some have disputed his account, the U.S. House, *Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms*, report concludes ". . . the author asked a number of individuals who had served in or worked with the Reagan administration if the book [*Deadly Gambits*] described a world which they recognized. They answered in the affirmative. Moreover, Talbott's overall portrait is consistent with newspaper coverage of arms control in 1981–84." Ibid., 236, fn. 1.

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manifested itself in a debate over two competing proposals. The first proposal, advocated by the head of the Bureau of Politicol-Military Affairs of the State Department, Richard Burt, with the support of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was based on the SALT framework. Its main similarity to the ill-fated treaty was in its unit of account for limiting arms; limitations were to be placed on launchers as they had been in the past. The purpose of this proposal was not to repackage the SALT II treaty. Indeed, the proposal differed from the treaty in a number of different ways. Among other things the proposal was designed to be less complex than SALT II and hence more understandable. In addition, the proposal included no special limits on bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) as had been the case in SALT. Yet these and other modifications were not dramatically inconsistent from what one might predict from the incremental model. The offspring of SALT II was still alive in the preliminary stages of policy formulation.[26]

The second, competing alternative bore little resemblance to its predecessors. Advocated by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and his colleagues, this plan shifted the traditional unit of account to throw-weight. Such a shift may be incompatible with a desire to enhance verification, but it did address what they believed to be the strength of the Soviet arsenal. This particular plan was explicitly different from SALT II; it relied on a different unit of account, proposed significant reductions, contained no provisions for offsetting advantages, and presumably would require more than NTM for verification.

In the first year of the Reagan administration, SALT II remained alive, but it was seriously challenged by a competing proposal. In the years ahead, traces of SALT II would reappear, but they became fainter as time wore on.

It was not until May 1982 that the administration unveiled its opening arms control proposal. It resembled an amalgamation of the two competing plans outlined above. The combination of two apparently disparate plans was achieved by the adoption of a two-phase implementation strategy.[27] The Burt plan was to be the first line of attack; the Perle proposal was to be adopted following the successful negotiation of the first phase. Remnants of SALT survived in that the launchers were the unit of account for the first phase. Yet much of the plan, including modifications of missile re-load provisions and the focus on throw-weight in the second phase, demonstrate that the SALT II framework was being gradually replaced.

Although the Reagan administration was moving away from SALT, the Soviets attempted to guide the negotiations back in that direction. After a freeze proposal, largely put forward for political reasons, the first serious counterproposal from the Soviets was not that far removed from prior arrangements. The Soviets proposed limits on delivery vehicles with reductions from the SALT II ceilings. One might suggest that such a proposal would have resembled a SALT III agreement

[26] Ibid., 234ff.
[27] Ibid., 263ff.

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rather than a dramatic change from past practice. The Soviets insisted on treating SALT II as a viable framework for future negotiations, despite the hostile rhetoric from Washington.

Concurrently with the development of strategic arms proposals, medium range missiles (so-called gray area weapons) became a prominent topic for debate in Washington and the capitals of Europe. First, upon reflection by the administration, the critical window of vulnerability seemed to be more in the European house than the American one. Furthermore, the Euromissiles issue was more salient during the 1980s, with the stepped up deployments on both sides, than during SALT's heyday of the 1970s. The zero option in Europe was quite in contrast to the control-and-manage approach pursued by SALT. Indeed, at most stages of the INF negotiations, the SALT approach was ignored. The framework was different, and the philosophy was changed.

In Spring 1983, the president outlined another arms control idea, based primarily on the concept of a build-down. Under such a strategy, old weapons systems and warheads would be replaced by more modern counterparts; yet a greater number of systems must be dismantled for every new system introduced. The net effect is to combine the need for modernization with the preference for force reductions. Other than allowing the introduction of certain new weapons systems, such a strategy cannot be traced back to SALT. Indeed, it is consistent, assuming one accepts that the proposal promotes stability, with the arms control principles discussed above; these were designed to be the antithesis of SALT II.

At this stage the administration was no longer paying attention to the SALT framework in its policy formulation. Although the proposals presented to the public no longer resembled the ill-fated treaty, SALT survived in parts of the bureaucracy and in the American bargaining positions. For example, Secretary of State George Shultz suggested to the Soviet ambassador that the United States would consider limits on ALCMs along the lines of SALT II.[28] In Fall 1983, the administration even agreed to trade limitations on bombers for restrictions on ICBMs, a move reminiscent of SALT compromises.[29] Furthermore, a plan put forward by State Department official James Goodby was structurally and in some instances substantively similar to SALT II. That proposal received wide circulation and serious attention in the administration.[30] Although the outward signs suggested that SALT II exercised little influence on the Reagan administration at the end of its first term, other indications suggest that although its health was poor, SALT II still survived in the policy-making process.

The bargaining and actual arms proposals during the first term of the Reagan administration show a gradual decline over time of SALT II's influence in the formulation of alternatives. SALT-like plans emerged in the early years of the administration, but after a time officials even abandoned using SALT II as an ex-

[28] Ibid., 324.
[29] Ibid., 328ff.
[30] Ibid.

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plicit negative precedent in their proposals and arguments to the president. At best, SALT II appears only as an example of bad policy or as a contrast for rhetorical purposes when the president or his advisers wished to foster support for their initiatives.

UNDERSTANDING THE PUZZLE

The Reagan record on arms control proposals indicates that the SALT II treaty had a very limited influence on new policy initiatives. The puzzle lies in that the same treaty was observed by the administration concurrently with this policy reformulation. Furthermore, what limited influence was exercised gradually declined over the life of the Reagan administration. There are several explanations for these phenomena.

In order to understand these explanations, I use the agenda-setting framework described by John Kingdon.[31] He identifies three different streams: problems, policies (or solutions), and politics. The problem stream refers to the list of concerns that attract the attention of decision makers. What concerns us here is not where arms control falls on that list, but rather how that problem is defined. This in part will determine the action taken on the issue. The policies stream represents the set of solutions or proposals available for dealing with the problem under consideration. Finally, the political stream represents such things as the variations in public opinion and the changes in the key actors within a political system. The combination of these three streams can provide a good picture of the structure of a political agenda and the alternatives chosen to address the major problems.

SALT II is best understood as a solution that was selected by decision makers in the 1970s based on a particular definition of the arms control problem and given a particular array of political factors. Events in the Reagan administration led both the problem definition and the political stream to change. Consequently, solutions other than SALT II began to emerge as serious alternatives.

The problem stream of arms control took dramatic turns during the Reagan administration. The president himself changed the direction by redefining the arms control problem. Heretofore the problem was believed to be the potentially harmful effects of an unrestrained arms competition. It might be argued that the Reagan administration felt that such an arms race might even be desirable, because the United States would prevail. The administration believed that arms control agreements provided the Soviets with distinct advantages. Therefore, it emphasized issues such as throw-weight and verification, which had previously received less priority. Given this definition of the problem, SALT II no longer served as a viable solution to the problem; indeed, it was considered part of that problem.

A redefinition of the problem is not the full explanation for the abandonment of SALT II in the formulation of alternatives. The administration moved away from SALT II because new problems arose that were outside of that framework;

[31] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy*, 17–19.

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this is what is referred to as the march of problems. The new developments, partly the result of deliberate action by the administration with respect to SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) and INF, forced decision makers to develop new policies in those areas. The SALT framework either provided little guidance or offered alternatives that were judged unacceptable or outdated. Not surprisingly, new ideas were needed to meet new challenges.

Significant changes in the political stream also contributed to the declining influence of SALT II. One major change was the presence of new players in policy-making positions. There are inevitably some alterations when a Republican administration gives way to a Democratic one, or vice-versa, but the change in personnel and philosophy was much more dramatic with the advent of the Reagan administration. Each of the new players was not only dramatically more conservative than his predecessor, but was strongly opposed to SALT II. Eugene Rostow, Richard Perle, and Paul Nitze were vocal critics of the treaty prior to 1981 and assumed positions in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Defense Department, and the INF negotiating team respectively in the Reagan administration.

The Reagan administration also began to desire an arms agreement so that history can record it as a major achievement.[32] In order to make his mark, President Reagan and his advisers seemed to believe that they have no suitable precedent to rely on and wanted to carve out their own niche in arms control history. One might say that this is a dramatic change for an administration that once regarded arms control as contrary to the national interest. The net effect of this change in the political stream was to seek new initiatives rather than rely on the groundwork laid by SALT II.

The policy stream still included SALT II, but that alternative became increasingly less prominent in the flow. The change in actors in the Reagan administration resulted in different, competing solutions entering the stream. In the face of this competition, SALT II had a difficult time surviving. Generally, when prior programs are successful, there is less pressure to opt for new or different initiatives, and hence a tendency exists to rely on "old" solutions.[33] In the case of SALT II, the administration did not regard the treaty as a success in restraining the arms competition; consequently, other solutions became more prominent.

After several years in office, the Reagan administration began to rely on the precedents established by its own policy rather than those of SALT II. Once an administration has built a record in a given area, it will tend to make incremental changes in order to develop future policy. By the beginning of the second term, the president and his advisers had developed a series of their own ideas and had gone through several iterations of bargaining with the Soviets. This provided the basis for their negotiating posture and helps explain why the influence of SALT II faded after the first few years of the administration.

[32] See Light, *The President's Agenda*, 66, for his discussion of the desire for historical achievement by a president and the impact on the setting of the agenda.

[33] Ibid., 123.

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The reasons that the incremental model cannot explain arms control policy in the Reagan administration are evident from the changes in the problem, policy, and political streams. First, the redefinition of the arms control problem by the Reagan administration and the emerging problems of INF and SDI made SALT II an inadequate and often irrelevant policy option. As if this were not enough to eliminate the treaty from serious consideration, changes in the policy-making actors with the advent of the Reagan administration led to a different attitude toward SALT II in the highest circles of government. The policy stream has changed course as a result of the changes in the problem and political streams as SALT II lost the competition to be a solution under active consideration.

Although not the focus of this article, the forces that weakened incrementalism continued during President Reagan's second term. The change in Soviet leadership and subsequent major changes in Eastern Europe altered the political stream, and it also had the effect of redesigning the stream of solutions. Mikhail Gorbachev removed SALT II from the solution stream with his bold, new arms control initiatives. Furthermore, the Reagan administration appeared increasingly anxious in its waning days to negotiate an arms control treaty. Viewed in these lights, the INF treaty was a consequence of the Reagan administration's moves away from the SALT framework during its first term and subsequent, significant changes in the political stream during the second term.

The above analysis reveals why SALT II had a limited impact on Reagan administration arms control initiatives during the period 1981–1984. Yet the treaty was observed for almost six years and SALT-based alternatives were considered in the early stages of the administration. Understanding these occurrences in the context of agenda setting requires further analysis. It should be noted, however, that the failure of all three streams to come together (what Kingdon refers to as the window of opportunity)[34] resulted in no new alternative being selected. In the absence of that new policy, SALT II persisted in order to fill a potential vacuum in the regulation of the arms race.

It took several years for SALT II to be replaced fully in the policy stream, in part because of the Soviet insistence that it remain under consideration; the Gorbachev agenda finally removed that obstacle. During Reagan's first term, the president had to deal with ailing and often invisible Soviet leaders. In this environment the Soviets did not pursue any dramatic new initiatives and tended to fall back on the bargaining positions developed under SALT. They had a strong propaganda incentive to renew calls for SALT II. Yet they also had more than expedient motives for keeping the treaty alive. The Soviets invested a great deal of time and effort and made some important concessions, in their view, in negotiating that treaty. Not surprisingly, their initial bargaining offers resembled elements agreed to on SALT II. This forced the Reagan administration to address SALT issues whether it was inclined to or not. In the early stages, the Soviet position and counterproposals forced some aspects and extensions of SALT II back on the agenda.

[34] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy*, 193ff.

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Nevertheless, SALT II probably would have lingered in the solution stream even if the Soviets had not helped keep it there. Although many of the so-called new solutions put forward by the administration had been advocated in years past, they had not gained the legitimacy in government needed for consideration as serious alternatives. Such ideas need to undergo a "softening-up"[35] process by which they are introduced to the government and to the mass public. This is a lengthy, but necessary process for the ideas to compete as viable alternatives in the policy stream. As a part of this process, the legitimacy of SALT had to be undermined to pave the way for alternatives that were the antithesis of the treaty. The administration succeeded in giving its ideas legitimacy as SALT II was replaced in the policy stream. Yet this is a gradual process and several years passed before the influence of SALT II passed away. This explains why the impact of SALT II was present in the early stages of the administration, but gradually subsided thereafter.

Another influence keeping SALT II alive was the support it received in Congress. Democrats insisted throughout Reagan's first term that SALT II not be violated and that the administration continue in SALT's footsteps. Until the Reagan administration developed its own proposals, it was put on the defensive. Keeping SALT II alive was in large part attributable to congressional insistence that it remain on the agenda in the absence of any credible alternative.

Summary and Conclusions

I have sought to analyze the impact that SALT II exercised on arms control policy during the Reagan administration. SALT II provided an interesting case study given that the treaty was never ratified and was explicitly denounced by the administration. An agenda-setting framework, with an emphasis on the consideration and selection of alternatives on the arms control agenda, was used to assess SALT II's impact. The focus was first on the incremental effects from the treaty on policy making, which were particularly evident in the "no undercut" policy of the Reagan administration. For almost six years, the United States did not exceed the SALT II limits despite the absence of a legal obligation to do so. Furthermore, the SALT II treaty retained a prominent role in the continuing American accusations that the Soviet Union was violating its obligations under a variety of treaties. Thus, SALT II remained very much a part of continuing American policy.

The treaty had much less impact in the formulation of new alternatives designed to replace the status quo. SALT II was influential as a negative precedent in the formulation of basic guidelines for the administration to follow. The treaty also affected the formulation of new policy proposals, but only in a limited fashion; generally, the frameworks for some of the proposals shared certain features with SALT II. Yet this limited influence declined over the course of the Reagan administration, and new initiatives represented significant changes in strategy and content from SALT II and its predecessor. Several explanations from the litera-

[35] Ibid., 134–137.

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ture on agenda setting and elsewhere can be used to explain these occurrence. The results of this investigation confirm what Kingdon, Light, and others have reported about agenda setting for domestic policy. Nevertheless, the results here suggest more than a confirmation of prior findings as applied to foreign policy formulation. The behavior of the Reagan administration exposes several patterns about policy making and reliance on precedent.

First, the evidence from the Reagan arms control record suggests that decision makers will continue past policies in circumstances other than the success or perceived success of those policies. The Reagan administration continued to observe SALT II even though it refused to ratify the treaty. There seem to be several conditions attached to continuing undesirable past policy. First, the costs of continuing past policy have to be very low. SALT II did not really affect any administration plans for new weapons deployments until late 1986; correspondingly, adhering to the provisions of the treaty did not inhibit other policy decisions. In addition to the low costs of policy continuation, it is helpful if the policy yields a few benefits. SALT II helped restrain the Soviet military build-up, regardless of the treaty's faults on verification or other matters. Perhaps most importantly, the policy may continue only as long as it takes for a new policy to be adopted. Decision makers probably will not follow an undesired course of action indefinitely; they will regard the old policy only as an interim step until their own policy position is implemented. It took an extraordinarily long time for a new arms control regime to be established during the Reagan administration. Correspondingly, SALT II's provisions were observed for far longer than might be anticipated given the hostility of the administration. If staying with current policy appears desirable in comparison to another option or no policy at all (assuming that one cannot quickly implement policy along the lines of one's own preferences), then even a fatally flawed document may guide actual policy until its costs become too great, its benefits insufficient, or it is replaced by a policy of one's own design.

This analysis also reveals some important differences in the processes of agenda setting and alternative selection in the domestic and foreign policy contexts. Through constitutional powers and tradition, the president has much greater control over the negotiating positions and actual arms control policy than he does in domestic policy. In the latter, legislative powers may allow Congress to seize the initiative and direct any of the three critical streams. Although presidential power is by no means absolute in foreign affairs, the problem definition and search for solutions is much more confined in areas such as arms control than in welfare spending.[36] With perhaps some exceptions, notably the Israeli lobby, interests groups are also less a part of the foreign policy process.

Even though the executive branch must face fewer intragovernmental constraints in forming an arms control agenda, unlike domestic policy, the arms control agenda

[36] The domestic constraints on arms control policy, however, should not be underestimated. See Steven Miller, "Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control," *International Security* 8 (Spring 1984) 67–90.

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is shaped through dynamic, bilateral (sometimes multilateral) interactions with a hostile opponent. To that extent, an administration may be driven by forces over which it has little control or influence. The number of possibilities for change in the political stream brought about by events in the international environment are great; this would seem to make control of an arms control agenda more difficult and less stable over time than domestic agendas and alternatives.

Another factor that complicates foreign policy, in particular arms control policy, is the speed of technological innovation. Advances in the accuracy, destructive capacity, and detection of weapons systems can readily make past policies obsolete. Technological change can force a redefinition of the arms control problem, redirect the problem stream to a new issue, and eliminate several solutions from the policy stream. The introduction of MIRV technology, and even the potential feasibility of SDI, rearranged the arms control agenda. This is not to say that technological change does not affect domestic agendas; rather, the rapidity and resulting displacement caused by the change are not as great. One might expect that the stream for arms control alternatives is much more fluid than in domestic issue areas.

Finally, much has been made of the advantage in policy making that the president possesses early in a term, during the so-called honeymoon period. This is supposed to be followed by a period of declining influence for the president.[37] In the area of arms control, there may be no early advantage for the president. The ability to reshape the agenda is hampered by the process of policy review, seemingly longer than occurs with domestic policy. Furthermore, the president is limited by the expectations of his Soviet adversaries; there is no honeymoon period when dealing with the Soviet Union or other states. Too often, a dramatic attempt to redefine the agenda results in failure and the accusation that U.S. foreign policy lacks consistency. Jimmy Carter's attempt to redirect the arms control negotiations at the beginning of his term ended in frustration.

The models of agenda setting developed by analysts of domestic policy are useful in understanding the formulation of foreign policy. Yet they are limited in their ability to capture the unique challenges and constraints that face foreign policy decision makers.

The influence of SALT II on Reagan policy offers some insights into the formulation of new policy alternatives. As might be expected from the incrementalist model, prior policy, even undesired prior policy, is still used as a basis for new initiatives. Nevertheless, this study has revealed that such impact declined over time so that the influence was minimal in Reagan's second term. This suggests that unless prior policy is reinforced by new policy molded in its image, the relative influence of the original policy may decay; this may especially be true as new proposals establish precedents of their own. Were there a SALT III, the legacy of the framework in I and II would probably remain strong today.

The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the end of the cold war suggest that SALT II may become a mere historical artifact, an example of an arms con-

[37] Light, *The President's Agenda*, 123.

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trol agreement never ratified and subsequently bypassed by changing world circumstances. In one sense that is true as the Bush administration is pursuing new arms limitations, much more far-reaching than anything envisioned under SALT. Until those agreements are negotiated and a new world order has been established, however, the American nuclear force structure will continue to reflect decisions made in the early part of the Reagan administration that were influenced in several ways by SALT II.*

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1987 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. The author would like to thank Martin Hillenbrand, Robert Durant, David Nice, Loch Johnson, George Downs, and Nikos Zahariadis for their comments and suggestions.

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There are two kinds of heart attack victims.

The quick and the dead.

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Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human Rights

HOWARD TOLLEY, JR.

Human rights law groups began a major policy-making initiative in the 1980s to persuade United States courts that new international norms have binding legal effect. Since the 1950s the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and environmental and consumer public law interest groups have successfully used litigation to change government policy on racial segregation, prisoner's rights, conservation, and product liability.[1]

Human rights advocates had no such success until the 1980s, when several federal courts made unprecedented decisions based on international law. In *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, the appeals court ruled that the federal district court had jurisdiction to hear an alien's tort claim against a Paraguayan national for violating the

[1] Stephen Rosenbaum, "Lawyers *Pro Bono Publico:* Using International Human Rights Law on Behalf of the Poor" in Ellen L. Lutz, Hurst Hannum, Kathryn J. Burke, eds., *New Directions in Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 109–34; Hurst Hanum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984); K. Burke, S. Coliver, C. de la Vega, and S. Rosenbaum, "Application of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts," 18 *Texas International Law Journal* 291 (1983); Clement E. Vose, *Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); Harmon Zeigler, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964); Burton Weisbrod, Joel Handler, and Neil Konesa, *Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Stephen Wasby, "Civil Rights Litigation by Organizations," *Judicature* 68 (April-May 1985): 337–52.

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international law against torture.[2] In *Fernandez v. Wilkinson* a U.S. district judge in Kansas ruled that indefinite detention of a Cuban refugee denied asylum violated international law.[3] In *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca* the U.S. Supreme Court used the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to inform its interpretation of a congressional statute on standards for granting asylum.[4] Most recently, Justice John Paul Stevens favorably cited international law in blocking one execution, while Justice Antonin Scalia expressly rejected identical claims in upholding a similar juvenile death sentence.[5] Initial victories encouraged the growing domestic litigation effort, despite significant losses that reveal major obstacles. The human rights attorneys raising international law claims in domestic courts have a major policy goal—to make the rule of international law directly enforceable by individuals against government officials in domestic courts. Remedies limited to individual violations would merely treat symptoms without addressing the underlying cause—a deficient legal system in which sovereign nation states are above the law.

That internationalist goal conflicts sharply with classical doctrines of national sovereignty and judicial restraint in foreign policy making. In the nineteenth century, American legal scholars and practitioners developed a dualist model in which municipal legal systems operate separate from and largely independent of international law.[6] Realists contend that the law of nations primarily governs disputes between states and largely ignores conflicts among private citizens or between individuals and governments.[7] Positivists acknowledge that under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution treaties ratified by the president and Congress become law enforceable in national courts. The United States, however, has ratified few human rights instruments, and evolving norms of customary international law are too indefinite to enforce.

Monists, by contrast, promote a single hierarchical system in which international law is superior to national law.[8] Internationalists seek judicial enforcement of a legal regime that includes not only treaties but also evolving customary norms based on a higher natural law. U.S. courts should give individuals standing to assert internationally created legal rights violated by national authorities. This article explains how and why human rights public interest law groups developed, their litigation strategy, the preconditions for success or failure, and the possible consequences.

[2] *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876 2d Cir. (1980).

[3] *Fernandez v. Wilkinson*, 505 F.Supp. 787 D. Kan. (1980), *aff'd* on other grounds *sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernadez v. Wilkinson*, 654 F.2d 1382 10th Cir. (1981).

[4] *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (1987).

[5] *Thompson v. Oklahoma*, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988); *Stanford v. Kentucky*, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989).

[6] Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph Steinhardt, "Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*," *Harvard International Law Journal* 22 (Winter 1981): 53–113.

[7] James Watson, "Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law," *University of Illinois Law Forum* (1979): 609.

[8] Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, 2d ed. (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1973).

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Human Rights Interest Groups

The first attempts to stimulate international human rights policy making by the courts followed postwar development of new human rights law. U.S. prosecutors at Nuremburg held Nazi officials accountable for crimes against humanity defined by customary international law; the Supreme Court sustained the conviction of Japan's General Tomoyuki Yamashita for war crimes. Pressed by nongovernmental organizations and Latin American allies, the United States joined the first major global effort to codify international human rights law. The United States promptly ratified the United Nations Charter, including the Articles 55 and 56 pledge to take action to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.S. representatives then worked effectively for a Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Civil liberties interest groups in the United States promptly added to their court pleadings references to the UN Charter's prohibition of discrimination.[9] The ACLU and others cited the UN Charter as well as the U.S. Constitution in briefs urging both state and federal courts to invalidate restrictive housing covenants and alien land laws.[10] In other civil rights cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, the ACLU, the American Association for the UN, the American Jewish Committee, B'nai B'rith, American Veterans Committee, the National Lawyers Guild, the NAACP, and others challenged racial discrimination in education,[11] transportation,[12] and employment[13] as violations of the UN Charter and/or the Universal Declaration.

The first attempt to secure domestic enforcement of international law lost in the courts, in Congress, and with the executive. Initially, four judges of the U.S. Supreme Court joined concurring opinions that supported arguments based on the Charter.[14] The California Supreme Court, however, considered the Charter's human rights provisions non-self-executing and unenforceable without implementing legislation by Congress.[15] That result reversed a favorable appeals court decision and obscured a contrary holding by the Oregon Supreme Court. Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court consistently disregarded international human rights law claims and, like the California court, found that discrimination violated only the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In the early 1950s Congress and the president did considerably more than the courts to frustrate internationalist litigation. Southern representatives worried that international norms of racial equality might override state segregation laws. Ohio's

[9] Bert Lockwood, "The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946–1955," *Iowa Law Review* 69 (May 1984): 901–956.

[10] *Sei Fujii v. State,* 217 P.2d 481 Cal. Dist. Ct. App. (1950) *aff'd* 38 Cal 2d, 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); *Namba v. McCourt,* 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d. 669 (1949); *Shelley v. Kraemer,* 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

[11] *Sweatt v. Painter,* 339 U.S. 629 (1950); *Bolling v. Sharp,* 247 U.S. 497 (1954).

[12] *Bob-lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,* 333 U.S. 28 (1948).

[13] *Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,* 334 U.S. 410 (1948).

[14] *Oyama v. California,* 332 U.S. 633 (1948).

[15] *Sei Fujii v. State* (1952).

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Senator John Bricker proposed a widely supported but ultimately unsuccessful constitutional amendment to limit the reach of treaty law. After the 1952 presidential election, U.S. representatives at the UN Commission on Human Rights withdrew from further participation in drafting an International Bill of Rights.[16] The UN completed new human rights conventions, but interest groups made only minimal efforts to obtain recognition of those norms in U.S. courts.[17] The human rights litigation movement revived in the 1960s with campaigns against domestic segregation and the Vietnam intervention.

Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, Southern Africa Project. At the request of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, prominent members of the bar created the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to combat race discrimination in the United States. The group created a Southern Africa Project in 1967, when a South African fellow at New York University, attorney Joel Carlson, asked the committee to assist thirty-seven Namibians. By 1986 the project employed four professionals in Washington, D.C. directed by Gay McDougall on a budget of $800,000 raised from foundation grants, private donations, and major law firms.[18]

The project directed most of its resources to assisting attorneys in South Africa, but in the 1960s it initiated several domestic proceedings based on U.S. law to give effect to UN antiracist measures.[19] The project unsuccessfully challenged newspaper want-ads for South African jobs with racially discriminatory employment criteria,[20] asked the Civil Aeronautics Board to deny South African Airways a new route permit,[21] and objected to commerce with Namibia in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.[22] After adoption of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the project petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reject eight pending applications and to revoke other licenses for importing uranium from South Africa. The project also has helped companies and local governments selling off South African investments to defend against lawsuits brought by opponents of divestment.

Center for Constitutional Rights. In 1966 "anti-establishment" attorneys founded the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) to "develop innovative, aggressive legal strategies" to support the southern civil rights struggle. Trademark lawyer Peter Weiss soon became an active supporter with particular interest in international human rights. Eight staff lawyers in New York work on behalf of

[16] Howard Tolley, Jr., *The U.N. Commission on Human Rights* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987).

[17] Richard B. Lillich and Frank B. Newman, *International Human Rights: Problems of Law and Policy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 155–21.

[18] *North American Human Rights Directory* (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Internet, 1984).

[19] David Weissbrodt and Georgina Mahoney, "International Legal Action Against Apartheid," *Law & Inequality* 4 (October 1986): 485–508.

[20] *New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission on Human Rights,* 41 N.Y. 2d 345, 361 N. E. 2d 963, 393 N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1977).

[21] *Diggs v. CAB,* 516 F.2d 1248 D.C. Cir (1974) *cert denied* 424 U.S. 910 (1976).

[22] *Diggs v. Richardson,* 14 I.L.M. 797 D.D.C. (1975) *aff'd sub nom. Diggs v. Richardson, 555* F.2d 848 D.C. Cir. (1976). Frank Newman and Kathryn Burke, "Diggs v. Richardson: International Human Rights in U.S. Courts," *National Lawyers Guild Practitioner* 34 (1977): 52–64.

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people's movements, antiwar activists, native Americans, blacks, Puerto Ricans, women, and others seeking to change United States policies and structures.

New York University Center for International Studies director Tom Franck turned to Weiss when the Southern Africa Project was reluctant to challenge the U.S. importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN sanctions. The South African fellow, Carlson, joined others with lead plaintiff Charles Diggs in an unsuccessful CCR suit against Treasury Secretary George Schultz.[23] Throughout the Vietnam war, CCR along with the National Lawyers Guild and others defended draft resisters and initiated unavailing affirmative challenges to the war's legality. Courts uniformly declined to acknowledge the Treaty of London and Nuremburg Judgment prohibiting war crimes, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Hague Conventions, and the Washington Treaty of 1922.[24] Five CCR lawsuits in the 1980s challenged U.S. intervention in Central America and the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe.

CCR won the seminal human rights victory in *Filartiga* that indirectly resulted from its search for remedies to war crimes. Widespread outrage at the My Lai massacre stimulated research into possible legal remedies in U.S. courts. Weiss discovered a rarely used and little known federal alien tort claims act adopted in 1789 that allowed noncitizens to seek a remedy in U.S. court for violations of the law of nations.[25] A Vietnamese survivor of the My Lai slaughter might then have brought an action for damages against Lieutenant William Calley in U.S. courts. In 1978 an Amnesty International staff member contacted Weiss about a Paraguayan torturer on the verge of being deported from New York. CCR promptly filed a tort claim against Norberto Pena-Irala in U.S. district court on behalf of Joel and Dolly Filartiga; their son and brother Joel had been tortured to death in Paraguay. Since the victory in *Filartiga*, CCR has represented plaintiffs against Argentina, Chile, Filipino Ferdinand Marcos, and Argentinian General Carlos Guillermo Suarez-Mason.

In addition to the civil rights and antiwar organizations, a separate movement for international human rights prompted the founding of new litigation groups in the 1970s. As in the postwar years, intergovernmental human rights activity was an important stimulus. The UN completed the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights as well as a 1965 convention prohibiting race discrimination. In 1967 the UN Commission on Human Rights began reviewing complaints of violations, primarily to aid black South Africans and Palestinians. The American Convention on Human Rights was opened for signature in 1969. International law scholars and practicing attorneys adapted existing professional groups and created new organizations to promote U.S. ratification and to participate directly in the novel international procedures.

[23] *Diggs v. Shultz*, 470 F.2d 461 D.C. Cir. (1972) *cert denied*, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).

[24] Francis Boyle, "Defending Nonviolent Civil Disobedience Against the Reagan Administration Under International Law," *Crime and Social Justice* No. 24 (1986): 110–34.

[25] "Proceedings, Conference on International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts," *University of San Francisco Law Review* 17 (Fall 1982): 1.

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International law professors at Berkeley, Virginia, Harvard, Columbia, and New York University began training human rights practitioners to staff new public interest law firms that could represent clients in both international and domestic tribunals. The number of law schools offering human rights courses or seminars grew to forty-six by 1983,[26] and students obtained practical experience as interns with nongovernmental organizations petitioning the UN. Early graduates established new law school programs in Minnesota and Cincinnati and organized public interest law firms in part to litigate human rights claims.

The Ford Foundation provided essential backing for the new academic and interest group enterprises. Since 1980 "Human Rights and Social Justice" has been one of the Ford Foundation's six major themes, with grants awarded for both training and litigation. The academic recipients include the University of Minnesota's Human Rights Internship Program, Columbia University's Center for Human Rights, and a recently created program at Harvard. Ford helped establish the research oriented Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute (PAIL), which sponsored summer institutes for human rights instructors starting in 1979. The Aspen Institute used Ford grants to conduct seminars for over ninety federal district and appellate court judges on international human rights law. Nearly all of the major public interest law firms got started with Ford grants, each exceeding $100,000 – the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and its Political Asylum Project; the Haitian Refugee Center; the National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum; the ACLU National Fund for Alien and Immigration Rights; the International Human Rights Law Group; and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee.[27] The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, MacArthur, Carnegie, and Edna McConnell Clark Foundations, the Jacob Blaustein Institute, Eleanor Patterson Fund and others gave additional support.

Carter administration policies after 1976 also encouraged the domestic litigation effort. The president endorsed human rights as a foreign policy goal and signed the two International Covenants and the Race Discrimination Treaty. During Jimmy Carter's term the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Agency for International Development encouraged human rights training and practice with grants to the International Human Rights Law Group. In both *Filartiga* and in the Iran hostages case argued before the International Court of Justice, the Carter Justice and State Departments claimed that customary international law had binding effect.

American Civil Liberties Union. By far the largest organization engaged in human rights litigation, the ACLU has national offices in New York and Washington, state affiliates, and local chapters throughout the country. The headquarters operates an Immigration and Aliens' Rights Task Force, and the New York Civil Liberties Union has also had a refugee project. In Kansas City, Atlanta, and elsewhere, local ACLU attorneys worked for the release of Cuban detainees. In

[26] Richard Lillich, "Teaching of International Human Rights Law in U.S. Law Schools," *American Journal of International Law* 77 (October 1983): 855–863.

[27] Ford Foundation Annual Reports, 1981–86.

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Washington D.C. and California the ACLU has challenged the Reagan administration's order closing the Palestinian Information Center and deportation proceedings against PLO members. The national board however has resisted proposals that the ACLU become more actively opposed to U.S. foreign policies that violate human rights abroad.

The large Southern California ACLU, which initiated the postwar challenge to alien land laws, has engaged in extensive human rights litigation under legal director Paul Hoffman. A former president of Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), Hoffman coordinated an AIUSA Legal Support Network with over 400 volunteer attorneys, local groups in fourteen cities, and a comprehensive newsletter. In criminal prosecutions of sanctuary workers in Texas and Arizona, ACLU defense attorneys attempted unsuccessfully to invoke the Geneva Convention in defending U.S. sanctuary activists charged with illegally aiding Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.[28] Taking the offensive, counsel then brought an affirmative action to enjoin further prosecutions.[29] The ACLU affiliate has also brought alien tort claims on behalf of clients from Yugoslavia, Argentina, and the Philippines.[30]

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). The first major public interest law firm dedicated exclusively to international human rights issues was created in 1975 by the International League for Human Rights and the Council of New York Law Associates. The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights initially functioned primarily as a nongovernmental organization monitoring and exposing human rights violations abroad. After Berkeley law graduate Michael Posner became executive director in 1978, the committee began representing aliens in U.S. courts and filing amicus briefs in other cases. By 1985 the LCHR employed a ten-member staff with three full time attorneys in New York and one office representative in Washington D.C.

As increasing numbers of refugees sought assistance, the committee in 1980 established a Political Asylum Project headed by Arthur Helton. The project has sought procedural fairness for refugees seeking asylum – right to notice, counsel, individualized review, and release on parole pending review.[31] The committee recruited over 1,500 volunteer attorneys to assist in deportation and asylum proceedings, prepared a 250-page manual and sixteen training videotapes, conducted training sessions in seven states, and provided small Ford Foundation educational grants. The committee supported major class action challenges by the Haitian Refugee Center against expedited procedures and then interdiction on the high seas.[32] Another suit challenged the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

[28] *U.S. v. Maria Del Socorro Pardo de Aguilar,* (1989); *U.S. v. Merkt,* 794 F.2d 950 5th Cir. (1986).

[29] *American Baptist Churches v. Meese No. C-85-3255 RFP,* N.D. Cal. (30 March 1987).

[30] *Handel v. Artukovic,* 601 F. Supp. 1421 D. D. Cal. (1985) *aff'd; Clemente v. Marcos,* N.D. Cal. (1986). 1989 WL 76898 (9th Cir. Cal).

[31] *Louis v. Nelson,* 544 F. Supp. 1004 S. D. Fla. (1982).

[32] *Haitian Refugee Center v. Civilletti,* 503 F. Supp. 442 S. D. Fla. (1980); *Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,* 675 F.2d 1023 5th Cir. (1982); *Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey,* 600 F. Supp. 1396 D.D.C. (1984); 809 F.2d 794 D.C. Cir. (1987).

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policy of sending refugees into indefinite orbit from one airport to another by deporting excludable aliens from Afghanistan and Iran without advance assurance that they would be admitted to another country.[33] The committee and the ACLU have also sought due process for Cuban detainees under the UN Protocol on Refugees and customary international norms of due process.[34]

Several other human rights groups go considerably beyond procedural claims by arguing that international law also creates enforceable substantive rights not previously recognized under the U.S. Constitution—rights to education, social security, food, housing, and a job. International norms prohibiting race and sex discrimination may go beyond the protections afforded by the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection holdings. Ardent proponents of new internationally recognized rights attack "stale Austinian notions of legal legitimacy and skepticism about the binding nature of international law engendered by American isolationism."[35]

The International Human Rights Law Group. Founded by the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute in 1978, the International Human Rights Law Group employs a small staff and law school interns in Washington, D.C. on an annual $100,000 budget. Its board includes legal scholars, attorneys from major law firms in the capital, and former State Department legal advisers and deputy assistant secretaries for human rights. Human Rights Advocates in Berkeley and an International Law Group in Houston cooperate as affiliates. The Law Group's significant educational program includes publications and training seminars on practicing international human rights law.[36] The Law Group has asked the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to find that racially discriminatory death sentencing and juvenile executions in the United States violated international law.[37] A domestic litigation committee maintains a roster of forty-six pro bono attorneys who have engaged primarily in amicus briefing rather than direct representation.

In addition to its support for alien tort claims and refugees, the Law Group invoked international law to assert new rights to education, to work, and to disability benefits, as well as enhanced protection for racial minorities. In support of alien children denied a free public education in Texas, the Law Group provided expert trial testimony and an amicus brief on the right to education on a non-

[33] *Sarwary v. Sava.* The suit contributed to political pressure that brought the release of thirty-two detainees in an out of court settlement. In *Ishtyag v. Nelson,* 627 F. Supp 13 E.D.N.Y. (1983) the court denied a petition from Afghan and Iranian refugees.

[34] *Roshan v. Smith,* 615 F.Supp. 901 D.D.C. (1985). The courts dismissed the effort to halt construction, but did delay the transfer of some asylum applicants who would have been adversely affected. *Velasquez v. Nelson,* S.D. Fla. (1986).

[35] Joan Hartman, "'Unusual' Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty," *University of Cincinnati Law Review* 52 (Summer 1983): 669.

[36] Hurst Hannum, ed., *Guide to International Human Rights Practice* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1984).

[37] The commission refused to consider the race discrimination petition, but did endorse a claim advanced by the Law Group with many others that the execution of juvenile offenders in South Carolina violated the American Declaration. In re *Roach* (1987).

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discriminatory basis guaranteed in self-executing provisions of the Organization of American States (OAS) and UN charters.[38] Invoking International Labor Organization conventions, the Law Group argued as amicus that asylum applicants have a right to work.[39] Human Rights Advocates failed to convince the 6th Circuit that international law created a right to disability payments.[40]

In two amicus briefs disregarded by the Supreme Court, the Law Group has argued that customary and treaty law forbids state supported race discrimination.[41] Another Law Group amicus effort challenged death sentences for juvenile offenders in *Thompson v. Oklahoma.*[42] Taking the difficult high road, the brief urged the court to incorporate directly relevant provisions of the International Convention on Political and Civil Rights, the American Convention, and customary international law.

It is not possible to describe in similar detail the many other human rights lawyers' organizations and public interest law groups with a human rights component that have become active in the 1980s—the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, the Haitian Refugee Center; the Indo-Chinese Refugee Action Center; the National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum; the National Lawyers Guild's National Immigration Project; and a brief bank and pro bono projects of the American Immigration Lawyers Association of the Los Angeles Bar Public Counsel; and the International Institute of Boston.

Despite the growth in organizing activity, human rights organizations remain quite minor players in the public interest arena. CCR's budget has increased from $40,000 to over $1 million per year, but less than 20 percent of that goes to international litigation. The ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund have raised over $6 million annually, but most of their litigation asserts constitutional and statutory rights. By contrast, a well endowed corporate law project, the Pacific Legal Foundation, spent $14 million and participated in over 200 cases in 1973.[43] With meager resources and few paid staff, volunteer human rights litigators frequently collaborate to develop a common strategy that can maximize their impact.

Strategy: Collaboration and Conflict

Overlapping organizational memberships within the small human rights network facilitate extensive collaboration. Minnesota Law Professor David Weissbrodt, for example, filed a joint amicus brief in *Filartiga* on behalf of the Lawyers Committee, AIUSA, and the Law Group. When Judge Irving Kaufman then asked the

[38] *Doe v. Plyler,* 458 F. Supp. 569 D. Tex. (1978); 628 F.2d 448 11th Cir. (1980); *Plyler v. Doe,* 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

[39] *National Center for Immigrant's Rights v. INS,* 644 F. Supp. 5 C. D. Cal. (1980); 743 F.2d 1365 9th Cir. (1984); 791 F.2d 1351 9th Cir. (1986).

[40] *Yeiter v. Sec'ty HHS,* 818 F.2d 8 6th Circ. (1987).

[41] *Bob Jones v. U.S.,* 461 U.S. 574 (1981); *McCleskey v. Kemp,* 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

[42] 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988).

[43] Oliver Houck, "With Charity for All," *Yale Law Journal,* 93 (July 1984): 1415–1563.

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U.S. State Department for an advisory memorandum, the Law Group lobbied Justice Department officials to support CCR's case. In a Haitian refugee action filed by the Lawyers Committee, the ACLU, NYCLU, AIUSA and the Law Group filed amicus arguments. The Lawyers Committee coordinated amicus briefs in *Cardoza-Fonseca* submitted by the Law Group and others, and The UN High Commissioner for Refugees was encouraged to set forth the international standards. After failing to persuade the judiciary to block deportation of Salvadoran exiles, activists collaborated on lobbying Congress for remedial legislation, the Moakley-Deconcini bill. Regular conferences, publications, brief banks, and bar association meetings are the most common tools of cooperation.

In 1975 Richard Lillich convened at the University of Virginia the first conference of human rights practitioners to plan litigation strategy. Subsequent meetings at Washington and Lee in 1979 and American University in 1985 followed up on developments.[44] On the West coast similar strategy meetings were held in San Francisco in 1982 and Los Angeles in 1983, where participants gave special attention in successful state court litigation in California and Oregon.[45] Annual meetings of the American Society for International Law provided regular opportunities for consultation. The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on World Order Under Law and the Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities published materials and organized institutes on international law and practice.[46]

Human rights activists now seek to expand the litigation campaign from its main center in New York, Washington, San Francisco, and Los Angeles into courts throughout the country. In order to enlighten the judiciary, attorneys must begin supporting domestic claims with international law arguments in as many state and federal courts as possible. Continuing legal education programs, publications, and brief banks encourage and assist practitioners from the heartland to enlist in the campaign. Newsletters from the AIUSA Legal Support Network and the Lawyers Committee as well as docket reports from CCR and the Law Group have become essential tools of information exchange. The Meklejohn Civil Liberties Institute's Peace Law and Education Project maintains a peace law brief and issues bank at Berkeley. The Lawyers Committee prepared a training manual for volunteer attorneys taking asylum and refugee cases. The Law Group sponsored the *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*. In order to set the stage for future litigation, strategically placed law review articles criticize unfavorable decisions, praise enlightened opinions, and seek to discredit dualist theories.[47] Bar Association

[44] Deborah Gerstel and Adam Segall, "Conference Report: Human Rights in American Courts," *American University Journal of International Law and Policy* 1 (Summer 1986): 137–166.

[45] "Proceedings," 1982; "Symposium on International Human Rights Law in State Courts," *The International Lawyer* 18 (Winter 1984): 59–88.

[46] Richard Lillich, *Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts* (Chicago: American Bar Association, Standing Committee of World Order Under Law, 1985).

[47] Blum and Steinhardt, "Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims"; Howard Tolley, "The Domestic Applicability of International Treaties in the United States," *Lawyer of the Americas: The University of Miami Journal of International Law* 15 (Spring 1983): 71–88.

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members have enhanced the authority of customary international law with revisions to the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law.[48]

Despite their shared goals, the groups have distinctive approaches. The Law Group has twice petitioned the Inter-American Human Rights Commission about issues still pending in U.S. courts. The Lawyers Committee and the ACLU have exhausted domestic remedies first before petitioning the UN Commission on Human Rights on behalf of Cuban detainees. CCR has worked exclusively in the domestic forum, first challenging Reagan administration policy under U.S. law. After the International Court of Justice rendered its decision favoring Nicaragua against the United States, CCR sought to enforce the result in U.S. courts.[49]

CCR has been more willing than the Law Group and the Southern Africa Project to take and appeal cases that have little or no prospect of success. Concerned about an adverse holding by the Supreme Court, the Law Group decided not to prepare an amicus argument claiming an internationally guaranteed right to equal education in *Plyler v. Doe*. CCR by contrast has repeatedly represented members of Congress in legally fruitless challenges to presidential abuse of the war power. Some question the propriety of using such litigation for political organizing and education. Critics of U.S. policy nevertheless persist in filing unwinnable claims in order to keep their principled convictions before the courts, the public, and prospective supporters.

Groups have also disagreed over the wisdom of supporting a Torture Victim Protection Act in Congress to secure the victory in *Filartiga*. Passage would resolve the doubts raised in *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic* about a victim's standing to recover in U.S. courts for torture.[50] The Lawyers Committee agreed to draft the bill introduced in March 1987, and the Legal Support Network has urged members to lobby for passage. Some, however, worry that congressional failure to act might weaken *Filartiga*, providing evidence that the courts do not have jurisdiction to hear alien tort claims.

However extensive the collaboration among human rights groups, there can be no master plan that controls litigation by independent counsel. In one instance, private counsel set back the internationalist movement. Relying on the precedent established by CCR in *Filartiga*, counsel representing Israeli national Hanoch Tel-Oren unsuccessfully sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Libya for a terrorist bombing.[51] Plaintiffs had failed properly to serve two of the defendants and had not filed the complaint until two years after the local statute of limitations had run. Libya could also have claimed sovereign immunity. Concerned that the case might result in an unfortunate precedent, international human rights

[48] The 1986 Restatement concludes that torture, genocide, slavery, piracy, and race discrimination violate customary international law.

[49] *U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan*, D.D.C. (1987).

[50] *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 726 F.2d 774 D.C. Cir. (1984), *cert denied*, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).

[51] *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic* (1984). Anthony D'Amato, "What Does *Tel-Oren* Tell Lawyers," 79 *American Journal of International Law* (January 1985): 92–105.

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lawyers attempted without success to dissuade private counsel from taking an appeal to the D.C. circuit.[52] Two judges on the D.C. appeals court panel then wrote opinions at odds with the second circuit's approval of alien tort claims.

Tel-Oren illustrates a potential conflict that confronts public interest lawyers forced to choose between their organizations and their clients.[53] An organization that selects plaintiffs to bring test cases has greater freedom to discontinue the litigation when an adverse decision might defeat the group's long-term goals. Retained counsel may feel an ethical duty to proceed with dangerously weak international law arguments if they represent the best case that can be made for the client.

Human rights litigators must also make a strategic choice between competing international law arguments. For the purist, international common law should be urged on the courts as directly enforceable rules having the same force as U.S. statutes.[54] The more pragmatic advocate urges the U.S. judge to interpret national law with reference to emerging international human rights norms.[55] In two important capital punishment decisions invalidating state-imposed death penalties for rape and felony murder, the Supreme Court reviewed international practice and "the climate of international opinion."[56] Similarly, the Court should be urged to respect international standards when interpreting due process and equal protection. Tactically, idealistic amicus briefs advocating direct incorporation may make more acceptable the pragmatic amicus arguments for informing constitutional interpretation with internationally recognized rights. In *Thompson v. Oklahoma,* a juvenile death penalty appeal, the Law Group's amicus brief advocated pure incorporation, while AIUSA urged the court to construe the Eighth Amendment's evolving "cruel and unusual" standard in light of emerging international norms. In an opinion for the court blocking the execution, Justice Stevens joined by Justices William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry A. Blackmun cited Amnesty's brief in describing the "civilized standard of decency."[57] A year later, however, a radically different five-member majority allowed the execution of seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds. Writing for the court, Justice Scalia concluded, "the practices of other nations . . . cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people."[58]

[52] David Weissbrodt, "Ethical Problems of an International Human Rights Law Practice," in *1985 Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1985), VII: 246, n. 118.

[53] Weissbrodt, "Ethical Problems," 217–251.

[54] Farooq Hassan, "The Doctrine of Incorporation: New Vistas for the Enforcement of International Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 5 (Winter 1983): 68–86.

[55] Gordon Christensen, "Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses," *University of Cincinnati Law Review* 52 (Winter 1983): 3–37.

[56] *Coker v. Georgia,* 433 U.S. 584 (1976): 596, n. 10; *Enmund v. Florida,* 458 U.S. 782, (1982): 796 n. 22.

[57] *Thompson v. Oklahoma,* 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988): 2696, n. 34.

[58] *Stanford v. Kentucky,* 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989): n 1.

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Winning Combinations

Human rights attorneys have both won and lost major cases on alien tort claims, refugee detention, and asylum and deportation procedures. The conflicting results reached in cases that could go either way reveal four significant factors that contribute to successful litigation—congressional authorization, executive approval, vulnerable defendants, and responsive judges. Conversely, litigation normally fails when Congress and the president are indifferent or opposed, when offending public officials are immune from suit, and when the judges are predisposed to favor state authority over individual rights.

Congressional Authorization. Under Article III of the Constitution, the judicial power extends to cases "arising under laws of the United States." A 1900 opinion by Justice Horace Gray concluded that customary international law is part of U.S. common law enforceable by the courts.[59] Even where such customary rules become clearly elaborated in ratified treaties, however, individual citizens may not have a cause of action unless Congress adopts implementing legislation. Nor do citizens normally have standing to challenge executive foreign policies that they claim violate U.S. or international law.

The first Congress expressly conferred on U.S. courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."[60] In 1980 Judge Kaufman writing for a unanimous second circuit panel in *Filartiga* found that the 1789 Alien Tort Statute created a private cause of action. District court Judge Joyce Green and Judge Robert Bork of the D.C. circuit court of appeals concluded in *Tel-Oren* that Congress had not authorized jurisdiction unless a cause of action previously existed under international law. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, but most courts have followed Judge Kaufman's precedent and granted standing to many aliens.

In the 1980 Refugee Act, Congress implemented provisions of the UN Convention and Protocol on the Rights of Refugees. According to the protocol's provision on nonrefoulement, individuals should not be repatriated when they have a "well founded fear of persecution." The INS required that aliens seeking to avoid deportation or to qualify for asylum demonstrate a clear probability that persecution was "more likely than not." The Supreme Court accepted the INS standard on deportation, but the asylum question was treated separately, because Congress adopted somewhat different language in that provision of the Refugee Act. Human rights proponents successfully argued that the "well founded fear" phrasing in the act incorporated an international standard that the INS had disregarded.[61] Concluding that Congress had deliberately sought to incorporate the international standard in U.S. law, the Supreme Court reviewed preparatory materials from the UN Protocol in order to apply the drafters' intent. By contrast, in the 1976 Foreign

[59] *The Paquette Habana*, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).

[60] Judiciary Act of 1789, chap. 20, sec. 9 (b), 1 stat. 67, 77 (1789), codified at 28 U.S.C. sec. 1350.

[61] *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).

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Sovereign Immunities Act, Congress severely limited federal court jurisdiction to review claims against other states.[62]

Executive Approval. In *Filartiga* the executive's approval of jurisdiction was more critical to success than congressional authorization. Uncertain of the State Department's views, Kaufman solicited a memorandum.[63] The Supreme Court similarly requested an amicus brief in *Tel-Oren* and denied certiorari as recommended by the executive.[64] One district court vacated a default judgment against Argentina after the executive raised objections in a Suggestion of Interest.[65] The 9th circuit requested and then favorably cited an executive opinion in deciding that the act of state doctrine does not protect former Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos in a civil action.[66] Courts are particularly solicitous of the president's recommendations on immunity for foreign governments and their officials, since important international relationships could be jeopardized.[67]

Human rights litigators seek to invoke executive authority whenever possible, even when challenging executive branch action. In a successful effort to compel release of a Cuban detainee, a Law Group brief noted that President Carter had signed the American Convention on Human Rights and made a crucial argument before the International Court of Justice on behalf of U.S. hostages held in Iran: "It is well established that . . . aliens are entitled to be free from arbitrary or discriminatory arrest and detention."[68] In an effort to block the Coast Guard's interdiction of Haitian refugees on the high seas, The Haitian Refugee Center unsuccessfully argued that the president's Executive Order incorporated by direct reference Article 33 on nonrefoulement of the Convention on Refugees.[69] Litigators can use the annual State Department country reports detailing human rights violations when bringing an alien tort claim or when seeking to show a well-founded fear of persecution in a deportation proceeding.

Vulnerable Defendants. Most human rights offenders either remain beyond U.S. courts' territorial jurisdiction or have a strong claim for legal immunity.[70] Governments that maintain permanent embassies in the United States may enjoy

[62] *Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic,* 830 F.2d 421 2d Cir. (1987), *reversed,* 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989).

[63] Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala* (1980) in *International Legal Materials* 19 (1980): 585–611.

[64] Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic* in *International Legal Materials* 25 (1985): 427.

[65] *Siderman v. Argentina No. CV 82-1772-RMT(Mex)* C.D. Cal. (12 March 1984), vacated on other grounds. C. D. Cal (March 7, 1985) in Lexis, Genfed library, Dist. file.

[66] *Trajano v. Marcos,* 818 F.2d 1439 9th Cir. (1989).

[67] Michael Bazyler, "Litigating the International Law of Human Rights: A 'How to' Approach," *Whittier Law Review* 7 (1985): 719–735

[68] Memorial for the United States, "Case Concerning U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran," *ICJ [International Court of Justice] Pleadings* 1 (1980).

[69] *Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey,* 600 F. Supp. 1396 D.D.C. (1984); 809 F.2d 794 D.C. Cir. (1987).

[70] Jordan J. Paust, "Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine," *Virginia Journal of International Law* 23 (Winter 1983): 191–249.

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sovereign immunity. In the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, Congress has withheld immunity in commercial transactions and for offenses committed in the United States. As a result, the Chilean government could be held liable for a murder committed in Washington D.C.[71] Several courts have exercised their discretion to limit immunity by finding the egregious violation alleged was not a legitimate government activity entitled to immunity.[72]

Individuals are more vulnerable than governments as defendants, but even former officials enjoy considerable protection. Under the act of state doctrine, U.S. courts refuse to sit in judgment on foreign officials conducting government business. Plaintiffs from Argentina circumvented the act of state defense by demonstrating that a defendant general committed unauthorized torture repudiated by his own government.[73] The occasional triumphs over a sovereign defendant's motion to dismiss are, however, quite rare and may be more symbolic than real. As the litigation proceeds, foreign officials may travel beyond the reach of court-ordered discovery or execution of judgment.[74]

Should the claimant satisfactorily establish that a human rights offender is not immune from suit, the court might still conclude that the forum is inappropriate. The alleged violation will have occurred abroad, and the judge might decide that trial should proceed in the country where witnesses and indispensable parties are located. The court might also reason that it would violate due process to judge the defendant by U.S. law rather than by foreign statutes that are unavailable. If the claimant fails to bring an action within the statute of limitations period, counsel must show why the time limit should be extended. The difficulties in obtaining personal jurisdiction over appropriate defendants are so great that it is remarkable how many alien tort claims have proceeded to judgment.

Responsive Judges. Judicial attitudes are particularly critical in human rights litigation, because the court has such great latitude in determining whether a plaintiff has standing or the defendant enjoys immunity. Judges create and interpret the Act of State Doctrine and are not invariably bound to dismiss every claim made against a foreign government official. The courts also have great discretion in deciding which cases present nonjusticiable political questions for which there are no judicially manageable standards to apply.

Judges familiar with international law presumably find those standards manageable and will not routinely dismiss human rights claims. One local judge characterized as "junk and gobbledygook"[75] an inmate's claim based on the UN Stan-

[71] *Letelier v. Chile,* 488 F. Supp. 259 D.D.C. (1980).

[72] *Von Dardel v. USSR,* 623 F. Supp. 246 D.D.C. (1985); *Domingo v. Republic of Philippines,* C82-1055V D.W.D. Washington (1984).

[73] *Forti v. Suarez-Mason, N. C-87-2058 DJL* D.N. Cal. (1987).

[74] A retired colonel of the Chilean armed forces competing in the Pan American Games in Indianapolis avoided service of process by leaving the United States. See *Capiz and Fliman v. Gonzalez* U.S.D.C. Ind. (1987).

[75] *Turner v. Ward Superior Court of Schenectady County, N.Y.* 1977. 1 Practitioners Notebook 5 American Bar, International Law Association as cited in Lillich and Newman, *International Human Rights,* 121.

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dard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners – rules that Judges Hans Linde and José A. Cabranes cited favorably.[76] Oregon Supreme Court Judge Linde, a Democrat, clerked for Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, served in the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, and was an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly. District Court Judge Cabranes, from Puerto Rico, was appointed by Carter and represented the U.S. in Belgrade at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A human rights litigator would obviously prefer to argue before former California Supreme Court Judge Frank Newman than Judge Robert Bork of the D.C. circuit court of appeals. Newman, a liberal Democrat and active supporter of Amnesty International, taught international law at Berkeley; Yale law professor Bork, a conservative Republican, served at the American Enterprise Institute.

Which personal characteristics most favorably dispose judges to decide claims in favor of individual litigants against state authority?[77] In non-unanimous civil liberties decisions judges appointed by Democrats tend to favor the individual rather than the state, while Republican appointees are more disposed to support the government.[78] The Reagan administration proclaimed an intent to staff the courts with judges who practice restraint, and recent appointees are unlikely to grant previously unrecognized rights.[79] Perhaps members of religious and ethnic minorities as well as women are more inclined to decide cases in favor of the underdog than white male judges from more privileged backgrounds.[80]

As expected, different judges render conflicting legal opinions when confronted by the same human rights issues. Judges Irving Kaufman, Wilfred Feinberg, and Amalya Kearse held that the Alien Tort Statute creates an individual cause of action, while Judges Bork, Pamela Rymer and Green disagreed. District Judge Richard Rogers and two members of a tenth circuit panel invalidated the indefinite detention of deportable aliens who posed no demonstrable threat to public safety.[81] Judge Robert Vance and a majority of his colleagues on the eleventh circuit firmly ruled that excludable detainees had no rights that could be invoked in U.S. courts.[82]

[76] *Hans Linde in Sterling v. Cupp,* 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1982); *Lareau v. Manson,* 507 F. Supp. 1177 D. Conn. (1980); 651 F.2d 96 2d Cir. (1981). In *Boehm v. Superior Court,* 178 Cal.App.3d 494; 223 Cal Rptr. 716 (1986), Judge Charles Hamlin *sua sponte* cited Martha H. Good, "Freedom from Want," *Human Rights Quarterly* 6 (August 1984): 335–65, in challenging a county's reduction in general assistance welfare payments.

[77] Glendon Schubert, ed., *Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

[78] Sidney Ulmer, "The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court," *Journal of Public Law* 11 (Winter 1962): 352–62.

[79] Sheldon Goldman, "Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments," *Judicature* 68 (April–May 1985): 315–316. "Note – All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Court of Appeals," *Columbia Law Review* 87 (May 1987): 766–93.

[80] S. Sidney Ulmer, "Social Background as an Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 1947–1956 Terms," *American Journal of Political Science* 17 (August 1973): 622–30.

[81] *Fernandez v. Wilkinson,* 505 F. Supp. 787 D.Kan. (1980), *aff'd* on other grounds *sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson* 654 F.2d 1382 10th Circ. (1981).

[82] *Jean v. Nelson,* 727 F.2d 957 11th Cir. (1984); see also *Garcia-Mir v. Meese,* 788 F.2d 1446 11th Cir. (1986) *cert denied sub nom. Ferer Mazorra v. Meese,* 107 S.Ct. 289 (1986).

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TABLE 1

U.S. District and Appeals Court Judges' Human Rights Orientation by Party of Appointing President

	*12 Alien Tort Cases**		*10 Refugee Rights Cases***	
Judges	*Democrat*	*Republican*	*Democrat*	*Republican*
For	5	3	12	4
	50%	23%	63%	25%
Against	5	10	7	12
	50%	77%	37%	75%
Total no. judges	10	13	19	16

* *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 577 F.Supp 860; 630 F.2d 876 2d Cir. (1980). *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 517 F.Supp. 542 D.D.C. (1981). *aff'd per curiam*, 726 F.2d 774 D.C. Cir. (1984), cert. denied. *Von Dardel v. USSR*, 623 F.Supp. 246 D.D.C. (1985). *Domingo v. Republic of Philippines*, D.W.D.W'ton (1984). *Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (Mex)* C.D. Cal. (12 March 1984), vacated on other grounds. (C.D. Cal March 7, 1985) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist. file). *Letelier v. Republic of Chile*, 488 F.Supp. 665 D.D.C. (1980); 748 F.2d 790 2d Cir. (1984), cert denied, 105 S.Ct. 2656. *Forti v. Suarez Mason*, 694 F.Supp. 707 N.D.Cal. (1988), 672 F.Supp. 1531 (1987). *Handel v. Artukovic*, 601 F.Supp. 1421 D.D.Cal. (1985) *aff'd. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan*, 568 F.Supp. 596 D.D.C. (1983), *aff'd*, 770 F.2d 202 D.C. Cir. (1985). *Guinto v. Marcos*, 654 F.Supp. 276 S.D.Cal. (1986). *Trajano, Sison & Hilao v. Marcos*, D.Haw. (1986). *Clemente v. Marcos*, N.D.Cal. (1986).

** *Fernandez v. Wilkinson*, 505 F.Supp. 787 D.Kan. (1980), *aff'd* on other grounds sub nom. *Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson*, 654 F.2d 1382 10th Circ. (1981). *Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ.*, 495 F.Supp 1365 D.N.M. (1980). *Narenji v. Civilletti*, 481 F.Supp 1132 (1979) 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir 1980). *Haitian Refugee Center v. Civilletti*, 503 F.Supp. 442 S.D.Fla. (1980), *Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith*, 676 F.2d 1023 5th Cir. (1982). *Fernandez-Rogue v. Smith*, 567 F.Supp 1115 N.D. Ga. (1981) reversed sub nom *Garcia-Mir v. Meese. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith*, 541 F.Supp. 351 C.D.Cal (1982) 563 F.Supp. 157 D.D.C. (1983). *Ishtyag v. Nelson*, 627 F.Supp. 13 E.D.N.Y. (1983). *Jean v. Nelson*, 727 F.2d 957 11th Cir. (1984). *Roshan v. Smith*, 615 F.Supp. 901 D.D.C. (1985). *Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey*, 600 F.Supp. 1396 D.D.C. (1984), 809 F.2d 794 D.C. Cir. (1987).

Judges Feinberg and Parker rejected defenses of sovereign immunity found compelling by Judges Robert Carter, Kearse, Thelton Henderson, and John Rhoades.[83] District court Judges Santiago Campos and Green barred discriminatory treatment of Iranian nationals, but Judges Roger Robb, Edward Tamm and George MacKinnon sustained the government practice.[84]

In order to test the relationship of party affiliation, gender, and race to the disagreements observed, twenty-two cases were selected where different U.S. district and appellate court judges had made conflicting rulings on comparable issues in two areas of human rights litigation. In twelve alien tort cases, twenty-three district and appeals court judges took positions; thirty-five judges have voted in ten comparable cases affecting refugees and alien immigrants. The accompanying table shows how votes on issues creating split decisions are significantly related to party affiliation as predicted. Republican appointees came out three to one against the

[83] *Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic,* 830 F.2d 421 2d Cir. (1987); *rev'd* 109 S.Ct. 683. *Von Dardel v. USSR,* 623 F. Supp. 246 D.D.C. (1985).

[84] *Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ.,* 495 F. Supp 1365 D.N.M. (1980); *Narenji v. Civilletti,* 481 F. Supp 1132 (1979) *rev'd* 617 F.2d 745 D.C. Cir. (1980).

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human rights claimants, while Democratic appointees favored refugee petitioners in two-thirds of the cases decided. President Ronald Reagan appointed ten judges voting in the cumulative total of twenty-two cases, and nine rejected the human rights petitioners.[85] All three women and all three black judges in the sample voted for the refugee petitioners. Gender and race were not related to voting in alien tort claims litigation, as the seven women and black judges divided almost evenly between plaintiffs and defendants.

In several instances the clash of views and social background has been quite pronounced. The three second circuit Judges on the *Filartiga* panel were all appointed by Democrats; the opinion's author had lectured at the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders; two of the judges are Jewish and the third is a black woman previously active in both the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the NAACP. By contrast, the two D.C. circuit judges opposed to the *Filartiga* result in *Tel-Oren* were white male Republican appointees with a more conservative background. An eleventh circuit panel approving due process rights for Cuban detainees included two Carter appointees—a Jewish woman and a black judge.[86] Four Republican and three Democratic appointees for the full court vacated their decision, granted *en banc* review, and ruled that excludable aliens had no constitutional or other due process rights.[87] Liberal Democrats split with conservative Republicans on the D.C. circuit when the majority sustained discriminatory treatment of Iranian nationals.[88] The results clarify what human rights litigators seeking a forum already appreciate: they will be more favorably received in the second than in the eleventh or D.C. circuits.

Judges have by no means voted a straight party line, nor is gender or race a certain predictor. When confronted with distinct issues, Judge Joyce Green has rejected one alien's tort claim but approved another's antidiscrimination complaint. Judge Amelya Kearse voted with Judges Kaufman and Feinberg in *Filartiga,* but dissented from Feinberg's opinion on sovereign immunity in *Amerada Hess.* One Reagan appointee strongly endorsed the *Filartiga* rationale and rejected the Act of State defense.[89] In *Filartiga* responsive judges alone might not have rendered a favorable decision if one or more of the other critical factors had been absent—Congressional authorization, executive approval, and a vulnerable defendant. When those key ingredients are missing, defeat is almost certain, no matter how responsive the judge.

[85] Judge Jensen refused to dismiss petitioners' claim in *Forti v. Suaraez-Mason, No. C-87-2058* D.N.D. Cal (6 October 1987).

[86] Phyllis Kravitch and Joseph Hatchett. Nixon appointee Charles Clark joined the opinion.

[87] *Jean v. Nelson,* 727 F.2d 957 11th Cir. (1986).

[88] Dissenting opinion from denial of *en banc* review by Judges Skelly Wright, Spottswood Robinson, Patricia Wald, and Abner Mikva in *Narenji v. Civilletti,* 481 F. Supp 1132 (1979) *rev'd* 617 F.2d 745 D.C. Cir (1980).

[89] *Forti v. Suarez-Mason,* 672 F. Supp. 1531 N.D. Cal. (1987). Later, however, Judge Jensen dismissed tort claims for "disappearance" and for "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" 694 F. Supp. 707 (1988).

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Certain Losers

With few exceptions, certain human rights claims have invariably failed. The courts rarely if ever entertain attempts to change U.S. policy toward other governments. The president remains virtually untouchable, and lesser cabinet rank administrators and independent agencies appear almost as far beyond the courts' self-restrained reach. Nor have the courts accepted international law claims to family rights, disability benefits, and nondiscriminatory capital sentencing—rights not identified as fundamental in the Restatement.

In foreign policy disputes, federal courts consistently dismiss even cases arising under U.S. law as nonjusticiable and regularly deny citizens standing to sue. The courts rejected the Southern Africa Project's domestic law challenges to U.S. policies affecting Rhodesia and Namibia. CCR has unsuccessfully attempted to bring the Reagan administration to judgment for illegal conduct in El Salvador and Nicaragua under the Neutrality Act, the War Powers Resolution, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.[90] The legal doctrines for denying judicial review vary from case to case and even at different stages within the same case—lack of standing, nonjusticiable political questions, presidential immunity,[91] non-self-executing UN measures, and the last-in-time rule. Whatever the legal rationale, there is an unwavering consistency of unfavorable results when human rights proponents challenge executive conduct of U.S. foreign policy.[92]

Litigation to secure internationally recognized economic and social rights beyond the Constitution or the Restatement has been equally unproductive. Since the United States has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, litigants must rely on the imprecise and less enforceable aspirations of customary international law. Judges proud of American constitutional guarantees have been reluctant to find defects in the national order that should be remedied by "superior" international standards. Nor have anti-discrimination lawsuits been effective vehicles for advancing new internationally recognized rights for women and minorities. In discrimination cases where human rights plaintiffs have prevailed, courts based their rulings solely on the Constitution and civil rights laws. More often than not the international law arguments are not even mentioned in the opinion.

[90] *Crockett v. Reagan,* 720 F.2d 1355 D.C. Cir. (1983). Mark Gibney, "Judicial Failure to Enforce Human Rights Legislation: An Alternative Analysis of *Crocket v. Reagan,*" *Human Rights Annual* 4 (1986). *U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan,* D.D.C. (1987); *Dellums v. Smith,* 573 F. Supp. 1489 N.D. Cal. (1983).

[91] *Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,* 568 F. Supp. 596 D.D.C. (1983), *aff'd,* 770 F.2d 202 D.C. Cir. (1985). See also Mark Gibney, "Human Rights and Human Consequences: A Critical Analysis of *Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,* 10 *Loyola International & Comparative Law Journal* 10 (1988): 299–320.

[92] In an unusual exception the court found the UN Charter's trusteeship provisions entitled Micronesians to certain rights denied by the U.S. government. Saipan ex rel. *Guerrero v. Dep't of Interior,* 502 F.2d 90 9th Circ. (1974) *cert denied* 420 U.S. 1003 (1974).

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Hollow Victories and Productive Defeats

Many of the celebrated legal successes since 1980 provided more symbolic than tangible benefits to the claimants. Four courts made default judgments awarding damages to aliens for torts, but the defendants never paid. Américo Pena-Irala returned to Paraguay, avoiding the Filartiga's $10.4 million award; an appeals court prevented Orlando Letelier from attaching Chile's airline for $5.2 million; and the trial court reversed itself and vacated an Argentinian victim's $2.6 million claim against Argentina. Alien tort plaintiffs suing the USSR and the Philippines who avoided dismissal have been unable to obtain a judgment against those sovereign defendants. Suarez-Mason has been extradited to Argentina and has not satisfied $60 million in claims.

Asylum and refugee procedures have in some ways become worse after the courts invalidated expedited procedures for 4,000 Haitians and discriminatory detention of 1,900 Haitians. The Reagan administration began a Haitian interdiction program at sea, constructed a remote detention center, and instituted nondiscriminatory detection of *all* asylum applicants, revoking a more generous parole policy that had been in effect since 1954. The Supreme Court's support for the Refugee Convention's nonrefoulement provision has not assisted refugees returned to Haiti by the Coast Guard before they enter U.S. waters. From 1981 to 1984 perfunctory interviews of 1,700 applicants conducted on board seventy ships did not identify any eligible asylum applicants. Individual Haitians already in the U.S. obtained personalized review as a result of the class action victories, but the overall results are at best a qualified success.

The Supreme Court's favorable decision in *Cardoza-Fonseca* could also be circumvented by executive officials determined to limit asylum. INS officials continue to exercise considerable discretion, and the attorney general has given first preference under the more generous standard to 200,000 Nicaraguan exiles in the United States.[93] Securing asylum for Salvadorans and others will require expensive follow-up litigation with testimony by human rights experts about the frequency of persecution in different countries.

Disappointing victories have been offset in part by losses that contributed to reform. In an action before the U.S. Customs service, the South Africa Project invoked the 1930 Tariff Act on behalf of the United Mine Workers to block the importation of South African coal produced by forced labor. The union lost in the administrative proceeding, but the South African Parliament subsequently repealed many laws that had imposed criminal sanctions for violating labor contracts. Post-trial administrative proceedings in the Commerce Department softened the blow of an adverse judicial decision on Namibian trade.[94] Perhaps other litigation defeats for the project over many years contributed to a slow change in public opinion, which made possible the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

[93] *New York Times*, 9 July 1987.

[94] *Diggs v. Richardson*, 555 F.2d 461 D.C. Cir. (1972) *cert denied*, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).

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After the ninth circuit reversed a district court order directing the attorney general to investigate allegations of U.S. misconduct in Nicaragua, an independent counsel began criminal inquiries that led to the prosecution of Oliver North and John Poindexter. Congressional representatives rebuffed by the courts ultimately initiated their own hearings into many of the problems identified by CCR in its persistent challenges. Perhaps publicity about the unavailing litigation contributed to public disaffection with administration policy in Central America. Whatever the possible benefits, the lawsuits have not achieved the primary goal of subjecting U.S. officials to rules of international law enforced by domestic courts.

An appropriate long-range strategy to reach that ambitious goal must confront difficult realities. U.S. judges reared in a dualist tradition naturally feel a certain pride in the national legal system and resist claims that domestic law is somehow inadequate and international law superior. After sustained attacks on judicial policy making, conservative Reagan administration appointees with unparalleled hostility to human rights claims now dominate the federal bench. Human rights law groups lack the resources and political organization to engage in significant judicial recruitment. Additional effort to secure more favorable appointments would complement the ongoing long-term investments in law school curriculum, continuing legal education for practitioners, and seminars for judges.

In the short run, overzealous efforts to obtain judicial opinions directly incorporating international law to change U.S. policy or to create extraconstitutional rights may prove counterproductive. Offsetting whatever educational or tactical value such litigation might have, the results will add further unfavorable dualist precedent that will be difficult to overcome in more propitious times. Relitigating claims repeatedly rejected might also provoke hostile judges to impose sanctions for bringing frivolous suits. The more pragmatic attempt to educate lower state and federal courts to be guided by emerging international standards in construing domestic law seems more promising than a premature, overambitious effort to realize monist ideals.

Domestic litigation alone will be insufficient to reform the conservative legal order. The incremental changes achieved in the 1980s resulted from partial acquiescence by the Carter administration and congressional adoption of the Refugee Act. Public interest law groups properly recognize that successful litigation will be greatly aided by congressional ratification and implementation of human rights treaties and statutes expressly conferring on the federal courts jurisdiction over human rights. Wisely, the groups have lobbied the executive and legislative branches to obtain the statutory authority required by overly deferential judges. The Torture Victim Protection Act and corrective amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act could create an improved basis for jurisdiction. Results of future elections might make the legislature and the executive more promising than the courts as arenas for policy initiatives.

The slight progress realized in the 1980s provided heartening encouragement to internationalist litigators. Little progress has yet been made in overcoming the most difficult, traditional obstacles—standing limitations, sovereign immunity,

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the act of state doctrine, non-justiciability concerns, non-self-executing treaties, the last-in-time rule, and forum non conveniens. Political factors may ultimately matter more than legal doctrines, as the NAACP discovered in its eighty-year quest for racial justice. The human rights docket in U.S. courts will continue to grow as increasing numbers of public interest groups and private attorneys seek a political and legal order where individuals can hold government officials accountable under an international rule of law.

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Book Reviews

Reform and Reaction in Twentieth Century American Politics *by John J. Broesamle. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1990. 481 pp. $49.95.*

This stimulating reassessment of American political history from the 1890s into the 1980s should interest all those who detect tides, rhythms, or cycles in American politics. Broesamle rejects a cyclical hypothesis in the sense of regular periodicity, though in fact his three twentieth-century waves of reform and reaction do come at fairly precise thirty-year intervals. His preoccupation rather is with the life cycle of the great reform eras. "Reform movements may not emerge with cyclic predictability; but once they have appeared their course, and particularly their decline, do follow a roughly predictable pattern. We can expect that they will take certain broad forms, and expire in certain ways" (p. 460).

His approach is taxonomic, rather in the style of Crane Brinton's classic *The Anatomy of Revolution*. The overriding theme of American twentieth-century reform, as Broesamle sees it, is the movement toward the welfare state. Three major sections—Reform, Resistance and Reaction—seek to isolate recurrences and uniformities in the reform eras. The discussion is based on wide and heterogeneous reading. The tone is lively, chatty, discursive, not terribly rigorous, sometimes contradictory, and occasionally repetitious. There are sharp insights and vivid phrases: "The rebels of the sixties reacted against what they perceived to be a plastic society but answered it with plastic rebellion" (p. 105).

I must declare an interest. "If this book does take a lead from earlier writings," Broesamle writes, " . . . it takes it from the Schlesingers" (p. 3). However, he uses the Schlesinger thesis as a point of departure. While he mentions generations from time to time, he does not see, as I would, the generational succession as a mainspring of political change. He adopts instead a pluralist view of the origins of the reform eras. They emerge, he writes, "at variable times in response to very different causes" (p. 2). He does agree that "reform emerges independently of major shifts in the economy" (p. 456), but insists that "they do not respond to any particular cycle at all" (p. 93).

The great common feature among the reform eras in Broesamle's view lies in

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the way "in which they have declined rather than in what has precipitated them in the first place" (p. 2). His analysis of the life cycle of reform eras—initial enthusiasm, fatigue, disorientation, factionalism, disillusion, apathy—is detailed and thoughtful. He has an incisive account of what he calls the "foreign policy escape hatch" (p. 255)—the tendency, that is, for presidents to flee from intractable domestic problems into foreign affairs where they have more respect and greater freedom of maneuver.

His account of the relationship between liberalism and foreign policy, however, is murky. Thus on one page he describes liberalism as containing "an inherent inclination toward internationalism" and "a missionary approach to diplomacy"; on the next, he writes, "Liberalism has long held foreign involvement suspect, and running through it one finds a strong, if intermittent, strain of isolationism" (pp. 14, 15). His emphasis on war, hot or cold, as "the single greatest destroyer of reform" (p. 249) does not do justice to the extent that international crisis may also promote reform—racial justice, for example. And he accepts too easily the revisionist thesis that the liberal anti-Stalinism of the 1940s was a bad thing. Surely principled liberalism could only take the position that liberalism and Stalinism had nothing in common, either as to means or as to ends. However, a book of this range and speculative quality is bound to provoke dissent here and there. Devotees of the cyclical approach and of recent American political history will find *Reform and Reaction* a rewarding contribution. The index is incomplete and inadequate.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s *by Coral Bell. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1989. 182 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $11.95.*

Coral Bell is impressed by what she considers to be the paradoxes of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy—the signing of a major arms control agreement by a dedicated opponent of arms control; the embrace of détente with a regime once described as an "evil empire"; the attempted ransom of hostages by an administration that vowed never to negotiate with terrorists, to name just a few. Her book is an inquiry into the causes of these paradoxes and the consequences for American foreign policy.

To answer the question of cause, Bell focuses on the distinction between Reagan's rhetoric and his behavior, between words and deeds. She argues that in foreign affairs governments respond to two different types of signals: "operational," which are what governments do, and "declaratory," which derive from presidential statements. The paradox of Reagan is explained by the disparity between the two. Basically, Bell argues, Reagan's rhetoric derived from neoconservative thought, which

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tends to view international politics as a Manichean struggle between good and evil (respectively, the United States and the Soviet Union). His behavior in office, however, was dominated by conservative premises that view international politics as a Hobbesian struggle of all against all and that are reflected in the techniques of *Realpolitik* and pragmatism.

Besides the Iran imbroglio, Bell offers as illustrations of the "chasm between declaratory and operational policy" U.S. policies in China, Poland, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, the gas pipeline, and arms control. In case after case Reagan was forced by the realities of international politics to abandon his ideological principles. Operationally, Bell concludes, there were few fundamental differences between Reagan and his predecessors.

How damaging to U.S. policy was Reagan's rhetoric and the paradoxes it created? Here the author is somewhat contradictory. At one point she concludes that his declaratory policies "were on balance damaging" (p. 148). She suggests that the signals sent to the Sandinistas probably drove them to intransigence. Declaratory signals were certainly disturbing to America's NATO allies, particularly European liberal and Left opinion. On the other hand, Bell does concede that Reagan's rhetoric induced caution on the part of the Soviet Union. For example, she believes that his Strategic Defense Initiative, which she describes as a declaratory signal, provided Moscow with a strong incentive to negotiate.

Some of Bell's criticisms of the Reagan rhetoric reflect a European perspective on American politics, which particularly dislikes American nationalism and moralism. She is as critical of Jimmy Carter's left-wing utopianism as she is of Reagan's right-wing utopianism. There are other possible explanations for the paradoxes of American policies in the 1980s besides the gap between rhetoric and behavior stressed by Bell. One major factor was the change in the world during the 1980s, most particularly the change that took place in the Soviet Union and its foreign policy behavior. Bell does allude to this, but only briefly. There were indeed paradoxes in Reagan's foreign policy, but it is by no means clear that they were any more substantial than those of other U.S. administrations. Virtually every president has discovered that the world as viewed from the Oval Office is different from what it appeared to be before he got there. This is a provocative and insightful analysis. It is not the definitive study of the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan, but it is a useful place to begin.

JOSEPH L. NOGEE
University of Houston

Reagan and the World *edited by David E. Kyvig. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1990. 200 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95.*

"The fox knows many things," goes Archilochus's famous fragment, "but the hedgehog knows one big thing." If American presidents were to be classified in

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these two groups, there is little doubt where Ronald Reagan would fit. This stimulating volume, recording a conference of six historians with differing expertise and perspectives, makes an early assessment of President Reagan's foreign policy and reinforces our impression of Reagan as hedgehog.

The two scholars who find Reagan's policies most effective are, not surprisingly, the ones who look at areas where his core beliefs—anticommunism, democracy, free trade—were involved. In a well wrought and controversial argument John Lewis Gaddis sees Reagan tempering his anticommunism toward the Soviet Union with pragmatism. The administration followed its cliché "negotiate from strength" quite literally: it first built up military strength and then negotiated. The result, Gaddis concludes, was the most successful policy towards the Soviet Union in decades.

In a brief but strikingly original essay Akira Iriye looks at U.S. -East Asian relations in the 1980s. He commends Reagan for refusing to give in to protectionist sentiments in Congress and actively promoting free trade. The United States in the 1980s fostered an atmosphere conducive to political and economic growth and provided these countries with markets, capital, and technology. Iriye then moves to much broader issues, asking whether Asia's rise has been at the expense of America. It is not a zero-sum game, he explains. In fact both regions have gained—for example, America's "export" of democracy has been extraordinarily successful in East Asia. East Asia's rise takes place in the context of this economic and political interdependence and thus presents no dire threat to America or the international system. Iriye suggests that the Reagan administration must be credited for this well-managed interdependence.

As one moves from large issues to smaller countries the criticisms grow. Geir Lundestaad sees Reagan's policies in Western Europe as insensitive and clumsy. But he realizes that these were attempts to respond to the difficult reality that today's Europe is totally transformed from the 1945 Europe on which American policy rested. Lundestaad sees Reagan muddling through like most of his predecessors, making tactical errors, but because the basic strategy was sound, eventually "stumbling to success."

The Third World experts are predictably harsh in their judgments. In a careful study, Philip S. Khoury sees the Reagan team's Middle East policy as careening from unnecessary intervention to (mostly) benign neglect. Randall Rotberg also accuses the Reagan administration of indifference and disdain for Africa. Susanne Jonas, on the other hand, wishes that Reagan had shown more benign neglect in Central America. Jonas manages, with considerable skill, to combine serious scholarship with a vigorous polemic against not just Reagan's Central American policies but all postwar policy toward that region. Conceding certain successes within the Reagan logic, she denounces America's constant attempts to reconstruct Central America rather than come to terms with it.

At one point in his essay, Rotberg explains that the reason the Reagan administration was bad at regional policy was that it approached such policy from a globalist perspective. But this oft-made criticism must recognize that the late Reagan and early Bush administrations achieved key objectives in regional policy—in Namibia,

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South Africa, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua among others—not because of any clever regional maneuvering, but rather because of the changed global climate. If the structure of the system—the superpower relationship and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—had such a large impact on regions, then it might have been wise for the U.S. to focus its energies on those big relationships. There is little doubt that America, like the Soviet Union and most dominant powers in history, is ill suited for the complications of regional policy. But if hegemons cannot be foxes, they might as well try to be good hedgehogs.

FAREED ZAKARIA
Harvard University

Race: Twentieth Century Dilemmas—Twenty-first Century Prognoses *edited by Winston A. Van Horne. Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin System Institute on Race and Ethnicity, 1989. 314 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $14.95.*

This edited volume, the eighth in the Ethnicity and Public Policy series, is a useful collection of thoughtful articles summarizing historical, legal, and social science research on the status of blacks in education, the family, housing, health, the military, employment, and politics. One familiar theme is that the status of blacks has improved considerably in the last century, but disparities remain, and many of the gains show signs of being reversed.

Newer themes concern the changing relationship between race and class and the debates about future strategy and policies. Thomas V. Tonnesen, asserting in the preface that racism is the problem not race, says that if you want to end racism and achieve racial harmony, work for justice.

Bernard R. Boxill's two interesting chapters give his interpretation of what justice entails. He argues that race and class are now powerful and autonomous, though interacting forces that cannot be reduced one to the other. Race conflict is now concealed by class conflict; he says, "society would almost certainly not be as slow to help the underclass if it were disproportionately white" (p. 4). Reviving civil rights activism to support the emerging struggle of the black underclass should be the main item on the black agenda. The first obstacle is possible resistance by the black middle class. The second obstacle is that positive economic and social rights essential to justice for the underclass are not as widely accepted as traditional civil rights.

His second chapter critiques those like Glenn C. Loury and Thomas Sowell who advocate relying solely on self-help because further civil rights legislation is not politically feasible due to the economic self-interest and racism of whites or would actually be counterproductive. Boxill counters that in an expanding economy, further civil rights legislation will be possible, can be consistent with the basic principles of American law and morality, and can be effective. He argues that taxation has been used effectively to improve the education, welfare, and employment of many earlier waves of white immigrants.

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Kenneth S. Tollett's article on the expansion and contraction of educational opportunities and Wade W. Nobles's article on the African-American family support these arguments. Nobles says that white society, by viewing African people as innately inferior and demeaning their culture, has undermined the African-American family.

Karl E. Taeuber presents new data on the diversity of emerging racial housing patterns. Declines in metropolitan segregation and increases in black suburbanization indicate a trend toward residential desegregation and the prevalence of class over race in determining residential location.

Leith Mullings, attributing racial differentials in health status to cultural factors, calls for a national health service plan. Richard O. Hope warns against a reduction in the proportion of blacks in the military, since participation in the military has promoted black opportunity and mobility. David H. Swinton says that since black economic progress under laissez faire is an impossible dream, blacks must once more organize to bring about effective national policies. Ronald W. Walters argues that even though electoral politics and the mobilization of blacks have created power bases for black leaders, racial polarization could become worse. Winston A. Van Horne says that to get beyond the philosophical wilderness of integration and segregation, a new philosophical foundation is needed, one that is based not on the primacy of reason and individual will but on conjunctive will that unites intuition, reason, appetite, and passion.

Together the articles provide a broad perspective across diverse policy areas. But they do not consider how the increasingly multiracial population and divergent conceptions of justice will have an impact on blacks and what new strategies of black mobilization should be used in an era when white support and liberal coalitions are weak and Republican control is strong. It would also be interesting to consider the similarities in emerging philosophies sensitive to race and to gender and how they might complement each other.

DALE ROGERS MARSHALL
Wellesley College

Politics by Other Means: The Declining Importance of Elections in America *by Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter. New York, Basic Books, 1990. 225 pp. $19.95.*

Shefter and Ginsberg's *Politics by Other Means* marks a new entry in the literature discussing the deadlock of American government. Unlike the standard fare, which segments the issue of paralysis, the authors take the view that this paralysis is pervasive and stems from an increasing decay in the practice of electoral politics. Shefter and Ginsberg see the decline of parties as the linchpin in the deadlock of governance. Local party organizations have withered. Part of the reason may have been the vertical integration of patronage. That is to say, since the New Deal, incentives

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(money and other resources) have come directly from the federal government to local client groups.

Patron-client relationships have been built, but at the expense of local party structures. As the authors state, " . . . the Democratic and Republican parties still exist. But they have essentially become coalitions of public officials, office seekers, and political activists; they lack the direct organizational ties to rank-and-file voters that had formerly permitted parties to shape all aspects of politics and government in the United States" (p. 10).

The reduction in party organization and strength has led to a decline in voter participation. But most important for Ginsberg and Shefter is that a decline in party influence leads to a rise in influence of other "powerful institutions outside the electoral realm" (p. 11).

In the absence of party organization and discipline, political life has become Balkanized. There is a variety of nodes where those who seek power use institutions other than elective office to wage political battle. In this evolving model of politics, personalism and careerism are paramount. These are influences that have always been present in politics. Now with the decline of party organizations, they are uncontrolled. Political actors use the courts, the federal bureaucracy, and the media as vehicles for personal ambition. Thus Shefter and Ginsberg see recent charges of ethics violations in Congress and the prosecution of local officials for corruption as evidence of displaced political aggression.

With the decline in electoral politics, parties have turned to political triage and populism. They save what few political markets they have left. The Democrats, for example, rely on local client groups that benefited in the past from federal largesse (for example, local government officials and nonprofit organizations). These client groups take on added importance as local party organizations shrivel. Ginsberg and Shefter hold that the Democrats maintain a grip on Congress through their links to local government and vestiges of the local party organizations.

Success in Congress for Democrats has meant ceding the presidency to the Republican party. The Democratic base is composed mainly of groups committed to government spending and liberal causes (for example, civil rights, gay rights, and women's rights). The Republicans have used this as a wedge to dislodge the formerly Democratic blue collar voters who are now very conservative on fiscal and social issues. Each party is locked into specific political markets. No one party can garner enough electoral support to become the true majority party. This helps shift the battle for political power to other venues.

There is little compromise. Each party uses the power of the institutions they control to denude the power of the institutions they do not control. Thus Democrats during the Reagan administration sought to undermine the foreign policy-making powers of the president by preventing the mining of Nicaragua's harbors (and limiting funding to the contras) and passing sanctions on South Africa. The administration countered by privatizing parts of their foreign policy (the Iran-contra affair). The authors provide different examples for this sort of institutional gamesmanship that range from foreign policy to domestic budgetary battles.

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The point conveyed by Ginsberg and Shefter is that both parties attack each other's policy program in a nonproductive manner. Policy is made more out of spite and a need to protect turf than from reasoned analysis and conviction. The authors present an original analysis. To be sure, there is nothing in the individual elements of the argument that will surprise scholars of domestic politics. The book's value rests with the attempt to link the current problems of electoral politics to problems in policy formation. As such, it is a serious work that deserves reading by both scholars of domestic politics and public policy.

ROLAND ANGLIN
Rutgers University

Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival *by John A. Wiseman. New York, Paragon House Publishers, 1990. 228 pp. $22.95.*

John Wiseman and his publishers exhibit an uncanny sense of timing. Their new volume arguing that democracy in Africa has fared better than generally realized appears simultaneously with a sudden intensification of pressures in a surprising number of African states for a pluralization of politics. When such robust autocrats as Omar Bongo (Gabon), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), and Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia) announce that competitive parties may be permitted to challenge their long-standing political monopolies, we can sense that the earth is moving beneath our feet. Whether despots long habituated to ruthless suppression of their opponents have experienced a genuine intellectual conversion may be open to doubt; what is beyond dispute is the confluence of formidable pressures from within and without that make the formulas of patrimonial autocracy so long dominant in most African states virtually impossible to justify.

In this text for our times, Wiseman seeks to supply a more hopeful gloss on the post-independent decades by focusing upon those instances where democratic forms were retained, rather than the many cases where political architects sought to construct unbreachable fortresses of permanent power. Little space is devoted to enlarging the debate as to what the essence of democracy might be; Wiseman chooses to concentrate upon the political history of the countries where elements of democracy have persisted. The evidence provided by these examples, he argues, suggests "a more positive and optimistic" view of prospects for democracy in Africa than one usually encounters (p. 190).

Wiseman, a British scholar, carried out his dissertation research in Botswana in the early 1970s. He subsequently taught for three years at Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria; he has also worked in Gambia. The relatively sanguine perspective he adopts in his lecture of post-colonial democratic experience partly reflects the areas with which he is most closely familiar.

Open political competition—electoral pluralism—is treated as the centerpiece of democracy. Most of the text is devoted to recapitulations of the political history

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of those countries where such elections have occurred regularly, or at least occasionally. The most extended treatment goes to Botswana, Mauritius, Gambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Ghana. Uganda, Liberia, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Mauritania, and Senegal receive more cursory review. Of this list, one may immediately query the inclusion of several where such electoral episodes as have occured would fail most tests of minimum integrity—Uganda, Liberia, Central African Republic, Mauritania.

In undertaking this subject, Wiseman enters a crowded field. In the last couple of years, major collaborative studies have appeared under the direction of two sets of western authors (Larry Diamond et al, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Persistence, Failure and Renewal*; Guillermo O'Donnell et al., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*) and two teams of African scholars (Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*; Walter Oyugi et al., *Democratic Theory and Practice*); as well, two recent presidential addresses to the African Studies Association have been devoted to democracy in Africa (Richard Sklar, Nzongola Ntalaja). In the face of this competition, the potted case-history approach Wiseman adopts is ill suited to carving out a distinctive niche for his work.

Where the author is on home ground—in the Botswana, Nigeria, and Gambia cases—the historical profiles are workmanlike. He performs a useful service in his exploration of the Mauritius case, which is widely cited but little known. Although its credentials as a genuinely African state are more a reflection of geographical location than population composition, its unique combination in the 1980s of electoral displacement of incumbents and striking economic success well merit the attention it receives.

The descriptions of the francophonic states are more superficial, partly attributable to the failure to consult French language sources. The ten-page bibliography contains not a single French entry, a fundamental flaw. But the most important weakness of the book is the thinness of its theoretical sections. Africa clearly is moving into a new phase, where the currents of liberalization that now flow strongly throughout the world tug toward pluralization of its politics. Far too much space is devoted to mere recapitulation of familiar facts, and much too little toward conceptual confrontation of the new conjuncture that is redefining African politics.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Democracy and Its Critics *by Robert A. Dahl. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 397 pp. $29.95.*

It's difficult to imagine a political science seminar in which this lucid and thoughtful book would not stimulate energetic discussion. Dahl uses questions posed by the philosophical critics of democracy to explore the assumptions and limits of

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democratic theory. In Part II he directly confronts the criticisms of democracy raised by anarchist and guardian theories. The problems and alternatives they raise illuminate the nature of democracy throughout the book.

In Part III, Dahl presents his own theory of the democratic process. He begins with a powerful statement of the justification of democracy implied by the "Strong Principal of Equality," which holds that no members of a collectivity *"are so definitely better qualified than the others that they should be entrusted with making the collective and binding decisions"* (p. 98, emphasis in original). Four illuminating chapters are devoted to analyzing the assumptions and implications of this principle.

In Part IV Dahl confronts questions raised by friendly critics of democracy, old and new. He focuses particularly on criticisms of majority rule as the preeminent decision rule for a democracy and on supermajorities (requiring a larger consensus than 50 percent plus one) as a philosophical and practical alternative. He also addresses the troubling problem of the appropriate boundaries for a democratic policy-making unit.

In Part V Dahl explores more fully the elements of polyarchy as the embodiment of democracy in the modern nation-state. He includes a discussion of the origins of contemporary polyarchies and the conditions that encourage or weaken them, as well as a critique of theories of inevitable minority domination in modern polyarchies. He argues also that the concept of the common good remains relevant and must include elements of democratic process as goods in themselves.

In Part VI Dahl concludes with comments on the threats and possibilities for democracy by increased international interdependence and by the increasing technological complexity of modern life.

Even those who have followed Dahl's writings of the past forty years (a group presumably including most contemporary political scientists) will find many riches, if fewer suprises, in this book. They will find the familiar attention to large empirical implications of abstract ideas, the unified vision of working democracy, the persuasively lucid style. They will also find responses to some recent work in political science. For example, social choice theorists have shown theoretical limitations and uncertainties in applications of majority rule. While generally defending majority rule, Dahl discusses and accepts some of these flaws as doing "great damage" to claims that majority rule is necessary for democracy under all conditions (p. 152).

Empirical comparativists have drawn attention to the difficulties of majority rule under some conditions of intense conflict. In a notable change since his formulation in *Polyarchy* (1971), Dahl accepts the argument for institutions implying supermajority decision rules in circumstances of ethnic or ideological conflict. This acceptance rests, however, in uneasy conjunction with Dahl's rejection of supermajorities at the theoretical level because of their status quo bias. The contradiction is highly suggestive for further analysis of conditions of conflict. However, more consideration might also be given to trade-offs between institutional properties that assist in electing majorities and those that encourage fairness and equality in participation and representation—criteria that are also essential parts

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of Dahl's vision of democracy. The case for consensual arrangements need not rest on conflict management alone.

This book encouraged me to think about some old problems in new ways. I encourage others to enjoy similar benefits.

G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.
University of Rochester

China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns *by Carol Lee Hamrin. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. 257 pp. Softcover, $26.50; paper, $18.50.*

The year 1989 was a risky one for authors and publishers. As the events in Tienanmen Square progressed, editors of symposiums about Chinese politics after forty years, authors of studies of post-Mao reforms, and commentators on current events had to fear the implications of 3 and 4 June for their manuscripts as well as for the future of China. Some did not fare well. Carol Lee Hamrin emerges virtually unscathed, though obviously a short postscript has been added to reflect the June events. The reason for her success makes this a very interesting and thoughtful book.

This is a relatively short volume composed of seven chapters that focus on the post-Cultural Revolution and Maoist reform period. Though there is a forward cast to many of her judgments, the book is really a dispassionate, albeit occasionally regretful, analysis of the Chinese reform efforts of the past fifteen years. Indeed, if there is a limitation to the volume it is the fact that the first twenty-five years of Chinese Communist leadership receive little attention. That said, however, the period and problems she has chosen to address are well worth the effort; her analysis is careful, measured, and balanced. The description proceeds with almost a sense of the inevitability of some sort of systemic upheaval, though obviously not the violent episode of June.

Hamrin briefly discusses her approach, sources, and related matters, together with a summary of the situation in China and among its leaders on the brink of the reform period. She then sets forth both the dimensions of the reform that was undertaken as well as the ongoing opposition of the conservative faction. This discussion reminds the reader that there has been continuing opposition during the reform period and that the reformers were themselves experimenting both with the methods and policies they adopted.

Chapter Five emphasizes the years 1983–1985, when the reformers made many of their boldest decisions. It includes discussion of national security issues and foreign policy changes linked to domestic decisions. In this section of the book Hamrin sets the tone of her work and signals the weakness of the institutional basis for reform. Chapters Six and Seven lay out the emerging economic problems that were developing from the reform policies, the political infighting between Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng, and the final clashes of 1989, which brought about the deci-

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sion to use force to suppress the protest movement in Beijing. The book's summary includes an assessment of the June events, although it does not appear to have really been influenced much by the events. Without the suppression Hamrin might have had a somewhat more upbeat conclusion, but only marginally so. With the advantage of hindsight the policy dilemmas that led to the upheavals of 1989 are so basic and so difficult to resolve that even without the events of June the assessment of the future would have been quite worrisome.

The book has a short chronology and brief sketches of important players in the politics of the period—very useful as a reminder of the backgrounds of various leaders for the specialist and an introduction for the nonspecialist. The notes are well referenced and draw on both translation materials and a wide-ranging set of interviews with officials in China over the course of two years (1985–1987). Though the book is a general assessment of development, each specialist is likely to find some interesting data about his or her special focus, whether it be the origins of family planning decisions, relations among certain leaders, or other topics. The book is a fine combination of issues and institutional analysis together with references to the realities of power bases and personal relationships important in assessing Chinese developments. The specialist and the general reader will find this volume well written, informative, and worth buying.

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It *by James Q. Wilson. New York, Basic Books, 1989. 433 pp. $24.95.*

The recent political landscape is littered with the remains of candidates for public office who defended governmental intervention in political life in America. Large government, increased regulation, and defense of the bureaucracy have not been popular causes of late and they have not been on the agenda of the electorally successful. But the political survivors have not had an easy course either, as the problems of too little government in America have begun to be more evident in 1990. The price of recent government deregulation—as in the savings and loan industry—and of the political infatuation with limited government will prove to be an enormous one in political and economic terms. It is not a very sound practice to elect leaders who have attacked the systems that they lead.

America's distaste for government—which seems almost innate—stems in part from failure to understand what role government and governmental actors are supposed to play in society. Into this darkness comes James Q. Wilson's effort to explain what government bureaucracies do, and how they do it. His is the experience of the practitioner, the leading academic, and the teacher; and a great deal of the insight from these different perspectives is there in this really fine work. Scholarly and analytic, the descriptions of how bureaucracies do their work are vivid and readable. Even the expert shakes a head in agreement as Wilson tells story after story. There is no grand theory here, and in some respects the detail is overwhelming;

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but the work is well organized around themes such as managers, executives, operators, and culture. The work is helpful to the serious student and the curious. The book is thought provoking, and the practitioner will invariably apply many of these insights to situations that are familiar.

Wilson distinguishes government bureaucracy and its major task – to insure that the democratic processes work – from the work of the business enterprise – to maximize profit through efficiency. He explains why contracts have to be negotiated differently in the public sector and why governmental decisions and the implementation of them are so complicated. He knows what the price of democracy is, and he explains how that price has to be paid within the political system if there is to be public confidence in the governmental process. The government sacrifices efficiency for faith in the integrity of the process.

The work is at its best when it explains the differences among various bureaucracies. Wilson is familiar with the State Department, criminal justice systems, the Social Security Administration, and many others as well. He discusses the culture of these institutions, their leadership, their rules, and the environments within which they function. Government bureaucracies are different, and they perform differently when their mission is altered, when leadership is changed, and when they face crucial issues such as budget cuts. He tells that story well. Wilson also cites the leading works in the field – and many that are less well known. There is a generation of scholars who have worked under Wilson, and his knowledge of their work gives this volume a special, almost comprehensive, dimension.

The book suggests that there is some process of deregulation of bureaucracy that might be revealed in the final sections of the work. In fact, the proposals that Wilson offers are far too modest and appear to be an afterthought to satisfy the suggestion of an editor. What does actually emerge from this book is a demonstration of the long-standing belief that this democracy works by muddling through and that the bureaucracy, with all of its shortcomings, is the instrument for that process. If we are going to enjoy the blessings of a democratic system, we ought to be prepared to pay the price. Perhaps as significantly, we ought to know why that price is as high as it is. That is the special contribution of this work.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
Columbia University

Home Style and Washington Work: Studies of Congressional Politics *edited by Morris P. Fiorina and David W. Rohde. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1989. 254 pp. $34.50.*

The essays in this volume are in the first place a tribute to the constructive influence of Richard Fenno, our leading student of the contemporary Congress, on graduate students in political science at the University of Rochester over the last generation. In the second place, they are a tribute to the tremendous success of Rochester's department of political science, built primarily by William Riker and Fenno, in attracting and inspiring students of politics. Finally and most impor-

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tantly, they are a tribute to the central idea that animates the Rochester enterprise—scientific continuity in political research. The Rochester contribution to the long and not always edifying controversy in political science over the possibilities and payoffs of scientific procedures and scientific standards in social inquiry has to my mind been dispositive of the question. As the man who asked whether he believed in total immersion baptism replied: "Believe in it? Hell! I've seen it done."

For just about a half century, students of elections, public opinion, and voting—blessed with large numbers for their dependent variables—have led the way in claiming for politics a piece of the scientific enterprise. This book, which is almost entirely about the U.S. Congress, would be a good thing to put in the hands of a skeptic wondering whether the scientific study of politics is capable of a second act. Its ten essays by nine Rochester PhDs plus Barry Weingast and Douglas Rivers as coauthors cover a variety of topics more or less suggested by or dealt with in Richard Fenno's exemplary work.

Rivers and Fiorina, for instance, give a careful exposition of a model that specifies in what respects constituency service can help members of Congress achieve an incumbency advantage in congressional elections. This model attempts intelligently to grapple with the odd fact that straightforward empirical measures of resource allocation by members do not appear to confirm their persistent belief that these resources help them secure reelection.

Space constraints forbid a comprehensive evaluation of all the contributions in this book, but a few of them stand out in my mind because they intersect interests of my own. Barbara Sinclair's essay explains the institutional transformation of the U.S. Senate from the 1950s to the 1980s as a response to shifting goals of U.S. senators. David Rohde explores the apparent convergence between southern and other House Democrats in their roll-call voting, in spite of Republican inroads into the South among presidential voters. Keith Krehbiel discusses the uses of restrictive rules in furthering the purposes of individual House members, an argument with a structure like Sinclair's but ordering completely different empirical material.

In these, and a couple of the other contributions—for example, Kenneth Shepsle and Weingast on conference committee power as a function of procedural sequences—one can appreciate the intellectual leverage of the style of argument in *Congressmen in Committees* (1973), perhaps the least honored of Richard Fenno's major works on Congress. To me this has always been Fenno's book with the most theoretical punch, because it explores straightforwardly, without the systems-theoretical detour of *The Power of the Purse*, how individual goals of members shape institutional constraints and how institutional structures in turn shape political outcomes. I think I detect agreement with this view in this work by some of Fenno's most gifted students.

NELSON W. POLSBY
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New Ways and Means: Reform and Change in a Congressional Committee *by Randall Strahan. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 218 pp. $29.95.*

Twenty years ago, in the American Political Science Association's Study of Congress series, John Manley provided a sophisticated, readable analysis of the powerful Ways and Means Committee and its long-time chairman, Wilbur Mills. Like several other books in that series, Manley's *The Politics of Finance* immediately became a standard work. Things change, however. And the Congress (to say nothing of Wilbur Mills) changed a good deal in the 1970s. Within the congressional institution, few units changed more dramatically than its so-called power committees: Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means. Although we have numerous studies of the evolution of these panels, Randall Strahan's *New Ways and Means* is the first book-length treatment of a major committee in the postreform House.

Strahan examines the committee under its three most recent chairs: Mills, Al Ullman, and Dan Rostenkowski. Although he sees environmental and structural forces as playing key roles in refashioning Ways and Means over the 1974–1986 period, he places more emphasis on leadership styles than many other recent congressional scholars. At the same time, he does not provide lengthy analyses of Mills, Ullman, and Rostenkowski; we thus get sketches that sometimes verge on stereotypes. And there are some curious omissions. For example, Ullman is characterized as a chair who is not afraid to lose on the House floor, in contrast to Mills's abhorrence of even the possibility of such a defeat. This is fine as far as it goes, but Strahan does not even mention that Ullman's 1980 electoral defeat derived in large part from his strong advocacy of a value-added tax. This is especially strange in light of his use of David Mayhew's electoral connection model of congressional behavior to assess postreform committee behavior.

More generally, however, Strahan does a first-class job in connecting overall institutional developments to changes within a specific committee. Ways and Means was a microcosm of congressional metamorphosis, in that Mills's strong, consensual (if not bipartisan) leadership was followed by a much less settled period (1974–1980), in which the committee frequently met defeat on the House floor. Between 1981 and 1986, when the study ends, Rostenkowski combines a machine politics style of leadership with an increasing emphasis on policy entrepreneurial activities, as he demonstrated in the 1986 tax reform legislation. Much like the House as a whole, the committee became both more partisan and more willing to negotiate over large-scale packages in response to outside pressures such as the deficit.

In presenting his analysis, Strahan draws upon a substantial number of interviews, a thorough reading of secondary sources, and a modest amount of statistical data. In addition, he uses the purposive theories of Mayhew and Richard F. Fenno, Jr. to good advantage, although he is also sensitive to the Congress as an organization. In sum, this is close to the ideal second-generation study of the post-World War II Congress. Incorporating what has gone before, Strahan presents a coherent,

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well-informed depiction of the contemporary legislature as it seeks to define its place within the complexities of the American political and economic landscapes.

BURDETT LOOMIS
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Constitutional Diplomacy *by Michael J. Glennon. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1990. 353 pp. $35.00.*

Michael J. Glennon, former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and presently a law professor, has written a constitutional law treatise on American foreign relations. He provides an acute reading of leading court cases from the congressionalist perspective, opening the book with a fascinating account of whether or not the president has the inherent power to exceed his statutory authority when he orders a blockade and continuing on with cases focusing primarily on the treaty and war powers. He takes aim at what Edward Corwin once called "the high flying prerogative men" who surround the president and urge him on. Glennon believes that prudent decision making would have the president consult with Congress before the fact, rather than merely brief legislators after the fact. He believes that there is no presidential prerogative in foreign affairs that reaches above or beyond the Constitution—no sovereign or Lockean prerogative power. And he argues cogently in his treatment of Curtiss-Wright and the Steel Seizure cases that the Supreme Court has not recognized any such power either. At best, the president may have some concurrent power in foreign affairs that can be used until Congress legislates on the subject, and for the most part presidential power should come from statutory delegations.

Glennon offers more than a congressionalist interpretation of leading constitutional law cases. He is interested not merely in utilizing existing rules of interpretation, but also in developing "metarules" (my term, not his)—rules that rank and order other rules of construction to enable us to know which rules to use in construing the Constitution when we apply it to concrete cases. (In this attempt he imitates the international lawyers, who must first determine which set of rules are to be applied and who must therefore use "rules about rules.")

There are four sets of rules that can be used to find meaning in constitutional law: some rely on the plain meaning of the text of the document; others attempt to uncover the intentions of the Framers; still others can be used to state the customs and usages of the politicians who control the institutions of government; and a final set can be used to develop a functional analysis of separation of powers. Glennon is especially good when he demonstrates how we can distinguish a "custom" to which we should give deference from a mere event with no subsequent precedential meaning. He gives short shrift to the "functionalist" approach, pointing out, as others have before him, that to the extent more efficiency was wanted in 1787, it was already built into the constitutional arrangements. This argument will not

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satisfy those who call for even more efficient "crisis government" today, but Glennon also argues that even taking the presidentialists on their own ground, presidential government is often less efficient government than collaborative government would be.

After pointing out that each approach has its limitations, Glennon offers his own rank ordering for the constitutional lawyers. Not surprising for a congressionalist, his weighting is heavily on the side of plain meaning and Framers' intent, and much less on the side of subsequent custom. Glennon also offers a close reading of several statutes, the most important being the War Powers Resolution of 1973. He points out many of the flaws in drafting the law, as well as the fundamental miscalculations made by its sponsors that presidents would be willing to abide by its provisions. Building on a number of seminal law review articles he has written over the years, Glennon argues persuasively that at this point the act is virtually a dead letter; he even considers the possibility that we might have been better off without it. He offers in an appendix the text of a Use of Force Act, which would amend a number of the flaws of the existing law and for the first time delegate congressional war powers to the president (which could be regulated and limited in scope).

This is not a book for beginners and definitely not a book for an undergraduate class unless the students already have a strong background in constitutional law. Readers who are not already immersed in topics such as "sole organ of communication," "executive agreements," "treaty abrogation," and the intricacies of the War Powers Resolution will find this book tough going.

Glennon has written a fine book and most flaws are minor: the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed in 1964, not 1965; at one point he refers to Bickle rather than Bickel; and he cites an opinion of Edward Corwin about the War Powers Act from a 1978 edition of his work—but that opinion belongs to other commentators who revised Corwin's work. The one error I found was in his overbroad reference to *Bowsher v. Synar* as a case that invalidated the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Most provisions, including the target, were not touched by the decision.

I recommend this book highly for its intelligent treatment of the rules of constitutional construction, its attempt to formulate the metarules by which construction can be attempted, its exposition of the relationship between international and constitutional law, and its congressionalist stance, which should serve to balance other influential treatises. The introduction by William J. Fulbright is also worth reading, because his *mea culpa, mea maxima culpa* decision of how his own views about presidential powers changed in the 1960s should serve as a sober warning to anyone who still believes that a solo presidential turn on the bridge in crisis times is the best way to steer the ship of state.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
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Age, Class, Politics, and the Welfare State *by Fred C. Pampel and John B. Williamson. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 201 pp. $34.50.*

This tightly organized, densely written, and persuasively argued book exemplifies both the great virtues and inherent frustrations of sophisticated quantitative sociology. The authors seek to explain the causes and effects of growing welfare spending by national governments in advanced capitalist, socialist, and less developed societies from 1950 to 1980. Within their method's limits, they succeed admirably.

The authors begin with the limits of what in my view is largely a straw man, the "current orthodoxy," which explains the growth of the welfare state "as the result of conflict beween labor . . . and capital and the political parties that represent each class" (p. xiii). These "conventional views" deal insufficiently with ascriptive and other non-class-based groups, especially the aged, and neglect or confuse other debates in the literature on the welfare state. From this critique, the authors derive five models of welfare state development—industrialism, interest group theory, monopoly capitalism, social democracy, and a catch-all category of state-centered theories. The models are clearly described, sharply delineated from each other, and imaginatively used to derive testable hypotheses. I am not sure, nonetheless, that any scholar would recognize his or her argument in any of them—a standard problem of synthetic literature reviews.

Pampel and Williamson then exhaustively test the models' hypotheses with the best data available to them. They are always explicit about weaknesses in their data or methods, and they are punctilious about the degree of certainty their findings warrant. Within those constraints they draw coherent, consistent, and strong conclusions: "the major influence on the rise of social welfare spending from 1950 to 1980, at least in political democracies, is age structure—primarily the rise of the aged population" (p. 165). An increasing number of aged citizens, the growth of social insurance policies with automatic entitlements, the rise in medical care spending, and general societal wealth all partly explain this finding. But politics plays an independent role; specifically, "democratic procedures furnish the opportunity for socioeconomic and demographic groups to influence public policy." Thus "developmental change combines with democratic politics to raise welfare spending" (p. 166).

Turning to consequences rather than causes of social welfare spending, Pampel and Williamson find that a high level of national wealth and a high proportion of the aged reduce income inequality within nations; national wealth, women's education, urbanization, and medical care affect rates of infant mortality. "In contrast, political democracy, economic dependency [of peripheral nations on core nations], social welfare and other government spending, and leftist government control" have little effect on either income inequality or infant mortality (p. 168).

In short, "as a means to equality, political intervention appears to offer limited benefits" (p. 168). Pampel and Williamson speculate on reasons for this controversial finding that cuts against the "orthodox" view—primarily that "democratic poli-

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tics . . . raises spending [on middle class voters] but not equality [for the politically weak poor]" (p. 172). Their ideas seem plausible and sensible. But in the end they are constrained, as they say, by their data; so they can offer little beyond suggestions for further research.

The book is in that sense limited by its methods in a broader way than Pampel and Williamson discuss. One has no inkling of what is happening inside these nations; indeed, one is hard pressed even to find out what nations are being analyzed, since they are often listed only in footnotes. The authors several times call for individual country case studies to supplement their findings, so one need not set up a false dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods. Nevertheless, I came away from this book longing for a few proper nouns and anecdotes.

One can critique the book from within its own framework as well. Some operationalizations seem farfetched: the aged arguably are a unique force rather than a representation of all non-class-based groups; state autonomy is not to be found only in "government policies that counteract . . . the influence of economic development" (p. 112); class relations within a developing country are not fully captured by the degree to which that country is dependent on advanced industrial nations, and so on. These are not just quibbles: as Pampel and Williamson themselves show, substantive findings depend to a frightening degree on which nations are studied, how, and with what measures.

I do not, however, want to end critically. This is a fine book and shows an analytic and authorial maturity that we would all do well to emulate. The results are striking, important, and persuasive even if distressing to those of us who want to believe that the right government can make a difference. Beyond the obvious readership of those interested in social welfare policy, anyone interested in the relations among economy, society, and polity would do well to read this book.

JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD
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Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin *by Dusko Doder and Louise Branson. New York, Viking Press, 1990. 450 pp. $24.95.*

The authors state their basic thesis right at the outset: "Present Soviet history, we feel, is what Gorbachev is doing and suffering" (p. vii). The strengths and weaknesses of this account of the high politics of the Gorbachev period derive from this very personalized interpretation of the economic, social, and political revolution that is now playing itself out in the Soviet Union. There is little effort to relate the fascinating world of what remains Kremlin politics either to the complex structures of power and authority in the Soviet Union or to comparable experiences of reform in other countries and political systems. There is consequently little in the book of specific interest to political scientists, whose proper concern is the

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analysis of structures of power, or to the political historian, whose concern is the evolution of those structures over time.

At the same time, the authors have exploited excellent contacts in the Soviet political leadership and intelligentsia to provide a more rounded picture of Mikhail Gorbachev's political personality than we have had to date. They provide illuminating details about the impact of collectivization and the Stalinist terror on Gorbachev's family and the effect that this experience has evidently had upon Gorbachev in his determination to uproot the legacy of the Stalinist system.

One theme that dominates the authors' characterization of Gorbachev is that of the Soviet leader as product of the Enlightenment, committed to reason and to the reasonableness of his own conclusions as tools for the rectification of a failed system. In support of this insight, the authors convincingly show that Gorbachev has consistently overestimated the degree of consensus both within the Soviet political class and within Soviet society for his vision of reform. Faced with such recalcitrance and a much deeper crisis than he at first admitted, Gorbachev has been able to adapt his perspectives and commit himself and the Soviet Union to the path of increasingly radical reform.

Where the authors do attempt to generalize, they tend to engage in overly broad stereotypes, characterizing the Russians as "this deeply anti-Semitic nation" or arguing that "[u]nlike the commercial West, Russia is a country that fervently needs an ideology, a set of beliefs, a religion. . . ." (p. 403, p. 381). In like vein, they adjudge the Russians as suffering from "a collective incapacity to respond to changes without a theoretical (or religious) basis and without the approval and supervision of authority" (p. 369). Again, there is little effort to analyze the specific relationships between institutions, social structure, and individual and group behavior.

The authors do provide a perceptive analysis of the logic of Gorbachev's foreign policy, particularly the way in which the Soviet economic crisis intersected with the kinds of foreign and military policies pursued by the Reagan administration to actually facilitate the break that Gorbachev has been able to make with the Stalinist heritage in foreign policy. They also advance the Prussian *Rechtstaat* as a model against which to judge the constitutional revolution now being attempted in the Soviet Union—a comparison that aptly combines elements of authoritarianism, which remains central to Gorbachev's own political strategy, with a widening sphere of legally governed behavior for state and society. They also introduce the key insight into the resistance that the Gorbachev reforms face and the intrinsic political strength of Gorbachev to date: "What most people truly want they also fear the most" (p. 395). Nearly everyone in the Soviet Union today has excellent reasons to support and fear reform of the system. Such an impasse constitutes ready ground for leadership of the sort that Gorbachev has to date been able to exercise.

ALLEN LYNCH
Columbia University

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The Bloc That Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition *by Charles Gati. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1990. 226 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $12.50.*

The Soviet-East European Relationship in the Gorbachev Era: The Prospects for Adaptation *edited by Aurel Braun. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1990. 249 pp. Paper, $29.00.*

Since the truly historic events of autumn 1989 loom so large and so recent, it is hardly surprising that we are left with a multitude of recently published works on Eastern Europe that are now largely outdated and that we face a dearth of books (and even journal articles) that attempt to make sense of the autumn revolutions and their future impact. Charles Gati and Aurel Braun have written volumes that attempt to bridge the gap. Both wrote their original drafts before the autumn revolutions, only to undertake subsequent revisions.

Charles Gati has bridged the gap successfully, although one can criticize his book for failing to reexamine the conventional wisdom that prevailed before the autumn revolutions in light of what has happened since. Though Gati's chapters covering political, economic, and military relations between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are supposed to encompass the first four years of Mikhail Gorbachev's rule, more often than not his verbs are in the present tense. Nonetheless, these chapters offer specialist and nonspecialist alike a comprehensive summary of the major trends in Soviet-Eastern European relations for a period critical for understanding the autumn revolutions. His chapter on the economic relations offers a particularly insightful and clear explanation of the dynamics of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the deleterious impact that these relations have had upon national efforts at reform. Gati's book also includes a concise history of relations from the end of World War II until the death of Konstantin U. Chernenko. Overall, Gati's clear and simple writing style serves him well.

Nevertheless, some of Gati's interpretations are open to question. For example, it is true, as Gati asserts, that Gorbachev's policies during his first four years reflected his own thinking? Or did Gorbachev really have much choice as to the policies he pursued? It may be years, if ever, before we will be able to answer these questions. Nonetheless, this inquiry can shed light on the origins of radical reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

These questions merge into a more practical one in Gati's chapter on the autumn revolutions: What was the Soviet role? In particular, is Gati correct to claim that Gorbachev failed to foresee that radical political change in Eastern Europe would rapidly move in an anti-Communist direction? Apart from recent Soviet statements that they saw the writing on the wall, there were clear signals well before the autumn revolutions that Gorbachev expected the collapse of communism in at least several countries. One signal was Gorbachev's address before the Council of Europe in early July 1989, in which he explicitly allowed for the possibility that some socialist countries might change their "political and social orders" (p. 169).

Once the revolutions commenced, Gorbachev appears to have sided consistently

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with those seeking to topple Communist rule. A prime example is Gorbachev's "long phone call" to Polish Communist leader Mieczyslaw Rakowski in August 1989 to pressure Rakowski to agree to accept a Solidarity-led government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki (p. 168). And as Gati himself reveals, Gorbachev played a critical role in the East German revolution by encouraging Egon Krenz to countermand Erich Honecker's order to open fire on demonstrators in Leipzig. Gati also brings to light a Soviet press campaign begun in August 1989 against the neo-Stalinist regime in Czechoslovakia. Although this campaign in itself cannot be taken as a sign that Moscow was encouraging the overthrow of communism in Czechoslovakia, more recent evidence that the Soviet KGB acted during the November revolution to immobilize the Czech secret services does lend itself to such an interpretation.

Unfortunately, the volume Aurel Braun edited fails to bridge the gap between the works written before and after the autumn revolutions. Even without the dramatic events of late 1989, much of this study would still be out of date. The pieces by the other contributors, although many are well written (especially Karen Dawisha's), appear by and large to be reproductions of earlier works. A quick glance at the footnotes of these authors reveals an obvious dearth of sources after 1987. In view of this fact and also because Braun's chapters take up nearly half of the volume in any case, I will direct the remaining comments towards his contribution.

Braun's main chapter, entitled "On Reform," is a dense piece of writing. As a compilation of facts the chapter is impressive. Nonetheless, for an analytic work, it is overburdened with data and short on analysis. Indeed, an examination of Braun's footnotes reveals a heavy reliance upon western secondary sources, especially newspaper accounts.

Overall, Braun's analysis is not very inspiring. His discussion of the Soviet debate on a new defensive military doctrine fails to touch upon or even to mention the major Soviet writers or works in this debate. His clear lack of familiarity with this literature perhaps accounts for his conclusion that the Soviet debate is "muddled" (p. 194).

Braun's oft repeated assertion that indigenous "political culture" is a major barrier to the emergence of democracy and market economies in Eastern Europe only begs the question of how any society with an authoritarian political order makes the transition to democracy. Braun inadvertently raises this question in particularly stark form by claiming that the Spanish model is not applicable, again because of the authoritarian nature of political culture in Eastern Europe. However, as should be clear, Spain is a prime example of a country with a very strongly ingrained authoritarian political culture, which nonetheless successfully made the transition to democracy.

Finally, Braun reveals himself to be a prisoner of history. Running throughout all of his chapters is the assumption that because the Soviets have intervened in Eastern Europe to stop radical change before, recent efforts under Gorbachev to renounce interventionism and promote liberalization may be reversed at any time.

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Braun continues to stick to this logic even in his epilogue, which was written on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Thus Braun is so fixated on the past that he missed the powerful momentum of change sweeping the Soviet-Eastern European relations. To a lesser extent, we can say the same about Gati's analysis of the Gorbachev period. Future analyses of the events leading up to the autumn revolutions will have to reevaluate the Gorbachev period in light of what this momentum tells us about Gorbachev's goals and Soviet evolution.

PAUL MIDFORD
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Soviet Briefing: Gorbachev and the Reform Period *by Ben Eklof. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. 195 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $12.95.*

This volume chronicles in some detail a short but tumultuous period in recent Soviet affairs—that between January 1987 and mid-1988. The period is characterized by major changes in virtually every facet of Soviet domestic life (although the same could be said of any eighteen-month period since February 1986 when the XXVII Communist Party Congress was convened). The author's rationale for selecting the 1987–1988 period was that he was able to chronicle events as they occurred rather than reach back "into the quickly receding past" (pp. 4–5) about which other scholars had already written. Eklof, associate professor of history at Indiana University, utilizes varied Soviet sources to bolster his statements and also includes many assessments by western observers of Soviet events.

Because the Soviet Union is a country in rapid transition (what it is moving *from* is clearer at this point than what it is moving *toward*), some of Eklof's assertions based on data available at the time have been overtaken by events. Thus, for example, the claim that "Gorbachev has no interest in a multiparty system" (p. 25) has been negated by the successful Gorbachev-led effort in early 1990 to void the constitutional monopoly of political power by the Communist Party (Article 6 of the USSR constitution guaranteeing this monopoly was eliminated).

As another example, the Yeltsin affair (culminating with Boris Yeltsin's replacement as first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and removal as candidate Politbureau member, although he retained his seat in the Central Committee) seemed at the time (late 1987) to be a setback for Gorbachev and *perestroika*. As events of 1989–1990 have demonstrated, Yeltsin has consistently sought to establish himself as a much more radical reformer than Gorbachev, first within the Congress of People's Deputies and the newly reconstituted Supreme Soviet, later as the elected president of the Russian Republic (a newly created post), and finally (in July 1990) by declaring at the Party's XXVIII Congress that he was resigning from the Party altogether in order to be better able to represent all the people of his republic.

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Further, in writing about ethnic problems, Eklof declares, "We can begin with the obvious statement that the right to secession has always been, and will most likely remain, a convenient fiction" (p. 162). In fact, in 1990 the issue of secession is very real. Lithuania was the first to declare its determination to withdraw from the union and reestablish the independence it lost in 1940. Other republics have also declared their intentions to seek independence. Moscow's response has been to pass legislation that provides the mechanism for secession, to apply economic pressure, and to refuse to negotiate with republic leaders unless declarations of independence are suspended. As of this writing, the integrity of the USSR as a single multinational state is at stake, and the outcome is by no means certain.

These examples are not cited to fault Eklof, but rather to emphasize just how difficult it is to make assumptions about the future course of Soviet events based upon current data and analyses. The value of Eklof's work lies in the considerable detail he has provided for a finite period in recent Soviet domestic affairs. His book is well documented and highly readable. It will be useful to specialists and students of Soviet affairs and communist systems in particular, as well as to those who are interested in political and social systems undergoing rapid change.

JANE SHAPIRO ZACEK
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Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968 *by David Ost. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990. 279 pp. $34.95.*

This book is based on the author's doctoral dissertation, which he researched during a long stay in Poland in 1981–1982. While the latter chapters cover the period since then, with an Epilog and Postscript bringing the account up to October 1989, the strength of the book lies in the earlier period. Here the focus is on the ideological development of the Polish opposition movement and in particular two important strategies pursued by Solidarity and its predecessors: the anti-politics of building a civil society; and the political strategy of neocorporatism.

Up until 1968, the strategy of both the political opposition and liberals within the Polish party had been simply to reform the political system. The regime's anti-Semitic purges of 1968 and violent crackdown on striking workers in 1970, however, led the opposition away from this revisionist strategy toward a rejectionist one. Oppositionists Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, developing ideas first broached by philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, began to elaborate a new strategy for the political opposition. Instead of trying to reform the political system or overthrow it, Poles should simply *ignore* it and in the process begin to build a civil society independent of the state. By acting as if democracy and civil rights were already in place (a tactic Ost refers to as "anticipatory democracy"), society could proceed to build its own institutions and organize an uncensored press.

In August 1980, with the formation of Solidarity, this strategy became both victor

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and victim. The opposition had achieved its goal of creating an independent, legal civil society. But it was not ready for the next stage, which was to *institutionalize* civil society. This required a strategy of dealing with the political system, not rejecting it. At first, the Solidarity leadership was unwilling to pursue this path, leaving politics to the politicians and evading any responsibility for the results. With the political stalemate and economic decline of 1981, however, Lech Walesa and the Solidarity leadership became increasingly willing to negotiate with the government. But by this time, it was too late; the regime already was making plans for martial law.

As Ost explains, Solidarity's willingness to cooperate with the government constituted a neocorporatist approach, though the union's leadership did not recognize it as such at the time. Under a neocorporatist arrangement, diverse interests in society are represented in the polity without obtaining power through electoral contest. Ost quotes Philippe Schmitter to the effect that this entails subordinating one procedural norm of democracy, meaningful elections, to another one, freedom of association.

The declaration of martial law in December 1981 ended any such possibility. But the Solidarity experience had created a civil society that the regime could not ignore, and by 1987 there was a new basis for a neocorporatist alliance. The government had granted a limited amnesty for political prisoners and virtually abolished censorship. When workers went on strike again in the spring and summer of 1988, Walesa was able to mediate an end to the strike in exchange for the government's agreement to negotiate with Solidarity. The Roundtable Accord of April 1989 was a consummation of the neocorporatist deal for which Solidarity had been pushing since 1981.

Ost suggests that such neocorporatist arrangements might well be a model both for Poland's future (this time with an unpopular party being guaranteed a role in the government) and for the other Communist states. Here, though, as with so much recent analysis of Central Europe, events have gone beyond Ost's predictions and suggestions. Since the Kremlin no longer insists on formal Party control in Eastern Europe, the governments of the region no longer *need* to guarantee the Party a role. Indeed, the Communist Parties have all but disappeared from the scene. Perhaps, though, neocorporatism offers a solution to the even bigger political stalemate in the Soviet Union itself or for the post-Communist regimes in the Balkans. For both academic analysts and political activists, this book offers useful lessons from the Polish experience with anti-politics and neocorporatism.

DAVID S. MASON
Butler University

Israeli Visions and Divisions *by Myron J. Aronoff. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction, 1989. 178 pp. $29.95.*

The intricate partisan machinations that have fascinated and frustrated observers of recent Israeli politics have perhaps obscured longer-term and more fundamental

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causes of the political paralysis that has gripped that country. Weak, tired, and inept leadership; a nearly even split in public opinion on the issue of the occupied/liberated/administered territories; structural arrangements that give minority parties disproportionate power at times; and the absence of credible Palestinian Arab interlocutors are all proximate causes of the ongoing crisis.

Myron Aronoff, who uses a political-anthropological approach in his works on Israeli politics, argues convincingly that there is a more profound "crisis of political legitimacy" (p. xxi) underlying Israel's difficulties. The crisis was brought about by the decline of the Labor party's dominant ideology and political position and the failure of the Likud since it unseated Labor in 1977 to become either the dominant party or the bearer of the dominant ideology that would set the tone for the society as a whole. Zionism remains the shared political culture of the Jewish population of Israel, but Labor and Likud are "manifestations of competing ideological interpretations of a shared political culture" and neither interpretation is dominant or even particularly well articulated and exciting. While this might not be particularly critical in countries such as the United States or Great Britain, "Israel appears to have a greater need for a collective vision and a sense of mission than do most states whose right to exist is taken for granted by their neighbors or the international community" (p. 39). The current troubles of the USSR, where the official ideology and institutional arrangements have lost so much legitimacy, are another illustration of the paralysis that can result from the absence of a consensual legitimizing ideology or its interpretation. There are, of course, ideological movements in Israel today, but Aronoff dismisses them as either extremist or weak, and hence in both cases of limited appeal. His own sympathies are made quite clear, and he frets over what he sees as a tendency to extremism in politics and religion, and an erosion of the rule of law.

Aronoff analyzes the ideologies and political styles of the two major parties, Labor and Likud, and of two movements, the religio-nationalist Gush Emunim and the dovish Peace Now. Using interviews and participant observation in addition to more conventional documentary resources, the author convincingly analyzes the parties and movements, the sources of their strengths and weakness. Perhaps he exaggerates the importance of Likud's attempt to reinterpret Jewish history and promote new symbols and ignores bread-and-butter issues that probably have far more to do with voting behavior; but his is an unusual and insightful angle into Israeli and other politics. He admits that Gush Emunim is a new revitalization movement but warns against false messianism. He rejects the idea put forth by several scholars that there is a New Zionism based on religion that is Israel's new dominant ideology. What is needed, according to Aronoff, is a "refurbished and strengthened political culture" (p. 40). He concludes on a hopeful note, suggesting that the present crisis may prove beneficial because it might lead to new political options. Thus far, there are neither the ideas nor the personalities on the horizon that would justify this hope.

This is a perceptive analysis of the Israeli political stalemate and its root ideological causes. The book is somewhat episodic and marred by inconsistent and

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incorrect transliterations from Hebrew. The movement between anthropological theory and political analysis is sometimes awkward. On the whole, however, it is a persuasive and important analysis of the Israeli political system. Anyone interested in the story behind the deals, maneuverings, and intrigues of Israeli politics can do no better than read this book.

ZVI GITELMAN
University of Michigan

Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians *by Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1989. 238 pp. $39.95.*

Only the first of sixteen chapters, some fifteen pages, of this book deals with the *Intifada* or Palestinian uprising that erupted during December 1988 in occupied Gaza and the West Bank. The other fifteen chapters are an account of Israel's sub rosa relations with Jordan pre-dating establishment of the Jewish State in 1948. The authors trace these ties to contacts formed by Zionists in mandatory Palestine with the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan during the 1930s. The major thrust of this relationship, the authors assert, has been to undermine the Palestinian Arab nationalist goal of establishing an independent state in any part of the former mandated area. Both Zionists, later Israelis, and the Jordanian Hashemite regime have mutually perceived Palestinian nationalism as a far greater threat than Israel to Jordan or vice versa.

This book picks up the relationship and focuses on the several score of meetings between King Hussein and various Israeli leaders, mostly from the Labor camp. It continues the story recounted by Avi Shlaim in *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford, 1988), a far more scholarly, detailed, and credible work.

King Hussein followed the precedent set by his grandfather, Abdullah, through up to 200 direct encounters with Israeli officials to discuss mutual problems concerning political, economic, and military affairs. These meetings took place in Jordan, Israel, England, and Europe. They were usually straightforward and frank, although cordial, many of them leading to lasting friendships between Israelis and Jordanians. They subvert the frequent Israeli plaint: "we have no one to negotiate with" or "only Sadat had the courage to negotiate with Israel."

The major purpose of the Israeli-Jordanian parleys was to avoid head on confrontation or military encounters—objectives that were not always attained, as shown by the dozens of border raids of Israeli forces and by Israeli conquest of the West Bank in June 1967. Nevertheless, the border has been relatively quiet, largely because the two antagonists thrashed out a number of problems that could have greatly intensified hostilities.

Through exchanges of intelligence and by virtue of their mutual fear of and hostility to the Palestinians, Jordan and Israel collaborated in blocking the rise

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of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Thus a principal element of the Labor party's peace program has been the Jordanian option—a peace settlement based on an Israeli-Jordanian condominium in the West Bank rather than Palestinian self-determination. King Hussein has not been cooperative. Until he renounced all claims to the West Bank in favor of the PLO, he adamantly insisted that, like Egypt, he receive in return for peace all territory lost in 1967.

The title of the book is derived from the authors' assumption that both Israeli and Jordanian failure to acknowledge the Palestinian right to self-determination inevitably led to the *Intifada.* Continued failure to permit the Palestinians to govern themselves, failure to recognize and negotiate with their chosen leaders like Yassir Arafat, will only lengthen the conflict, the authors believe. Although Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians know that another round of bloodshed and war will be "the most lethal and tragic in Middle East history," the authors assert that "chances for a rapid breakthrough, at this writing, appeared poor" (p. 208).

Unlike the Shlaim study, this book is written in a rather racy, journalistic style that is easy to read, but often questionable when it comes to sources of direct quotes, personal interactions, and who thought what about who and what.

DON PERETZ
State University of New York at Binghamton

Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–1975 *by Sidney Tarrow. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 400 pp. $59.00.*

This is a superb book, which makes major contributions to the analysis of Italian politics, the study of protest, the relationship between conventional and unconventional forms of political participation in democracies, and the methodological and theoretical foundations of political science. It should be read carefully by all students of politics, not only those who are interested in the particulars of recent events in Italy.

Tarrow offers a collection of gems. His book joins with the contributions of several other scholars to establish a theoretical rationale and methodology to analyze the structural and political bases of protest. The imagery of waves, parabolas, and cycles and the specific hypotheses emphasize aggregate, institutional, and organizational qualities. The approach offers a powerful alternative to those that reduce political protest to a manifestation of the psychological needs or rational choice calculations of individual actors. Tarrow views political protest as a pattern of complex interactions. The outbreak, spread, and decline of protest are linked to structural crises, political opportunities, processes of imitation and solidarity, including competitive interaction among the groups of the social movement, repertoires of available and innovative forms of protest, and frames of meaning, the ways by which the demonstrators understand their actions. Here, protests flow directly out of and back into conventional forms of politics; and competition among

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the revolutionary groups, unions, and political parties confronts each with strategic and tactical choices. At the heart of the study lies the *political* logic of protest politics in democracies.

Much of the volume's strength rests on Tarrow's conceptual and methodological precision. Critical concepts are defined and operationalized, and an appendix details the methods by which Tarrow and his colleagues transformed articles in the *Corriere della Sera*, Italy's newspaper of record, into a rich data base. At the same time, beautifully crafted case studies draw the reader into the swirl of student demonstrations, assemblies and strikes at factories, revolutionary groups, and a break-away community of priests and lay Catholics, among other groups and happenings. The tables, graphs, and stories illustrate the analytic power that comes from combining quantitative and qualitative sources.

Tarrow weaves the hypotheses and empirical detail into an innovative analysis of recent decades of Italian politics. Arguing against those who claim that the demonstrations and assemblies caused the political violence of the 1970s, he maintains that "institutional expansion" as well as shootings and kidnappings were products of the decline of mobilization. "Italian democracy survived attack from the extreme left and right because violence was the product of the *end* of a period of mass mobilization, when protest in most social and economic sectors was being institutionalized" (p. 324). (Emphasis in original.)

It is a measure of the study's clarity that the next set of questions stand out so clearly. Future work should tighten the logical power of the theoretical net; consider how to specify the hypotheses so as to allow for multivariate analyses, and broaden the universe of cases, which can be shown to follow its logic. It needs also to confront the discrepancy between a theoretical system that emphasizes the language of waves and parabolas and the analysis of political violence, which uses the language of cause and effect. Tarrow's treatment of demobilization assumes an unreasonably high level of strategic sophistication and tactical flexibility by the members of the Italian political class, while stepping partially outside the argument's political logic and empirical precision to assert that the masses were exhausted and frightened. These questions highlight the power of a volume whose approach, net of hypotheses, and methodology will set the research agenda for those who study protest politics in democracies.

ALAN S. ZUCKERMAN
Brown University

Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany *by John Gimbel. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1990. 280 pp. $29.50.*

As the tide of World War II in Europe turned against the initiator, Hitler Germany, the United States developed plans and organizations (such as Projects Over-

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coat and Paperclip) for acquiring German technical knowledge of military and industrial value that might shorten the war against Japan and for commercial benefit. Allies had similar programs, and the French and Soviets removed major factory equipment to their own countries as reparations. It is the argument of this book, as suggested by its subtitle, that German industry, science, and technology and the economy were unfairly quarried and exploited in this manner beyond the bounds of "generally accepted definitions of reparations" (p. 165) by the U.S. government and individual American corporations—stimulated by Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) and others.

So keenly was Gimbel's sense of justice offended by the American programs that, he tells us, he took early retirement at Humboldt State College, California, and worked for more than ten years on research for this book. He was financed by several U.S. sources and by a "most generous research and travel grant from the Volkswagen-Stiftung" (p. xiv).

The author seeks to quantify the value of the patents and industrial and technical information appropriated by the United States. After stating, "I admit quite frankly that I am no closer to a precise evaluation than anyone else" (p. 170), he gives credence to the $5 billion figure in the 1947–1951 Harmssen Report by the economics minister of Bremen. Harmssen's report received high praise in Germany, but Gimbel says British and American reviewers were "vicious" (p. 246) in their criticism. *The Economist* (London) condemned the report as not moral, objective, or accurate and expressed concern that it might become "the *Mein Kampf* of the new German Nationalism" (p. 247). Nevertheless, Gimbel goes further and characterizes as "probably not far from the mark" (p. 170) a $10 billion figure for intellectual reparations (presumably by all the Allies) referred to "in Russian radio and newspaper reports" (p. 160). In 1947 V.M. Molotov, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, cited these reports as his authority for endorsing the $10 billion figure.

It is well to consider any valuation of intellectual reparations in context, from which Gimbel remains aloof. He makes no reference to the Nazi inhumanity, nor to its initiation of a war of conquest, nor to the cost in blood and treasure to the defenders, nor to German industry's ruthless exploitation of slave labor from concentration camps and foreign countries (for example, by Daimler-Benz, manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz automobiles); nor to the wartime taking to Germany of industrial booty from Peugeot and other French companies; nor to the value of the worldly goods expropriated from millions of Jewish and Christian concentration camp victims; nor to the billions of dollar equivalents of the tribute levied against occupied European countries. Objectivity requires at least brief reference to this evil chapter of human history.

Let's call the death roll of World War II in Europe: 36 million dead, more or less (more or less!), including 19 million from the USSR, 6 million from Germany and Austria, and 6 million Jews.

U.S. World War II defense costs exceeded $300 billion in European and Pacific theaters combined. Postwar Marshall Plan assistance added some $17 billions, along

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with several billion dollars of humanitarian aid to Germany and other war-ravaged countries through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and other UN agencies. Against these unparalleled monetary costs and the incalculable costs of the Nazi terror in human torment and misery suffered by the survivors and the dead, Gimbel devotes his attention and sympathy to the $5 or $10 billion he accepts as the value of intellectual reparations levied on postwar German industry. Gimbel's 184 pages of text are supplemented by 96 pages of notes, bibliography, and index. Those who refer to it might reflect on the omitted human relevancies. *Caveat lector.*

WILLIAM T. GOLDEN
American Museum of Natural History

Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic *edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1989. 363 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $16.95.*

This investigation of West German politics and the economy is based on a periodization as novel as it is plausible: The editor's "first republic" ended in 1966, with the fall of Ludwig Erhard; the second in 1980, with the decline of the center-left coalition and its neo-corporatist processes; and since then and especially since the mid-1980s, there is a bundle of changes occurring that constitute the movement towards a "third republic." Among these changes are new production techniques, new social movements in national politics, and trends in the international economy, such as the energy and debt crises and creeping protectionism. We should also emphasize the editor's desire to integrate the study of all three levels of politico-economic analysis—the shop floor, national economic politics, and the international economic environment.

The essays that make up the book indeed cover these levels and the responses of different industrial sectors—German core industries, declining sectors, and new, rising industrial branches—and the treatment often makes available to the English-speaking audience a great deal of new insight and information. The essays are not all equally well integrated with respect to the three levels or equally informative. One of the most insightful to this reader is the account of the new concepts of production in West German plants by two German industrial sociologists, Horst Kern and Michael Schumann. On the other hand, I expected more in the order of sinister revelations about the activities of German banks, which in the most recent past elicited strong apprehensions from former British Secretary of Trade and Industry Nicholas Ridley and led to the terrorist assassination of the head of the Deutsche Bank in late 1989. Searching for a synthesis, the reader inevitably turns to the editor's final chapter, a major essay on the alleged cumulative convergence of the small changes of the transitional 1980s.

Peter Katzenstein indeed weaves the disparate strands together with finesse and

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skill, beginning with the international economic context that has been so crucial to an understanding of *les incertitudes allemandes*. Since his and his contributors' assessments came to their conclusions in mid-1988, the results are unintentionally flawed by having missed the major changes of the two intervening years: they fail to account for the considerable economic upturn of the last two years and, of course, for the dramatic upheaval of the process and prospects of German unification. Considering how drastically the latter is changing many important aspects of the domestic agenda, not to mention the future role of a united Germany in the European, transatlantic, and East European contexts, it is a true sign of quality that this book still seems as informative as it is.

The secret of its success appears to lie in its skillful analysis of institutional change as the fulcrum and framework of social and economic innovation, both in the evolution of the "second republic" and in the transitions of the 1980s. Having analyzed the diffuse path of technological innovation and the differential impact of the social movements and of international competition on different industries, Katzenstein finally asks why the experimentation of the 1980s has not resulted in large-scale institutional transformation. He answers his own question by pointing to the existing tight domestic institutional linkages and the international constraints upon West German options. The mid-1980s debate on West German economic policies beyond the approaches of earlier decades already began to explore alternative possibilities. The domestic and international upheaval of the unification process after this book was completed is quite likely to break the institutional and other constraints that the editor emphasizes and to bring about the third socio-economic set of institutions he has anticipated in his remarkable concluding chapter.

PETER H. MERKL
University of California, Santa Barbara

A Marriage of Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and the United States *by Sidney Weintraub. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 270 pp. $24.95.*

As apt as the matrimonial theme in the title may be as a metaphor for the sometimes tempestuous and at other times petulant relations between these two nations, the temptation to continue with this imagery must be resisted. A review couched in such terms could easily slip into parody. That would be unfortunate, for it would trivialize these substantial analyses of a very important set of asymmetrical social, economic, and political relationships, the understanding of which the author has significantly advanced.

Weintraub asserts that the destinies of Mexico and the United States are inextricably interwoven and have been since each nation gained its independence. This often-ignored state of affairs is due to the interplay of many influences, the most

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notable of which are geographic propinquity, durable economic interests, and shared democratic aspirations. Over the years a "functional integration" (symbiosis) of the two societies has taken place, especially in the realm of basic economic needs and interests. This is particularly true of the border region where there is not only constant cultural contact and interchange, but also a growing concentration of economic activity (that is, *maquiladora*, large-scale assembly plants).

Integrative developments at the fundamental level of complementary economic interests have progressed even as the competing demands of unique nationalisms have achieved expression in terms of intransigent oppositions, mutual suspicions, defensiveness, and economic protectionism. The economic and political realms are frequently at odds, and vital interests in both societies suffer as a consequence. Policy decisions made in isolation by one of the partners in this dyadic relationship often have dysfunctional effects upon the other. What is needed, according to Weintraub, is "managed integration" in place of the current episodic, piecemeal, and self-confounding state of affairs. Managed integration would offer both nations more rational policy choices as a result of restrained, mutually respectful, and frequent consultations. For such an approach to work, however, the two nations must come to accept the concept of a shared and unavoidable destiny. And therein lies the rub. A major change in perceptions and attitudes would somehow have to be wrought despite their troubled diplomatic history. It is true that some nations with longer histories of cultural diversity, armed conflict, competing interests, and mutual suspicions have nevertheless managed to submerge their differences in pursuit of common economic and political goals. The prime example is the still emerging European community. However, the emotional appeals of nationalism, especially when rooted in a rich matrix of real or imagined wrongs, often prove resistant to appeals to a different rationality.

Various dimensions of the vaunted symbiosis between Mexico and the U.S. are explored candidly and even-handedly by the author in rich detail in a succession of data-laden chapters. The first three cover the social, political, and economic context in which the integrative phenomenon is said to be embedded. The next six chapters concentrate on policy issues arising from trade, industrialization, energy, public debt, the border region, and migration—all of which are said to depict diverse aspects of interdependency. A final chapter sums up and presents policy recommendations.

A Marriage of Convenience is copiously and carefully documented from both Spanish- and English-language sources. Weintraub has made an important contribution to our knowledge of a policy area that is poised for dynamic change, probably in the near future. For this reason, the book merits a wider audience than the usual fraternity of academic experts. It should be at the top of the "must read" list of Presidents Carlos Salinas de Gotari and George Bush, their key policy advisers, and other opinion leaders on both sides of the border. The book is not light reading. It is timely, immensely informative, and thought-provoking.

H. CARL CAMP
University of Nebraska at Omaha

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Foundations of American Constitutionalism *by David A. J. Richards. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 315 pp. $32.50.*

We are living, David Richards explains, in an age of "constitutional decadence" in which "American culture" has significantly failed to meet its "interpretive responsibilities" (p. 288). By this, Richards means that we have strayed from the Founders' project of Lockean constitutionalism with its ongoing egalitarian commitment and its emphasis on the protection of inalienable rights, particularly those of oppressed minorities. His work is thus an exercise in political philosophy, he tells us, intended to reconstitute the republicanism of the founding generation and draw us back to the core republican values that alone legitimate our continued allegiance to the basic American document. It will at once be obvious that Richards is nothing if not ambitious. Whether he is successful is, of course, another matter; and while most readers will find him provocative and entertaining, they will also, I suspect, have their doubts about Richards's brand of republicanism.

Richards insists that it is time to recapture "original intent" from its recent defenders (Robert Bork, Edwin Meese, and others of their ilk). He therefore urges us to reaffirm the Founders' republicanism and overcome the "sterile dichotomies" of "a history that makes no interpretive sense of our values and practices today and a political theory or conventionalism that makes no sense of history" (p. 16). The Founders (and for Richards this means primarily James Madison, with an occasional assist from James Wilson) were men of vision who created a framework within which progressive approximations of humanist and Enlightenment values could be realized. Only if we understand their republicanism in its deepest and most enduring sense, then, can we hope to grasp their intentions; and only thus can we secure a reading of the Constitution that will justify us, some two centuries later, in accepting the Madisonian solution rather than the Jeffersonian alternative of each generation's creation of its own constitution. But given that the Founders' republicanism transcends the limits of 1787–1791, given that they created a project at once morally justified and capable of realization, we in turn are both authorized and compelled to keep faith with their intentions.

Having established to his satisfaction that the Framers' vision is still valid, Richards moves rapidly from the late eighteenth century to the late twentieth century. In the book's second half, he takes up several of the more vexed and vexing constitutional issues of the present day. He is especially interested in the question of unenumerated rights, that *bête noire* of the current original intent school, and in an elegant and persuasive performance demolishes Bork's claim at the 1987 confirmation hearings that the right to privacy has no basis in the Framers' intentions. On the contrary, Richards argues, both as a matter of the deeper meaning of republicanism and within the specific context of the Ninth Amendment, Bork's objections to the "creation" of rights not specified in the original text are groundless. *Roe v. Wade* is thus shown to be correct in its outcome and, correspondingly, *Bowers v. Hardwick* is subjected to Richards's withering critique. In a final chapter, Richards too briefly reflects on the larger theme of constitutional decadence and

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tries to explain why his republican reading of the Constitution finds so little echo in professional practice. Few readers will be surprised to discover that higher education is at fault here. While distancing himself from the complaints of Alan Bloom, Richards is clearly alarmed by both the Balkanization of higher education and the sterile professionalism of lawyers' training—a kind of positivism run rampant.

Richards, in short, has written a plea for a renewed republican understanding of the Constitution. To be sure, his republicanism is largely *sui generis*, a republicanism so stripped to what he considers its essentials that most students of late-eighteenth-century Anglo-American political thought will have great trouble recognizing it. His quest for a workable original intent has—more or less as we might expect—led him to salvage a republican core from the Framers' legacy that is both admirably and conveniently modern and liberal. It is, therefore, a republicanism that readily ignores issues of passionate concern to the Framers. Note, for example, the disarming ease with which Richards disposes of their economic views (p. 160). It is a republicanism so immediately focused on individual rights as to leave little room for other constitutional concerns. Richards gives us an ethereal republicanism that has no real history, that is utterly abstracted from its social foundations, and that has no place for politics, which make their appearance only in the form of fatal compromises or deviations from true republican values, as in the 1787 Constitution's "obscene" (p. 154) recognition of slavery. It is not that Richards lacks familiarity with the eighteenth-century context—far from it. But rather, like many others who have gone in search of a usable past, he has his eye firmly fixed on the present.

In any case, Richards is remarkably forthright about what he is doing. If one doubts that his republican prescription is capable of achieving all he attributes to it, he has nevertheless given us an imaginative and often compelling picture of what a modern republicanism might involve. It may be yet another constitutional myth, but it is surely more attractive than that proffered by Bork and Meese.

HERBERT SLOAN
Barnard College

The Presidential Odyssey of John Glenn *by Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 1990. 302 pp. Cloth, $20.95; paper, $15.95.*

Why would any one want to write about one of the most inept presidential campaigns in recent memory? John Glenn's status as a genuine American folk hero is one reason. His exemplification of the many ills besetting the presidential nominating process is another. Richard Fenno's case study of the Ohio senator's failed bid to become the Democratic nominee in 1984 reveals much about both subjects; and by illuminating the motivations and strategies behind the Glenn campaign it makes an excellent complement to other studies of presidential primaries, such as Larry Bartels's analysis of candidate momentum. But its greatest value

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to students of American politics is what it tells us about the evolution of political careers.

Although Glenn might have lost to Ronald Reagan in 1984, he was among the most electable of the Democratic challengers. His name recognition, reputation for integrity, centrist views, and identification with a strong national defense made him attractive to the independents and conservative Democrats who had bolted to the GOP in 1980. In the pre-primary season, what Fenno terms the "campaign without voters," many observers thought he had the public persona to become another Dwight D. Eisenhower. But Glenn's abysmal showing in the Iowa caucuses and early primaries forced him to drop from the race in mid-March, leaving party activists and the press to shake their heads over the squandering of so much political capital.

Fenno attributes Glenn's failure to three factors: his inability to define himself to the electorate; his inattention to the basic rules of political coalition building; and his inept staffing of the campaign. Each of these weaknesses Fenno traces to Glenn's early political experiences. The senator undoubtedly was a casualty of the "front-loaded" primary system and unrealistic expectations among media scorekeepers, but his perception of himself as a candidate and his particular view of the political process made his poor showing at the polls seem inevitable.

If Fenno's analysis is correct, then political scientists cannot explain political outcomes without paying more attention to how politicians view their world. This is a position he has articulated frequently, and it makes particular sense when applied to the candidate-centered politics of American elections. Today candidates both define the alternatives for voters and act as entrepreneurs in organizing campaigns, so that their personal attributes and skills have become independent variables in the electoral equation.

Fenno's book is not a plug for psychoanalyzing politicians, however: indeed, he carefully avoids imputing motives to his subject. But he does make a strong case that perceptions predict behavior and that political scientists therefore should try to understand where these perceptions come from and how they shape political decision making. Following the sequential development of politicians' careers, he suggests, is one way to do that.

Yet Fenno's use of John Glenn exemplifies some of the limitations of trying to explain political outcomes from the politician's perspective. Over the course of the six years that Fenno observed and talked with the senator, Glenn either learned remarkably little from two senate campaigns and an unsuccessful presidential race or he was unwilling or unable to articulate how they shaped his thinking. Moreover, Fenno does not seem to have had the same access or rapport with Glenn that he has enjoyed with other members of Congress, and he consequently has relied extensively on press accounts of the senator's activities. Particularly during the exploratory phases of Glenn's candidacy and his early confrontations with Walter Mondale, the sense of mutual discovery between practitioner and scholar that so enriches Fenno's earlier books is disappointingly absent.

Nonetheless, this book provides provocative ideas on how the political careers

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of elected officials affect their behavior. And it reminds us that who politicians are and how they got into office have important consequences for the electorate.

LINDA L. FOWLER
Syracuse University

Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi after 1965 *by Frank Parker. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 254 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $12.95.*

This book is about a complex but important subject of interest to persons doing work in federalism, public policy, state and local politics, race relations, and community empowerment. It is concerned with securing the right to vote for American minorities, the strategies and impact of the voting rights movement, and the replacement of all-white with biracial government in the state of Mississippi. The voting rights movement is one response to the disfranchisement of American minorities, especially the egregious form that took in the biracial states of the Old Confederacy. It refers to the use of litigation to replace discriminatory election practices.

The voting rights movement is difficult to ignore. In 1981–1982, movement activists convinced the federal government to strengthen voting rights law. In 1986 the U. S. Supreme Court in *Thornburgh v. Gingles* emphasized the ability to elect minorities as a key consideration in evaluating voting policy. These actions had the effect of setting a framework for minority political rights comparable to the historic decisions in *Brown v. The Board of Education* and *Baker v. Carr.* By 1990, minority public officials throughout the nation – black, brown, and red – were involved in formulating government policy because of voting rights work.

If we are sure about these successes, we are less able to describe the movement, its personalities, techniques, coherence, place in American reform, or its bequeathment. The "movement" was actually separate actions in the states and in federal court districts.

Using the case study, Parker focuses on Mississippi. He relates his subject to efforts at voter registration in the civil rights movement, recalling the way that early effort was abandoned because of official hostility. He reviews the "independent" politics associated with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the increase in black voters after 1965, and the groping among activists for a response when increased registration was not matched by growth in elected officials. Change did come. There was a steady rise by blacks to elected positions secured by single member districts – the most effective of the voting rights remedies. He reports a parallel change in the white community. The old style leadership was replaced by younger more "progressive" white politicians who were willing to work with their black neighbors.

Parker attributes the change to the ability to block the state's political massive resistance. In January 1966 the then all-white legislature enacted a series of changes

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designed to nullify the recently enacted federal voting rights law. In a previous time such state policies—carefully phrased in nonracial terms—would have been allowed to stand. Indeed, Parker notes that certain judges agreed with the state's effort this time around. However, the presence of a well organized litigation effort gave black citizens a resource enabling them to respond effectively to the official defiance. Parker's discussion here is informative and illustrates the impact of voting rights litigation.

This book is timely. It comes in the year of the Los Angeles, California county redistricting—one more decision showing how the problems (and solutions) of voting rights work extend far beyond the Black Belt South. The book will be a useful reference during the 1990 reapportionment. Its conceptual power is limited, however, by the effort to take account of activity as disparate as civil rights, electoral politics, and litigation. More attention needs to be given to the limits of voting rights work. The movement peaked in the 1980s, remaining vital today less as vanguard action than as an aspect of a delicate effort at mobilization. In the Mississippi senate, despite full use of single member districts, only two blacks have won election even though ten senate districts contain majority black populations. Of the entire black legislative membership not one is elected from a majority white district.

ALEX WILLINGHAM
Williams College

From Patrician to Professional Elite: The Transformation of the New York City Bar Association *by Michael J. Powell. Russell Sage Foundation, N.Y., 1988. 269 pp. $29.95.*

The author develops the thesis that the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY) has moved from an elite upper-class WASP organization to an elite meritocracy dominated by the large law firms. He compares its achievements and failures with those of more inclusive (democratic) organizations such as the Chicago Bar Association (CBA).

Powell is at his best when he describes social movements and their impacts such as the civil rights, legal services, and anti-Vietnam War movements. He also does well in recounting history such as the revolt of the Young Turks in the ABCNY in 1971; the changes in admission policy and organization as the ABCNY grew larger and less homogeneous after World War II; the beneficial influence of such leaders as Harrison Tweed, Francis T.P. Plimpton, and how those leaders plus Bernard Botein, Orville Schell, and Cyrus Vance led the ABCNY to take an active position on major social issues.

The author's treatment and analysis of some of the successes and failures of the ABCNY is also done well. He attributes the significant role of the ABCNY in opposing the Bricker Amendment (restructuring the president's treaty-making

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powers during the Eisenhower administration), the Carswell nomination to the Supreme Court, and in supporting a new conflict-of-interest act governing federal employees in 1963 to its resources of legal expertise, money, prestige, standing, and connections of its members (the leadership of which has included five secretaries of state and several other cabinet members). Powell sees the influence of the ABCNY as greatest at the national level. On the other hand, he views the elite status as carrying disadvantages at the state and local level because of lack of breadth of representation, lack of familiarity with local political organizations and leaders, and, unlike the CBA, lack of regular contact with state legislative representatives and consistent unwillingness to hire a lobbyist at the state capital. Even in this area, however, Powell recognizes that the ABCNY was able to influence the discourse of change and was an agent to take up the cause of reform and mobilize support for change. He also to some extent recognizes the high value it placed on civic professionalism and responsibility.

The book would have been substantially improved if the author had avoided stereotyped views—apparently based on a handful of studies continually alluded to—and instead stuck with a balanced factual analysis without perjurative adjectives. The result of this approach is that even positive actions of the ABCNY are viewed through a negative prism.

Powell also rather grandiloquently questions the place of elite groups in a mass society with egalitarian pressures and democratizing tendencies. He apparently does not recognize the simple view that in a pluralistic society there is room for many diverse groups, and that even professional associations need not all be the same. Other organizations of lawyers in New York and elsewhere fill the role of more inclusive institutions. The influence of an elite group will depend to a large extent, as it always has and as the author correctly notes, on the excellence and merit of the work it turns out and the prestige of its members.

Despite all the derogatory comments. Powell concludes: "No other local, metropolitan, or state association has been able to play such a scholarly role within the American Bar, especially at the national and federal levels. . . . because of the relative homogeneity and economic security of its members, the elite association may well be able to consider and support quite radical changes that would be inconceivable for heterogeneous and representative organizations" (p. 235).

VICTOR FUTTER
Sills Beck Cummis Radin & Tischman

NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges *edited by John Chipman. New York, Routledge Chapman & Hall, 1988. 399 pp. $66.50.*

Any book about any aspect of European security published in 1988, including Chipman's edited volume on NATO's southern region, would seem dated in 1990. Missing must be any reference to the dramatic changes that continue apace in eastern

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Europe, the Soviet Union, and Germany and to important implications of these changes for western security and arms control. What is surprising about Chipman's book is how salient it remains. This contemporary relevance derives in part from the fact that, despite all the revolutionary changes in Europe, security problems for NATO's southern states, unlike those for NATO's central region, evidence more historic continuity than change. There are two reasons for this.

First, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and Mediterranean Eskadra are still very much a presence in the region. From the narrow perspective of military planning and in the current context of political uncertainty, their modernized ships and medium-range bombers pose a threat that is of no less concern than in the past. Chipman's military analysis in his introductory chapter is somewhat incomplete, even in 1988 terms. He gives inadequate attention, for example, to NATO reinforcement plans, non-U.S. forces, and NATO's offensive counterair assets, including cruise missiles. Some of the technical details and aspects of the political context within which these capabilities must be evaluated have, of course, changed since 1988. Nonetheless, much of the book's analysis of the threat and of its significance, still applies.

Second, the many security concerns of NATO states in this region that are not related to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have not been much affected by the changes in Europe. Potential threats from North Africa, spill-over from disputes in the Persian Gulf and between Israel and the Arabs, terrorist threats, and for Greece and Turkey, concerns about each other—all play an important and growing role in the foreign and defense policies of NATO's southern states. One of this volume's major strengths is that the five country chapters (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey) focus as much on the intra-NATO and so-called out-of-area security problems that each country's security policy must address as on those emanating from the Warsaw Pact. The divergence between the interests of NATO's southern states and U.S. interests with respect to these problems creates no less tension within NATO today than it did several years ago and largely explains why NATO's Eurocentric focus will not be easily broadened now that its European mission is being redefined.

The enduring value of this volume derives in larger part, however, from its blending in each country chapter of several perspectives: historical, geostrategic, domestic political, economic, and institutional. Each author treats these themes in a way appropriate to his own country. As a result, particular chapters dwell excessively on the role of political parties or seminal historical events or insufficiently on bureaucratic politics or force structure. Such unevenness is inevitable in an edited volume. Of more significance, however, the thematic coverage among country studies is in fact unusually consistent for such a volume. This book is one of several that reflect the long-overdue resurgence of interest in security issues of the Mediterranean and NATO's southern region during the 1980s. It is also one of the best, whose value has been least eroded by time.

TED GREENWOOD
Columbia University

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Dissent and the State *edited by C.E.S. Franks. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 288 pp. Paper, $14.95.*

Symposium volumes rarely exceed the sum of their parts, and this one is no exception. The editor's introduction provides little more than a recital of Canadian political events that led to the conference for which these papers were prepared, followed by a tedious description of the book's contents. There isn't a hint to the reader as to what might be the volume's underlying *leit motif* or even its principal message. No critical overview is provided. These lapses are unsettling in that the authors themselves are not always in agreement, as is their right.

As the title suggests, the issue is the variegated ways in which the state treats dissent—particularly forms of it that do not involve the commitment of a criminal act, but that nevertheless represent challenges to existing norms or to the political system itself. When older laws of treason and sedition did not serve the state's purpose, laws of subversion and terrorism were enacted. Inevitably, as several of the authors document, such legislation invites severe limitations of freedom of speech and assembly, as well as police methods that are crass and cynical violations of civil and human rights and of other laws.

On the origins of laws on subversion, Elizabeth Grace and Colin Leys in the volume's best chapter argue that they are deliberately intended to "*create* a 'grey area' of activities that *are* lawful, but that will be denied protection from state surveillance or harassment by being *declared* illegitimate, on the ground that they *potentially* have unlawful consequences" (p. 63, italics in the original). Laws on conspiracy, including much legislation on terrorism, are similarly motivated.

That East European police states are master witch hunters is not fresh news. Aural Braun's summary descriptions of how these police methods served to undermine regime legitimacy sounds old hat given the dizzying pace of contemporary events. Nevertheless, his brief remarks on "nationalist dissent" in the East provide some insights into how powerful are the ethnic divisions that will stand in the way of democratization of countries of the now disintegrated Soviet bloc. Ironically, the communist states were better able than will be their successors to keep in check the excesses of ethnic and racial rivalries.

The Canadian story is something else. Americans, who notoriously pay close to zero attention to their next-door neighbors north and south, will find arresting the extent to which their own anticommunist hysteria managed to infect Canada, even if not in as virulent a form. Reg Whitaker tells that story quite well; and chapters by several others make it (sometimes pedantically) clear that the equal protection of the laws can be denied there on both provincial and national levels.

As for the United States, Athan Theoharis's chapter on the role of the FBI as an instrument of countersubversion offers little that's new. Readers of this book will surely know that J. Edgar Hoover's prurience was insatiable, and his contempt for democratic procedure and civil rights unlimited. In supplying us with some of the details of the FBI's reports on Eleanor Roosevelt's or John Fitzgerald Kennedy's "liaisons," the author comes close to inviting the readers' prurient interests.

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Yes, the FBI has sometimes ridden roughshod over the laws and the constitution of the United States. Yes, Hoover used the "Do-Not-File" and "Obscene File" procedures to keep official authority from discovering the FBI's misdeeds—and, indeed, he even had files routinely destroyed. But the only inference Theoharis draws from this recitation is that Canada, by more vigilant legislative oversight, should not emulate the Americans.

The American witch hunting virus also spread abroad—to Latin American countries all too willing, as Philippe Faucher and Kevin Fitzgibbons show, to find yet another "justification" for the state's oppression of its enemies. It spread to Western Europe too, and G. Grant Amyot's treatment of the Italian experience is quite apt on this score. But he misses the point that in Italy, too, and without benefit of countersubversion laws, members of the Communist Party were systematically excluded from occupations felt to be essential to the security of the state and of NATO as well. The United States would not have had it otherwise, and adherence to American pressures on this score served the political interests of the hegemonic Christian Democrats.

The authors share the conviction that in the West countersubversion policies were fundamentally aimed at the political Left in the interest of safeguarding the capitalist liberal democratic state. This may well be the case. However, it is jarring to have this volume conclude in a chapter by Stanley Barrett that Canada should seriously consider legislation that would single out the political Right for exactly the kind of treatment deplored in these pages. The fact that *this* form of countersubversion would be directed against "Fascists and racists" does not modify its essentially insidious and antidemocratic character.

One problem with the Left, as the environmental and human conditions of Eastern Europe now reveal, is that in its hands the state is willing and able to make the excesses of capitalism appear downright benign by comparison. It is a pity, therefore, that we find not a shred of synthesis that might have addressed such dilemmas and contradictions.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Canada and International Peace and Security: A Bibliography 1985–1989 *compiled by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. Ottawa, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990. 434 pp. $15.00 (Canadian).*

The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955 *edited by Peter G. Boyle. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1990. 247 pp. $24.95.*

City Government Finances: 1987–88 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 120 pp. $6.00.*

County Government Finances: 1987–1988 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 152 pp. $8.00.*

German History 1770–1866 *by James J. Sheehan. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 969 pp. $64.00.*

The Municipal Year Book 1990 *compiled by the International City Management Association. Washington, D.C., International City Management Association, 1990. 425 pp. $77.50.*

The National Party Chairmen and Committees: Factionalism at the Top *by Ralph M. Goldman. Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1990. 671 pp. $49.95.*

Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in Congress *by Larry Makinson. Washington, D.C., CQ, 1990. 1199 pp. $120.00.*

Presidential Approval: A Sourcebook *by George C. Edwards III with Alec M. Gallup. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. 214 pp. $35.00.*

Public Administration Desk Book *by James R. Coleman and Robert E. Dugan. Newton, Mass., Government Research Publications, Inc., 1990. 270 pp. $38.00.*

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The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag *edited by Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson, and Robert Gerald Livingston. Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1990. 603 pp. $42.50.*

The Urban Politics Dictionary *by John W. Smith and John S. Klemanski. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1990. 613 pp. Cloth, $59.00; paper, $35.00.*

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1. Title of publication: *Political Science Quarterly.* (a) Publication number: 437260.

2. Date of filing: 9 October 1990. 3. Frequency of issue: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. (a) Number of issues published annually: four. (b) Annual subscription price: individuals, $28.00; institutions, $50.00. 4. Location of office of publication: The Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, New York 10115-0012. 5. Location of the general business office: same as 4. 6. Name and address of publisher: same as 4; name and address of editor: Demetrios Caraley, same as 4; name and address of managing editor: Anne Newland, same as 4.

7. Owner: The Academy of Political Science (nonprofit corporation).

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(c) Total paid circulation	8,862	8,619
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Political Science Quarterly

Volume 105
1990

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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